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Essays on the Role of Firms’ Competition Culture in 
Finance: A Textual Analysis Based Approach 
 
Terry Anderson M. Harris 




In this thesis, we introduce a measure of firms’ competition culture based on a textual analysis 
of firms’ 10-K filings.  Using this measure, we study the relationship between competition culture 
and various phenomena in corporate finance for a large sample of US-based financial and 
nonfinancial firms.  The thesis is comprised of three main studies as follows. 
The first study develops a measure of firms’ competition culture and based on theory and our 
own reasoning validate the measure by relating it to other well-known indicators of firms’ 
competition culture.  Further, in this study, we argue and provide evidence that transient 
institutional ownership intensifies firms’ competition culture, while dedicated institutional 
ownership lessens it.  
In the second study, we argue that firms with greater levels of competition culture are more 
prone to meet/ beat analysts forecast and experience idiosyncratic stock price crashes.  In this vein, 
we provide direct evidence that those firms with higher competition culture are able to consistently 
beat analysts’ forecasts.  In addition, we present evidence that firms with more intensive 
competition culture are susceptible to firm-specific stock price crash risk.  Furthermore, we 
investigate whether firms’ competition culture is a channel through which institutional investors 
are able to affect crash risk.  In doing so, we document a positive relationship between competition 
culture and crash risk only among those firms with a high proportion of transient and a low 
proportion of dedicated institutional ownership.  What is more, we directly test and find evidence 
that supports the notion that firms’ competition culture partially mediates the relationship between 
the composition of firm’s dedicated and transient institutional ownership and firm-specific crash 
risk.   
Finally, we examine the effect of competition culture on bank lending and loan loss 
provisioning.  We find evidence that banks with greater levels of competition culture are generally 
more prone to engage in lending and loan loss provisioning activity.  However, we find that during 
the recent financial crisis banks with higher pre-crisis competition culture reduce lending more 
and have a more pronounced increase in loan loss provisioning during the crisis.  
The findings of this thesis have important policy implications since it signals that competition 
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Traditionally, researchers in finance have tended to adopt a rather negative attitude towards the 
role played by culture in explaining firms’ economic outcomes.  According to Zingales (2015) this 
view has been historically taken because of the perception that culture was a “shoddy” way of 
dealing with economic problems, with many mainstream researchers in finance considering 
cultural explanations as a “cop-out” used by those unwilling to or incapable of unearthing the 
“real” economic reasons for the observations that they make (Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; 
Zingales, 2015).  However, in recent years there has been increased acceptance of culture as a 
valid explanation for phenomena that are unexplained by traditional theories in finance and 
economics.  This has led to an increasing body of work that has documented the significant role 
played by culture, and in particular corporate culture, in explaining a variety of firms’ economic 
outcomes (see, for example, Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Cronqvist et al., 2007; Popadak, 
2013; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Callen and Fang, 2015; Thakor, 2015; Zingales, 2015; Barth, 
2016; Erhard et al., 2016; Grieser et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2017; Bhandari et al., 2017; Song 
and Thakor, 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018).  These studies suggest that firm attributes such as 
corporate culture detail the operating philosophy that guides the top management teams’ decision-
making and influences the economic and policy outcomes of firms.  To be sure, these works 
identify firms’ culture as an important corporate attribute that governs managerial decision-making 
and hence impacts firms’ performance and shareholder value creation (Quinn and Cameron, 1983; 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983).   
This thesis extends the recent literature on the role played by corporate culture by first 
introducing a measure of firms’ competition culture that is based on a textual analysis of 10-K 
filings.  To develop our measure we conceptualize firms’ corporate culture by adopting the 
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competing values framework (CVF), which suggests that there are four main cultural orientations 
that firms take; namely, competition, collaboration, control, and creation oriented cultures 
(Cameron et al., 2014).  Following this, we use our measure of firms’ competition culture to 
explore its plausible antecedents.  In particular, following recent studies aiming to contribute to 
our understanding of the influence of institutional investors’ preferences and interventions on 
firms’ corporate governance (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2015; Giannetti and Yu, 2016; McCahery et al., 
2016; Harford et al., 2017), we first use the measure to investigate whether the composition of the 
institutional investor base influences firms’ competition culture.  Following this, we explore how 
firms’ competition culture relates to meeting/ beating analysts’ expectations and their propensity 
to experience stock price crashes.  Additionally, using the measure of competition culture 
developed in this thesis, we consider the nature of the relationship between banks’ competition 
culture and bank lending and loan loss provisioning.  
The competition culture of a firm can be described as the combination of those firm attributes 
that focus on assimilating external information and responding to market conditions (Quinn and 
Cameron, 1983; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Hartnell et al., 2011).  Hence, the competition 
culture of a firm involves those value-creating practices and activities that entail an aggressive 
pursuit of competitiveness and achievement.  Consequently, increase profitability, the speed of 
action, driving through barriers to deliver results, and building competition-focused decision-
making, all typify firms with a competition culture (Cameron et al., 2014).  In that vein, such firms 
have a proclivity towards being aggressive and moving fast, while assessing success based on 
indicators such as increased profit margins.  Conversely, it is conceivable that a firm with greater 
levels of competition culture, which also faces increased pressure to perform from investors, make 
suboptimal investment decisions that can harm long-term shareholder value creation. 
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In this thesis, we follow the growing literature that applies textual analysis in finance-related 
research (see, for instance, Tetlock, 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2009; Hoberg and Phillips, 
2010, 2016; Li et al., 2013a; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kearney and Liu, 
2014), to develop a measure of competition culture using the textual information in firms’10-K 
filings for the period 19942014.  Based on the intuition that the words used by management in 
firms’ 10-K reports are reflective of the stated and latent values that they hold, we adopt this 
measurement approach as it provides an efficient way of capturing firms’ competition culture.  
What’s more, by exploiting a large corpus of archival data describing current and future operations 
of US-listed firms we are able to circumvent severe data limitations associated with the 
measurement of latent corporate characteristics (e.g. culture) that has plagued past studies (Guiso 
et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015).  We operationalize the measure by parsing 10-K filings 
to identify a set of lexical items relating to attributes that shape firms’ competition culture.   
We assess the validity of our measure by relating it to alternative indicators of firms’ 
competition culture (see Appendix A).  In doing so, we note that according to existing theory, 
firms with a competition culture should be more in tune with and responsive to the external market 
environment and be more aggressive in the pursuit of profitability (Quinn and Cameron, 1983; 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Hartnell et al., 2011).  Hence, one important indicator of firms with 
elevated levels of competition culture is high-profit margins (Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Cameron 
et al., 2014; Tremblay, 2016).  Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that the level of a firm’s 
competition culture will persist over time since it reflects the long-lived traits, practices, and 
attributes of the firm.  Thus, we take advantage of these premises to assess the validity of our 
measure by exploring its relation to these alternative indicators of firms’ competition culture 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Cameron et al., 2014; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014).  To consider these 
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ideas, we conduct univariate and multivariate analyses that control for industry and year effects, 
and annual transition matrices analyses and find strong evidence that our measure of competition 
culture is positively related to firms’ profit margins and an alternative text-based indicator of 
competition culture.  Further, we find that our measure of firms’ competition culture reflects the 
slow-moving behavior that is consistent with our expectations. 
Then, in the first study of this thesis, we use our measure of competition culture to consider the 
overarching question; “what is the influence of firms’ institutional investor base on competition 
culture?” as this question is intriguing in many aspects.  For instance, it can inform recent literature 
that documents strong links between institutional ownership and corporate outcomes such as 
earnings manipulation, R&D investments, M&As, and financing (see, for example, Gaspar et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2007; Elyasiani et al., 2010; Harford et al., 2017), as well as between institutional 
ownership and financial performance (see, for example, Gompers and Metric, 1998; Nofsinger and 
Sias, 1999; Cai and Zheng, 2004; Giannetti and Yu, 2016).  However, unlike the prior literature 
that remains rather silent on exactly how institutional investors affect corporate outcomes and 
performance, in this thesis, we advance firms’ competition culture as a channel through which 
institutional investors appear to influence corporate decision-making and outcomes.  This 
proposition is consistent with recent evidence documenting that institutional investors regularly 
engage with management and the board of directors in behind-the-scenes interventions that can 
shape corporate environment and objectives (Edmans, 2014, Bebchuk et al., 2015; Brav et al., 
2015; McCahery et al., 2016, among others), and that the composition of firms’ institutional 
investor base can create (or mitigate) implicit incentives for managers to over-allocate effort 
towards improving current performance, potentially at the expense of long-term firm value (e.g., 
Bushee, 1998; Dikolli et al., 2009).  Based on these arguments, institutional investors could, 
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therefore, influence firms’ competition culture so as to create an operating environment that is 
more likely to fulfill their own goals at the expense of other investors.  Thus, it is important to 
trace the effect of institutional investors on firms’ competition culture since it details the context 
in which organizational members’ prioritize activities that could deliver lucrative (or devastating) 
financial results to investors (O’Reilly et al., 1996; Hartnell et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, in the first study, we provide robust causal evidence that transient institutional 
ownership has a strong positive relation to firms’ one-year-ahead level of competition culture.  As 
transient institutional investors invest based on the likelihood of reaping short-term trading profits 
(Bushee, 1998, 2001), this evidence supports the notion that they intervene and exert pressure on 
managers to intensify firms’ competition culture, perhaps aiming for results-right-now and more 
immediate financial performance.  As such, we argue that this behavior is explained in part by the 
management of a firm with more transient institutional investors being more likely to succumb to 
such pressures under the threat that if these institutional investors become unhappy, then they will 
forcefully exit by selling shares, thereby suppressing the firm’s stock price (Bernardo and Welch, 
2004; Fos and Kahn, 2015).   
Conversely, we demonstrate that dedicated institutional ownership has a negative relation to 
firms’ one-year-ahead level of competition culture.  This evidence supports the notion that 
dedicated institutional investors also intervene and influence managers but instead to lessen firms’ 
competition culture, perhaps following their incentives to monitor and offset managerial myopia, 
and to assess performance by relying on information beyond the current period (Gaspar et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2017).  Correspondingly, this evidence suggests that the 
managers of firms with more dedicated institutional investors feel less pressure to consistently 
meet market expectations and therefore ease their aggressive pursuit of short-term performance 
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objectives as they are less concerned about large price drops that can be spurred by the exit-selling 
strategies of these investors.  This is reasonable since a large proportion of dedicated investors are 
in fact passive investors who simply invest in firms (directly or indirectly) based on an index.  
These investors are therefore usually unable or unwilling to directly sell specific firms that 
comprise the index.  As a result, managers at firms with more dedicated investors are increasingly 
less likely to be concerned about selling pressure initiated by initial signals of underperformance 
(Cella et al., 2013; Giannetti and Yu, 2016). 
In the second study of this thesis, we use our measure of competition culture to investigate the 
relation between it and a firm’s proclivity to meet and/or beat analysts’ earnings expectations and 
engage in bad news hoarding that increases crash risk.  In firms with more competition orientated 
corporate cultures, it is expected that managers face greater pressures, have financial incentives, 
among other career motives, to extend themselves to consistently meet and/or beat analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.  Furthermore, it is plausible that managers at such firms face pressures to 
intentionally conceal bad news and accelerate the disclosure of good news, hoping that poor 
current performance will be masked by stronger future performance (Kim and Zhang, 2011a, 
2011b, 2016).  However, such practices make firms vulnerable to adverse economic outcomes in 
the form of large idiosyncratic stock price declines, known as crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009; Callen 
and Fang, 2013, 2015; Andreou et al., 2016, 2017).  For firms with an intense competition culture, 
managerial incentives to conceal negative information regarding poor operating performance 
would be naturally heightened, since such firms need to consistently deliver superior financial 
performance as they inherently have a proclivity to cater to market expectations.  Thus, after 
controlling for known determinants of crash risk, we empirically test this proposition and show a 
strong positive relation between competition culture and one-year-ahead measures of crash risk.  
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Combining the result that transient institutional ownership intensifies firms’ competition culture 
with the evidence that competition culture heightens the propensity for crash risk, we postulate 
that competition culture might be a channel through which transient institutional ownership exerts 
direct intervention within firms to influence corporate policies and economic outcomes.  To 
investigate this, we conduct subsample analyses and mediation test using seemingly unrelated 
regressions and the results are consistent with our expectations.  Specifically, with regards to the 
subsample analysis, we find that the strong positive relation between competition culture and 
future crash risk is present only within the subsample of firms that is dominated by high levels of 
transient institutional ownership and low levels of dedicated institutional ownership.  Hence, 
consistent with the theoretical underpinnings in the CVF (see e.g. Cameron et al., 2014), the 
analysis shows that competition culture does not cause any adverse effects on shareholder value; 
rather, the striking result is that competition culture of a firm becomes harmful only when it is 
associated with a high proportion of transient and a low proportion of dedicated institutional 
ownership.  Further, the seemingly unrelated regression analyses are consistent with competition 
culture mediating the relation between our measures of institutional ownership and stock price 
crash risk.  By and large, these findings qualify institutional investors as key corporate governance 
agents which can (either curb or) exacerbate firms’ competition culture as their preferences and 
interventions can lead management to become highly susceptible to making suboptimal decisions 
and to prioritize activities that harm long-term firm value.   
Finally, in the third study, we use our measure to consider the role played by competition culture 
in explaining various corporate phenomena in US-based financial firms (from henceforth referred 
to as “banks”).  While the prior studies of this thesis have explored the effect of competition culture 
on organizational outcomes in nonfinancial firms, the importance of banks’ corporate culture in 
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explaining phenomena cannot be overstated given the importance of the banking industry to the 
overall economy.  This makes banking and interesting industry to study in its own right.  Without 
a doubt, banks play a central role in the sound functioning of the entire financial system, and of 
particular concern to bank regulators is whether and how excessive risk-taking by individual banks 
pose a threat to the financial system as a whole (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2010; Hanson, et al., 
2011).  In this vein, important undecided issues related to the extent to which banks’ competition 
culture mitigates or exacerbates incentives for bank lending and abnormal loan loss provisioning, 
particularly in crisis periods, and its effects on the overall stability of the financial system remain 
unaddressed.  Furthermore, banks present a special case for understanding the relation between 
competition culture and organizational outcomes such as earnings manipulation since banks’ 
specific accruals (e.g., loan loss provisions) can be more easily isolated and modeled.  As a result, 
we are motivated to consider the following research questions; “what is the relationship between 
banks’ competition culture and bank lending and loan loss provisioning?” and “how does banks’ 
pre-crisis competition culture relate to crisis period lending and loan loss provisioning?”. 
The results suggest that banks with greater competition culture are likely to engage in more 
lending and abnormal loan loss provisioning activity.  Additionally, we find that banks with high 
competition culture are likely to engage in more procyclical lending, as they exhibit a more 
pronounced reduction in lending activity during the recent crisis period, given their pre-crisis 
period levels of competition culture.  Further, we find that during the recent financial crisis, those 
banks with higher pre-crisis period levels of competition culture engage in more discretionary loan 
loss provisioning during the crisis. 
This thesis contributes to the literature as follows.  Firstly, the finding that the composition of 
institutional ownership base impacts managers’ operating philosophy and decision-making as 
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indicated by their firms’ competition culture, adds direct knowledge to our understanding of how 
institutional investors engage with managers in behind the scenes interventions that leave an 
indelible mark on firms’ culture.  As such, our findings complement other recent studies (e.g., 
Edmans, 2014; Bebchuk et al., 2015; Brav et al., 2015; McCahary et al., 2016) that endeavor to 
provide direct evidence of institutional investors’ preferences and actions on their portfolio firms. 
Second, it contributes to the settling of the on-going debate regarding the benefits and costs of 
institutional investors on corporate decision making (e.g., Massa et al., 2015; Giannetti and Yu, 
2016; Harford et al., 2017) by investigating the impact of transient and dedicated investors on 
firms’ competition culture, which inherently encapsulates the managers’ decision-making 
environment instead of simply relying only on corporate outcomes like R&D, dividends, 
investments, financial fraud, etc.  Finally, this thesis also contributes to the burgeoning literature 
that focuses on the impact of firms’ organizational values, norms and principles to policies and 
economic outcomes (see, for example, Loughran et al., 2009; Popadak, 2013; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 
2014; Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015; Callen and Fang, 2015; Erhard et al., 2016; 
Graham et al., 2017) by introducing competition culture as another organizational effectiveness 
factor that links to firms’ economic outcomes.  As it is frequently very hard to measure such 
intangible corporate characteristics, we show how to operationalize such an empirical construct 
using textual analysis of the 10-K reports for all firms with such reports in the SEC Edgar database.  
The thesis is presented as follows:  In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the literature 
surrounding the role played by corporate culture in finance.  In addition, we provide a synthesis of 
the relevant theoretical and empirical works that explore the relationship between corporate culture 
and various economic outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature that discusses the textual analysis approach and 
how this method has been adopted by researchers in finance.  Also, we highlight the main findings 
from works that used this approach and discuss whether and how it can be applied to measure 
corporate culture. 
Chapter 4 provides the first study of the thesis.  In this study, we develop a text-based measure 
of firms’ corporate culture based on the CVF.  Also, we provide direct evidence that firms’ 
institutional ownership structure influences the level of competition culture, thereby providing 
confirmation that firms’ institutional ownership structure is an important antecedent of corporate 
culture.  In particular, we show that transient institutional ownership intensifies competition 
culture, while dedicated institutional ownership reduces it. 
In Chapter 5, we use the measure to show that firms with higher competition culture are more 
likely to meet and/or beat analysts’ forecasts and engage in bad news hoarding that increases firms’ 
stock price crash risk, a phenomenon particularly observed among firms with a high proportion of 
transient and a low proportion of dedicated institutional ownership, and that is consistent with 
competition culture playing a mediating role in the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm specific stock price crash risk.  
Chapter 6 presents the final study of the thesis where we examine the effect of competition 
culture on bank lending and loan loss provisioning.  Consistent with expectations, we find evidence 
that banks with greater competition culture are generally more prone to engage in greater lending 
and loan loss provisioning activity.  However, we find that during the recent financial crisis banks 
with higher pre-crisis competition culture reduce lending more and have a more pronounced 
increase in loan loss provisioning, thereby feeding into a procyclical dynamic.   
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the findings, outlines the policy 










What is culture?  Culture is a broad and inherently complex concept that can be defined as those 
values, norms, customs, and beliefs held by particular societal groups (See e.g. Schein, 1990, 1992; 
Guiso et al., 2006; Zingales, 2015; Graham et al., 2017).  Put another way, culture can be said to 
represent the nexus of all implicit and explicit contracts that govern behavior and human 
interaction within societal groups (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2011).  With regards to the firm, 
culture can be defined as an intangible asset that is designed to meet unforeseen contingencies 
(Kreps, 1990).  Simply put, culture can be said to be “the way things get done around here” (Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982).  
In recent years, there has been increased acceptance of culture as a valid explanation for 
economic behavior in finance (Zingales, 2015).  This has been aided in part by the development 
of new tools, methods, and methodologies aimed at measuring and analyzing the effects of culture 
on various economic outcomes.  To be sure, researchers in finance now have various seamless 
approaches for incorporating culture into empirical studies (Guiso et al., 2006).  A central theme 
to all this is first the identification of a direct impact of culture or of a particular cultural orientation 
on the rational preferences and/or expectations of certain economic agents or groups.  Following 
this, the researcher must show that those preferences and/or expectations, in turn, have a 
predictable and measurable impact on economic outcomes.  Finally, the researcher must identify 
the cultural component of the said preference and expectation by instrumenting them with an 
appropriate measure of culture.   
It is widely accepted that a particular group’s culture reveals their preferences and expectations 
and that this is necessarily an important determinant of their behavior.  Clearly, this realization 
 
26 
makes culture a seemingly important construct for explaining economic outcomes in finance.  
Nevertheless, despite this and other arguments that point to an economic impact of culture and 
social norms (e.g., Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1972; Akerlof, 1980; Hofstede et al., 1990), in past 
decades scholars in finance and economics have with very few exceptions (see for example Kreps, 
1990), doggedly avoided investigations into the role played by culture when conducting research 
for mainstream consumption.   
The negative attitude towards culture traditionally adopted by many researchers in finance was 
in part due to the perceived notion that it was a “sloppy” way of dealing with economic problems 
in finance.  In fact, many have considered cultural explanations as a “cop-out” used by individuals 
unwilling or unable to discover the “true” economic reasons for the empirical results that they 
obtain (Zingales, 2015).  However, in recent years there has been increased acceptance of culture 
as a valid explanation for observed phenomena that are unexplained by traditional theories in 
finance and economics.  This has led to an increasing body of work that has documented the critical 
role of culture in explaining a wide array of economic outcomes and phenomena (see, for example, 
Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Gray, 1988; Hofstede et al., 1990; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Guiso et al., 2006, 
2008, 2009; 2015a, 2015b; Doupnik, 2008; Chui et al., 2010; Callen et al., 2011; Giannetti and 
Yafeh, 2012; Li et al., 2013b; Cameron et al. 2014; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Callen and Fang, 
2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2013; Popadak, 2013; Ahern et al., 2015; Eun et al., 2015; Zingales, 
2015; Erhard et al., 2016; Dang et al., 2017; Graham et al., 2017).  
In this chapter, we review the finance-related literature centered on the role played by corporate 
culture to answer economically meaningful research questions.  In particular, we focus on the 
various theoretical frameworks and taxonomies that can be used to describe a firm’s “culture” and 




2.2 Corporate Culture  
Previous finance and economics based works on corporate culture provide theoretical insights 
into the role that it plays within the organization.  For instance, Kreps (1990) motivates corporate 
culture as an important economic concept and develops a model in which corporate culture can be 
used as a “coordination” mechanism that is designed to meet unforeseen contingencies.  
Furthermore, Cremer (1993) views corporate culture as the shared knowledge of organizational 
members that is unavailable to outsiders.  Similarly, Hermalin (2001) models the choice of 
corporate culture as the decision between high fixed cost and low marginal cost (strong culture) 
and low fixed cost and high marginal cost (weak culture).  Meanwhile, Van den Steen (2010a, 
2010b) interprets corporate culture as being concerned with the shared values and beliefs that can 
reduce belief heterogeneity and disagreement among organizational members.  More recently, Lo 
(2016) introduced the “Adaptive Market Hypothesis” view of corporate culture, which suggests 
that firm’s culture represent the core traits of an organization that survive various evolutionary 
processes. 
In recent times, the increased data available on firms, managers and those charged with 
governance has made it possible to quantify various aspects of corporate culture and to use these 
measures to answer questions motivated by past theoretical work (Popadak, 2013; Fiordelisi and 
Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b; Graham et al., 2017).  In particular, these firm-level 
measures of culture have made it possible to address questions such as; “does corporate culture 
affect firms’ economic outcomes, and if so how?”.  Further, the thrust to explore the role of 
corporate culture is also explained by the fact that in corporations rational agents have a greater 
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ability to shape the distinct norms and preferences of the organization (Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Zingales, 2015).  This makes corporate culture a fertile ground to explore such design choices in 
relation to existing finance and economic theories.  What is more, at the corporate level there is 
greater data available with which to undertake large-scale studies and hence it should come as no 
surprise that researchers in finance are increasingly focusing on corporate culture.   
 
2.2.1 Taxonomies of Corporate Culture  
To study the role of corporate culture in finance, we first make use of the extensive body of 
work that has explored the broader concept that is organizational culture.  This approach makes 
sense since past decades have seen a number of theoretical frameworks for organizational culture 
proposed and developed by esteemed researchers of organizational behavior (see for example, 
Handy, 1976; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Reynolds, 1986; Johnson, 1988; Denison, 1990, O’Reilly 
et al., 1991; Schein, 1990, 1992; Hofstede, 1980, 2001, 2011; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Cameron 
et al., 2014).  Table 2.1 presents a summarized list of taxonomies and theoretical frameworks on 
organizational culture that have been developed in recent decades.  Furthermore, in recent years 
these taxonomies for organizational culture have provided researchers in finance, interested in 
pursuing questions related to the role of corporate culture, with broad overviews of the many 
variations that exist between the different conceptualizations of organizational culture that can 
manifest within firms.  Therefore, to get a better understanding of these notions of organizational 
culture and how they are reflected in the corporate form of business organization, we next consider 





2.2.1.1 Handy (1976) 
Early work by Handy (1976) provides a coherent framework for thinking about organizational 
culture.  Based on a scheme originally introduced by Harrison (1972) he links organizational 
structure to firm culture and identifies four distinct types of organizational culture; namely the 
power culture, role culture, task culture and person culture.  The power culture captures the degree 
to which tactical and strategic decision making authority within the organization is concentrated 
on a key central person or among a small group of individuals.  The role culture seeks to delegate 
decision making authority to individuals with defined functions and specialties within a highly 
defined organizational structure.  In the task culture, decision-making authority resides with a 
small collaborative team of individuals with varying expertise who collectively solve problems 
and execute tasks.  Finally, Handy identifies the person culture where the individual is the central 
focal point and thus they believe themselves to be set apart from the organization as a whole.   
 
2.2.1.2 Deal and Kennedy (1982) 
Another popular taxonomy for organizational culture that can be used to explore corporate 
culture was introduced by Deal and Kennedy (1982), who defined organizational culture as simply 
“the way things get done around here”.  In their work, Deal and Kennedy identify six interlocking 
cultural elements that help to define the firms’ culture.  These cultural elements are institution’s 
history, values and beliefs, rituals and ceremonies, stories, heroic figures, and cultural network.  
By examining these cultural elements across a variety of organizations they identify two factors 
that influence observed cultural patterns.  These factors are i) the degree of risk that accompanies 
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the organization’s activities, and ii) the speed at which organizations learn and provide feedback 
concerning whether particular actions and strategies are successful.  These two dimensions 
combine to define four types of organizational culture; namely, work-hard, play-hard culture, 
tough-guy, macho culture, process culture, and bet-the-company culture.  In the work-hard, play-
hard culture speed of action and speed of recreation all typify this culture.  Organizations with a 
work-hard, play-hard culture focus on swift learning and the delivery of rapid feedback to 
members as it relates to their performance; these members are encouraged to take low risk.   The 
tough-guy, macho culture also emphasizes rapid learning and feedback but encourages members 
to take on high degrees of risk.   In the process culture learning and feedback is slow and members 
take on low risk.   The bet-the-company culture also provides slow learning and feedback but 
members within organizations that have this culture are encouraged to take on higher levels of 
risk. 
 
2.2.1.3 Reynolds (1986) 
Reynolds (1986) argues that the various dimensions of culture introduced by previous 
researchers (for example, Handy, 1976; Deal and Kennedy, 1982) overlap.  Synthesising the past 
literature, he presents 14 independent dimensions of organizational culture.  These are external 
versus internal, task versus social, risk versus safety, conformity versus individuality, individual 
versus group rewards, individual versus collective decision making, centralized versus 
decentralized decision making, ad hockery versus planning, stability versus innovation, 
cooperation versus competition, simple versus complex organization, informal versus formalise 
procedures, high versus low loyalty, and ignorance versus knowledge of organizational 
expectations.   
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In the external versus internal emphasis domain, organizations with greater external emphasis 
are said to focus on satisfying customers and other external stakeholders, while those organizations 
with an internal emphasis concentrate on enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of internal 
activities.  The task versus social dimension measures the degree to which organizations view 
either task completion or meeting the social needs and desires of members/employees is more 
important.  In the risk versus safety dimension, how willing individuals in the organization are to 
accept and adapt to changing environments and ways of doing work is measured.  The conformity 
versus individuality domain measures the degree to which the members are forced to kowtow their 
distinctive behavior to the group.  The individual versus group rewards domain captures how the 
organization rewards all members whether as a group and/or individually based on their 
contribution.  The individual versus collective decision-making dimension measures the degree to 
which decisions are made by individuals or as a group.  The centralized versus decentralized 
decision-making dimension captures whether decisions are made by those in senior positions in 
the organization or by those with the day to day responsibility for the implementation of the 
decided course of action.  The ad hockery versus planning domain reveals the degree to which the 
organization develops in an unplanned manner or whether detailed plans are made.  The stability 
versus innovation dimension captures whether the organization is open to adopting new and unique 
goods, services, and processes.  The cooperation versus competition domain reflects the attitude 
of individuals in the institution towards internal competition with other members of the 
organization for rewards and status versus their attitude towards teamwork and collaboration to 
enhance the effectiveness of external competition with outsiders.  The simple versus complex 
organization dimension measures the degree of complexity of the internal political processes of 
the firm as well as the formal and informal structures of the organization.  The informal versus 
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formalize procedures domain reflects the tendency within the firm to have detailed rules and 
procedures for making decisions.  In the high versus low loyalty dimension, the degree of loyalty 
individuals have to the organization compared to other relevant groups is captured.  Finally, the 
ignorance versus knowledge of organizational expectations domain reveals the degree to which 
organizations communicate performance expectations to members and the level to which members 
are aware of these expectations and how they, in turn, contribute to the achievement of 
organizational goals. 
 
2.2.1.4 The Cultural Web 
The cultural web proposed by Johnson (1988) is another noteworthy organizational cultural 
framework that is useful for understanding corporate culture.  Their framework identifies a number 
of elements that describe and influence organizational culture. According to them, these elements 
may overlap to form the culture of the organization; and they point out that a greater level of 
cultural coherence among these elements is a likely source of competitive advantage.  The first 
element of culture that they identify is the organization’s paradigm; this cultural element describes 
what the institution is all about, what it does, its values, its mission, and its objectives.  Next, they 
describe the control systems of the organization as the processes that are put in place to monitor 
internal activities.  They also identify the organizational structures of the entity, which defines the 
internal reporting lines that describe the way that work flows through the organization.  Further, 
they identify the power structures of the entity as the degree to which individuals or groups of 
individuals make the decisions in the organization.  Symbols include the organizational logos and 
designs as well as those internal symbols of power.  The rituals and routines of the firm are those 
habitual organizational practices that occur as a matter of habit rather than necessity.  Finally, they 
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categorize the institution’s stories and myths as those narratives accumulated about people and 
events that communicate what is valued within the organization.   
 
2.2.1.5 Denison (1990) 
Similarly, Denison (1990) proposes a model of organizational culture that is useful for 
understanding how corporate culture manifests within businesses.  In particular, this model allows 
the culture of organizations to be defined broadly as being either externally or internally focused 
as well as being flexible or stable.  Further, this model suggests that organizational culture and 
organizational effectiveness can be described by four dimensions; namely, involvement, 
consistency, adaptability, and mission.  The involvement domain refers to the degree to which the 
organization is able to create a sense of ownership and responsibility.  This sense of ownership 
engenders greater levels of commitment to the institution.  The consistency dimension involves 
the relationship between aspects of organizational culture and organizational effectiveness.  In 
particular, this perspective emphasizes the positive impact that culture can have on effectiveness 
by reinforcing core values, engendering agreement, and promoting greater inter-functional 
coordination.  The adaptability domain refers to the system of norms and beliefs which support 
the capacity of an organization to receive, interpret, and translate signals from the environment to 
internal behaviors.  Finally, the mission dimension captures the degree to which there is a shared 




2.2.1.6 O’Reilly et al. (1991, 1996, 2012) 
O’Reilly et al. (1991, 1996, 2012) advance a model of organizational culture that has proved 
popular in the finance-related literature (See e.g., Popadak, 2013; Guiso et al., 2015; Grieser et al., 
2016).  First, based on the idea that an organization’s culture is distinguished by the values held 
and reinforced from inside, they propose the Organizational Cultural Profile (OCP).  Hence, this 
model of culture gauges organizational climate and measures the degree of compatibility between 
individuals and the organization i.e. the person-organizational fit.  They argue that this model can 
be used to identify the most efficient persons suited to join the institution. 
Then, consistent with the OCP, O’Reilly et al. (1991;1996, 2012) identify seven main 
components of organizational culture; namely, adaptability, defined as the willingness to 
experiment, take risk and innovate; collaboration, which denotes the attitude individuals within 
the organization have towards working with others; customer-orientation, this indicates the degree 
to which customers are listened to; detail-orientation, which refers to the attention paid to detail; 
integrity, this signifies the regard held for honesty and high ethical standards; results-orientation, 
denotes emphasis placed on performance; and transparency, refers to the degree to which the 
information concerning the organization’s goals and practices are shared freely with interested 
parties.   
 
2.2.1.7 Schein (1990, 1992) 
Yet another important framework for organizational culture was proposed by Schein (1990, 
1992), who identifies external adaptation and internal integration as the two main reasons why 
cultures develop within organizations.  In his work, he posits that external adaptation suggests that 
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cultures develop and are maintained because they help organizations to survive and do well.  Thus, 
if the organization’s culture is valuable and presents the potential for engendering sustained 
competitive advantages, then it is retained.  The other main explanation for the development of 
organizational culture, internal integration, is identified as a function since cohesive social 
structures are important for the existence of organizations.  According to Schein (1992), 
organizational practices are learned through socialization at work.  Further, the work environment 
serves to support the prevailing culture by encouraging members to adopt the pre-existing cultural 
values and norm.  In addition, he develops the dimensions of organizational culture and introduces 
three levels of the organizational culture; namely, artifacts, espoused values, and assumptions.   
At the artifact level, aspects of the organization’s culture are visible to those external to the 
institution.  These cultural factors may include the organization’s formal and informal 
infrastructures and the language used in the organization’s messages.  An organization may claim 
certain values, however, its infrastructure may serve to undermine those espoused values.  In this 
case, the artifacts show that the values held by organizational leaders have not been effectively 
shared or transmitted such that they affect the organization’s activities.  Furthermore, once the 
external environment changes the organization’s artifacts are the first level of culture to be 
affected.  In turn, changes to this outer level of organizational culture may gradually affect the 
deeper cultural levels—espoused values and assumptions.   
The espoused values of organizations represent the middle layer of the three levels of 
organizational culture posited by Schein (1992).  This level denotes the philosophies, goals, 
objectives, and strategies of the organization.  Also, the espoused values represent those unwritten 
norms and customs that members understand and follow self-consciously.  Those individuals not 
adhering to the espoused values of the group are made to feel ostracised.  The espoused values 
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themselves are comprised of the working environment and the leadership style.  The working 
environment reflects the nature of relationships in the organization.  In particular, it entails how 
supervisors relate to their subordinates, the relations between members, and how conflicts are 
managed, etc.  In contrast, the leadership style reflects the approach of the leader in the execution 
of the organization’s strategies in the achievement of organizational goals and objectives. 
Assumptions are the core values that are shared by members of the group but that are often 
imperceptible even to these members.  The core values take a long time to develop and are hard to 
remove once established.  The essence of the core values is conveyed by communicating their key 
facets into the espoused values and artifacts of the organization.  Hence, to determine the 
assumptions of an organization, it is important to identify the values that are comprehended and 
followed by members of the institution.  Further, these core values should not just be slogans or 
even the speech/ writings of the directors, but they are reflected in the other cultural levels of the 
organization.  Put another way, the core values manifest themselves as automatic reactions and 
unconscious perceptions and/or opinions of organizational members.   
 
2.2.1.8 Hofstede (2011) 
In yet another important work that presents a taxonomy of organizational culture, Hofstede 
(2011) introduces a framework that identifies six dimensions to describe organizational culture; 
namely, process-oriented versus results-oriented, job-oriented versus employee-oriented, 
professional versus parochial, open system versus closed system, tight versus loose control, and 
pragmatic versus normative dimensions.  A further discussion of these six dimensions follows; 
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The process-oriented versus results-oriented dimension is closely linked to the operational 
success of the organization.  Organizations with a process-oriented culture focus on the technical 
and bureaucratic aspects of how the work is done.  On the other hand, organizations that are results-
oriented are concerned with outcomes, where members are focused on what is to be done.  Process-
oriented and results-oriented organizations also differ with respect to the level of risk-taking.  In 
particular, process-oriented organizational cultures seek to avoid risk, while results-oriented 
cultures tend to take-on more risk in order to achieve the organization’s goals and objectives.  
In Hofstede’s (2011) organizational culture framework, the job-oriented versus employee-
oriented dimension relates to the operating philosophy of management.  In job-oriented 
organizational cultures, members are held responsible for their performance without much regard 
for their individual wellbeing.  In contrast, organizations with an employee-oriented culture take 
both performance and the welfare of individual members into consideration.  
The professional versus parochial domain relates to how members are perceived by others 
within the organization and how they view themselves.  In the professional culture, members are 
identified with their profession or job category/type.  Conversely, in institutions that adopt a 
parochial culture, members are identified with their various organizational subunits/ groups (i.e. 
departments, teams, and/or work units).  
The open system versus closed system dimension reveals the ease of access to information about 
the organization.  In particular, it reflects the internal and external communication style of the 
institution and how easily insiders and outsiders have access to information of particular interest.  
In an open system, information is accessible to both insiders and outsiders, while in a closed system 
this information is not as accessible to outsiders. 
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The tight control versus loose control cultural domain refers to the level of discipline exercised 
within the organization.  Specifically, this dimension is concerned with the amount of control 
exercised over organizational members in terms of the level of formality and punctuality expected 
of them.  In a tight control culture, organizational members are exposed more control and 
discipline, while in a loose control culture members are expected to be less formal.  
Hofstede’s (2011) pragmatic versus normative dimension is concerned with the external-
internal drive of the organization.  In a pragmatic culture, the organization is focused on satisfying 
the needs, wants and demands of end users (i.e. customers) without much regard for other 
organizational norms.  Thus, such institutions are said to be externally driven.  Conversely, in a 
normative culture, the organization is said to be more internally driven since they place greater 
emphasis on their internal processes, ethical and compliance issues. 
 
2.2.1.9 The Competing Values Framework  
The final taxonomy for organizational culture that we will discuss is the competing values 
framework (CVF).  Modeled by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983), Cameron and Quinn (2011), 
and Cameron et al. (2014), this organizational culture framework has been widely cited in the 
literature and has been used in a number of recent finance related studies to conceptualize firms’ 
organizational culture (see e.g., Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Thakor, 2015; Barth, 2016; Tremblay, 
2016; Bhandari, et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018).   
Like previous taxonomies (see for example Denison, 1990) this framework for organizational 
culture differentiates between those competing values and attitudes within the firm that focus on 
the external environment from those that focus on internal effectiveness—the external-internal 
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domain.  Further, it distinguishes between those organizational attributes that emphasize 
effectiveness criteria that focus on flexibility and discretion from those that are centered on 
stability and internal control—i.e. the flexibility-stability domain.  These two dimensions intersect 
to define four distinct types of orientations that comprise the CVF, namely the competition culture, 
creation culture, collaboration culture, and control culture.   
Organizations with the competition culture value the accomplishment of measurable and stretch 
goals.  These types of organizations place particular emphasis on finance-based and market-based 
goals and objectives such as enhanced financial performance and increased market share.  In such 
institutions, the relationship between members and the organization is contractual and members 
are individually held accountable for achieving a pre-agreed level of performance.  Furthermore, 
a spirit of competitiveness permeates throughout the organization.  The entity focuses on the 
external environment and the formal control orientation reflects stability. 
A creation culture is a cultural form that is characterized by high levels of creativity and risk-
taking behavior.  The members of such organizations are committed to being innovative and on 
being on the leading edge of whatever endeavor the group is pursuing.  This type of organization 
reacts rapidly to change and in fact, creates it via individual initiative and flexibility that promotes 
growth that is reinforced by rewards.  This type of organization focuses on providing new and 
unique products and/or services.  Thus, the organization focuses on the external environment and 
the formal control orientation is flexible. 
In organizations defined by the collaboration culture, traits such as loyalty, cooperation, and 
teamwork are all valued.  Organizations with this type of culture place greater emphasis on internal 
effectiveness, while allowing for a flexible form of control.  Members of such institutions exhibit 
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a commitment to others in the group and to the organization as a whole that is beyond their mere 
job descriptions.  In response to the long-term levels of commitment (i.e. loyalty) by members, the 
organization reciprocates with a long-term commitment to the members.  In organizations with the 
collaboration culture, there is a strong peer pressure to abide by the norms that are valued by the 
group.  Thus, normative pressures within the institution generate enhanced levels of the valued 
traits.  Further, in such organization success is assumed to depend on cooperation and teamwork, 
as well as concern for other people. 
Finally, organizations with the control culture value rules, hierarchy, ordered coordination, and 
standardized operating procedures that are clearly defined.  These types of organizations are 
concerned with long-term efficiency, predictability, and stability.  Thus, managers within a 
bureaucratic institution are organizers and are required to police the rules and procedures to ensure 
that they are enforced.  The tasks, responsibilities, and authority of all members are also clearly 
defined.  However, this type of culture can impede the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organization as it is likely to dampen flexibility.  The emphasis of attention of this organization is 
internal, and the formal control is stable.  
 
2.2.2 Implications of Corporate Culture for Finance  
Recent empirical works have documented the importance of corporate culture for the behavior 
of so-called “economic man” in organizations (see e.g. Cronqvist et al., 2007; Popadak, 2013; 
Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015; Callen and Fang, 
2015; Erhard et al., 2016; Grieser et al., 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017).  In much of this strand of 
literature, corporate culture is conceptualized as a type of intangible asset of the firm that is 
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designed to meet unforeseen contingencies (Kreps, 1990).  In this way, corporate culture is said to 
reflect those intrinsic and informal institutions of the firm that help to shape employee behaviors 
(Popadak, 2013; Graham et al., 2017).  Thus, using this and other related definitions of corporate 
culture, hitherto unaddressed questions such as; “does corporate culture matter?”, and “what is 
the role of corporate culture?” are increasingly being answered by mainstream researchers in 
finance despite these relationships being largely unaccounted for in traditional finance and 
economic theories.   
For instance, in an extensive and influential work, Graham et al. (2017) conduct a survey and 
interview-based analysis of 1,348 North American firms and use this information to investigate 
whether differences in firms’ corporate culture help to explain why otherwise similar firms 
experience divergence in terms of success and failure.  They find that half of the senior executives 
believe that corporate culture is a top-three driver of firm value and 92% believe that improving 
their culture would increase firm value.  Somewhat surprisingly, they find that a mere 16% of 
senior executives believe that their firm’s culture is where it should be.  Furthermore, they find 
that senior executives link firms’ corporate culture to ethical choices (e.g. compliance and short-
termism), innovation (e.g. creativity and taking the appropriate risk), and value creation (e.g. 
productivity and acquisition premia).  They assess these links within a framework that implies that 
cultural effectiveness depends on interactions between the corporate culture, which is theorized as 
an informal attribute of firms, and those formal institutions.  In doing so, they find evidence that 
firms’ corporate culture is as important as their stated values in achieving success. 
The drive to investigate culture in the corporate setting is explained in part because the 
corporation provides a unique environment within which to examine the role played by culture.  
This is so since corporations are in fact micro-societies that have the ability to actively shape 
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distinct norms, values, and preferences (Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015).  Thus, in this 
vein researchers in finance who study corporate culture often embed it within the broader literature 
that surrounds corporate institutions and theorise corporate culture as a type of informal institution 
that helps to shape employee behaviors and hence firm outcomes (e.g. Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Graham et al., 2017).  In this way, corporate culture is thought to be a fruitful area for research 
into the role of culture broadly since it is more likely to reflect the specific design choices of those 
economic agents who first instilled these informal arrangements.  Also, in the corporate setting, 
there is greater data availability, and this fact coupled with the increased precision of variables 
measured at firm level make corporate culture and important and rich area for research into the 
impact of culture.  In fact, recent results suggest that management and those charged with 
governance help to shape the corporate culture of the firm (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; 
Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Bushman et al., 2017); further, prior results reveal the corporate culture 
has implications for firm performance (Sørensen, 2002; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 
2015b; Mironov, 2015), firm value (Popadak, 2013; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Au et al., 
2018) earnings manipulation activity (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; 
Braguinsky and Mityakov, 2015; Davidson et al., 2015; Grieser et al., 2016; DeBacker et al., 2015; 
Liu, 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017), bank behavior (Bushman et al., 2017; Barth, 2017; Nguyen et 
al.,2018), and merger and acquisition activity (Tremblay, 2016; Bereskin et al., 2017). 
 
2.2.2.1 Performance  
Prior literature suggests that strong types of corporate cultures can improve firms’ performance 
since they can help to enhance internal consistency of management and staff behaviors (see e.g. 
(Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996).  Given this, 
 
43 
Sørensen (2002) explore the impact of having a strong corporate culture on the variability of firms’ 
performance.  Using a sample of firms from a broad variety of US industries, he hypothesizes and 
finds that firms with a strong corporate culture do indeed perform well during times of incremental 
change.  However, he finds that the relationship between corporate culture and firms’ performance 
is weaker in more volatile environments. 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) also consider the implications of corporate culture to firms’ 
performance by examining the role it plays in the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
turnover.  In particular, they examine the question; “what role does corporate culture play in the 
decision to fire a CEO after [a] poor performance?”.  To answer this question, they adopt the 
competing values framework of culture proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983), 
Cameron and Quinn, (2011), and Cameron et al., (2014).  They find that the probability of a CEO 
change is increased when firms exhibit greater levels of compete- and create- oriented corporate 
cultures.  Further, their results suggest that the negative relationship between firm-specific 
performance and CEO turnover is strengthened by the control culture and diminished by the create 
culture.  Finally, they observe that firms with a create culture are less likely to replace the CEO 
with an outsider as opposed to an internal promotion.  
Guiso et al. (2015b) consider whether and why certain dimensions of corporate culture are 
related to firms’ performance.  They find that firms’ declared values are irrelevant for predicting 
corporate outcomes; however, they note that when employees identify top managers as being more 
ethical and trustworthy (i.e. managers have more “integrity”) firms’ performance is indeed 
stronger.  In addition, they find that when employees perceive managers as having more integrity 
the attractiveness of job offerings is increased and the degree of unionization among employees is 
decreased.  Further, they explore how differences in firms’ corporate governance structures affect 
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the ability to sustain integrity as a corporate value.  They find that while traditional measures of 
corporate governance do not seem to have an effect, privately held firms are better able to sustain 
integrity compare to publicly listed companies.   
Also examining the role that corporate culture plays in relation to firms’ performance, Mironov 
(2015) explores the relationship between a culture of managerial corruption, as indicated by 
managements’ propensity to corrupt (PTC), and firm performance.  Using data on Moscow traffic 
violations, he constructs the PTC of every licensed driver in Moscow.  Assuming that some traffic 
violations were not recorded due to bribe-taking activity, Mironov constructs individual PTC by 
taking the difference between the expected and actual number of recorded traffic violations, given 
observed driver characteristics.  Following this, they determine the PTC for the top management 
of over 58,000 privately held firms and find that a one standard deviation increase in managements’ 
PTC corresponds to a 3.6% increase in income diversion among firms.  Interestingly, given the 
previous results of Guiso et al. (2015b), he finds that firms with more corrupt managers in fact 
significantly outperform their less corrupt counterparts.   
 
2.2.2.2 Firm Value  
Popadak (2013), using the O’Reilly et al., (1991, 1996, 2012) model of corporate culture, shows 
that corporate culture is an important channel through which shareholder governance is able to 
affect firm value.  In particular, she finds that greater shareholder governance significantly 
increases results-orientation but lessens customer-orientation, integrity, and collaboration.  
Furthermore, consistent with a positive link between shareholder governance and firm value, she 
finds that stronger shareholder governance increases tangible financial results in the short-term.  
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However, she finds that by focusing on the tangible aspects of firm’s performance, the firm’s 
intangible assets associated with customer satisfaction and employee integrity declines, and this 
partially reverses the gains from greater results-orientation.  She argues that these results are 
consistent with a model of multitasking where stronger governance encourages managers to focus 
on easy-to-observe short-term targets at the expense of the harder-to-measure intangibles, even 
though to do so is not in the long-run interest of the firm. 
More recently, Au et al. (2018) identify employee flexibility as an important dimension of 
corporate culture that leads to higher firm value.  Further, they note that this is particularly true for 
those firms that are exposed to high exogenous risk.  In particular, they estimate firms’ employee 
flexibility scores using a textual analysis of job reviews published by a career intelligence website 
for a sample of S&P1500 listed firms.  They find that firms with a strong employee flexibility 
score earn abnormally high stock returns.  Moreover, consistent with their hypothesis that firms 
with proactive and resilient employees respond best to unexpected situations, they find that the 
benefits of greater employee flexibility are concentrated on those firms with an elevated exposure 
to systematic risk and in periods of policy uncertainty.  Also, they find that firms with a culture of 
flexibility have higher gross profitability.  All told, their results suggest that a culture of employee 
flexibility is valuable but market participants do not fully value this intangible asset. 
 
2.2.2.3 Earnings Manipulation 
Considering the impact of firm’s culture on earnings manipulation, Benmelech and Frydman 
(2015) explore how the personal traits of CEOs can help to shape the corporate culture and the 
effect that this can have on firms’ propensity to commit financial fraud.  To achieve this, they take 
 
46 
advantage of exogenous variation in the propensity to serve in the military (see, for example, 
Angrist et al., 1990, 1991, 1998) and find that military service is associated with conservative 
corporate policies and ethical behavior.  In particular, they find that CEOs with military service 
pursue lower levels of corporate R&D investment and are less likely to be involved in fraudulent 
corporate activity.  Further, they find that firms which have Military CEOs have superior 
performance during industry downturns.  Taken together, their finding suggests that CEOs with 
military service are able to shape the corporate environment and firm outcomes. 
Furthermore, Biggerstaff et al. (2015) explore the ability of management to shape corporate 
culture and the implications that this can have on fraudulent activity by examining the culture of 
firms’ top executives and whether this affects corporate malfeasance.  To do this, they explore the 
relationship between those firm CEOs who personally benefit from options backdating (i.e. 
“suspect CEOs”) and various forms of corporate misbehavior and find that such CEOs are more 
likely to engage in financial fraud and to overstate earnings.  Thus, they argue that whether CEOs 
personally benefit from options backdating is suggestive of an unethical corporate culture.  Further, 
they find that private companies are more likely to be acquired by suspect CEOs and that this is 
possible in an effort to hide the frauds that such CEOs commit.  Also, they note that when suspect 
CEOs make acquisitions the market response is more muted.  They also find that the relation 
between suspect CEOs and corporate misbehavior is acuter for externally hired CEOs and this is 
consistent with outside CEOs having a greater ability to help shape firms’ corporate culture 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Importantly, they point out that the cost of such corporate 
misbehaviors is reflected in larger stock price declines/crashes during market corrections and 
increased CEO turnover rates. 
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Focusing on the implications of corporate culture to financial fraud, Braguinsky and Mityakov 
(2015) consider differences in corporate culture between multinational corporations and privately 
held domestic firms in Russia.  They note that firms from developed countries usually have a 
culture of transparency and that this is in contrast with firms from transition economies, such as 
Russia, where a culture of hiding and insider dealing persist.  To examine whether firms’ corporate 
culture of transparency affects firms’ proclivity to commit fraud, they make use of Russian 
administrative data on reported earnings and the market values of cars.  Based on the intuition that 
reported earnings can be more easily falsified relative to car values in Moscow, they measure 
transparency as the difference in employees reported earnings and car values.  Using this measure 
of transparency, they find that the employees’ earnings reported by foreign-owned firms are, on 
average, four times higher than those reported by domestic firms for employees with the same car 
values.  Further, they show that closer ties with multinational firms lead to increased wage 
reporting transparency by privately held Russian companies.  Also, they find a positive relationship 
between a corporate culture of transparency and increased hiring from multinational firms. 
Likewise, Davidson et al. (2015) examine the influence of corporate culture on financial 
reporting by considering how executives’ behavior external to the workplace is related to financial 
reporting risk.  In particular, they explore whether executives’ ownership of luxury goods, 
including expensive cars, boats, and real estate etc. (their “frugality”) and whether they have prior 
legal infractions predicts fraudulent activity and material mistakes in corporate reporting.  They 
find that CEOs and CFOs who have a legal record are more likely to engage in fraudulent reporting.  
However, they find no relation between executives’ frugality and their likelihood to engage in 
fraudulent corporate reporting.  Instead, they note that less frugal CEOs generally administer over 
a relatively weak internal control environment that is characterized by a comparatively high 
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likelihood of fraud being committed by others.  They also find that unintentional material reporting 
mistakes are also more likely when CEOs are less frugal.  Further, they find that cultural changes 
that are consistent with an increased risk of fraud are associated with less frugal CEOs. 
Moreover, DeBacker et al. (2015) explore how corporate cultural norms affect illicit corporate 
activities.  Using confidential U.S. data obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits 
and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, they find that 
foreign-owned/controlled U.S based firms are more likely to evade taxes when the owners are 
from countries that have higher levels of corruption norms.  They also note that this effect is more 
pronounced among smaller firms and is decreasing in firm size.  Furthermore, they find that 
enforcement efforts aimed at reducing tax evasion are less effective in corporations whose owners 
are from corrupt countries.   
What’s more, Liu (2016) considers the role played by corporate culture in influencing corporate 
misconduct.  Using a large sample of U.S. publicly listed firm-year observations, she examines 
whether a firm’s corruption culture influences corporate misbehavior.  To measure corruption 
culture, she adopts the epidemiological approach as described in Fernández (2011), where it is 
assumed that when individuals emigrate to a new country, their prior cultural values, norms, and 
beliefs travel with them and are passed down to their descendants (Guiso et al., 2015b).  Thus, 
corruption culture is proxied as the average corruption values for all insiders, where individuals’ 
corruption values are based on the corruption index in the insiders’ country of ancestry identified 
using their surnames (Lauderdale and Kestenbaum, 2000).  Using this measure, she finds that firms 
with high corruption culture are more likely to engage in earnings management, accounting fraud, 
option backdating, and opportunistic insider trading.  Further, she finds evidence that corruption 
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culture operates both as a selection mechanism and by having a direct effect on individual 
behavior.   
In a recent and thought-provoking paper, Grieser et al. (2016) explore the effects of firms’ 
culture on earnings manipulation by moving beyond the self-reported measures of integrity used 
in previous studies (see e.g., Guiso et al., 2015b), to a measure based on individual employee 
action.  Specifically, they use the frequency of employees’ decision to register for, and use, 
AshleyMadison.com, a website that facilitates extramarital affairs, as a measure of integrity.  They 
find that in those firms that score low on integrity, as their employees have a high number of active 
accounts with AshleyMadison.com, are associated with a greater probability of SEC enforcement 
actions for accounting misstatements, lower corporate ethics ratings by external analysts, and a 
greater propensity for tax-avoidance.  However, they also report that such firms also have higher 
research and development output, more patents and patent citations, and greater patent diversity, 
thereby suggesting a link between a lack of integrity and higher levels of creativity.  
Bhandari et al. (2017) examine the effect of firms’ corporate culture on earnings management 
practices.  To quantify culture they follow past studies (e.g., Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014) by 
adopting the competing values framework and implementing a textual analysis of firms’ 10-K 
filings for a large sample of US firms.  They measure firms’ earnings management practices using 
an accruals-based model of earnings management, real activities based model of earnings 
management, and the presence of a GAAP violation.  They find that firms with collaboration 
(competition) oriented corporate cultures are more (less) likely to manage earnings, while firms 
with the control culture are more prone to engage in real activities based earnings manipulation 
only.  Further, they find that auditors price the risk of culture-driven earnings manipulation since 
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firms with collaboration and control culture face on average higher audit fees, while firms with the 
competition culture face on average lower audit fees.   
 
2.2.2.4 Bank Behavior 
In a recent examination of the relevance of corporate culture to bank behavior, Barth (2016) 
utilize the competing values framework of corporate culture proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh 
(1981, 1983), Cameron and Quinn, (2011), and Cameron et al. (2014).  In particular, following the 
theoretical literature which suggests that corporate culture plays an important role in the sorting 
process of workers into firms (see e.g. Friebel and Giannetti, 2009; Van den Steen, 2010a, 2010b), 
he examines whether banks that differ in terms of their corporate culture also differ in terms of the 
compensation schemes that they deploy, plausibly in an effort to attract a particular type of staff.  
Consistent with this, he finds that at banks with a stronger competition culture CEOs’ total 
compensation have a larger proportion of variable elements.  Furthermore, investigating the impact 
of corporate culture on banks’ risk-taking and performance, he finds that banks with more 
competition culture are associated with higher levels of credit risk and higher buy-and-hold stock 
market return. 
Moreover, Bushman et al. (2017) explore the role of corporate culture in banking by considering 
whether and how bank CEO materialism influences bank culture.  In particular, they measure CEO 
materialism using a revealed preference approach similar to that previously adopted by Davidson 
et al., (2015) for non-financial firms which suggest that executives’ personal ownership of luxury 
goods can be viewed as a manifestation of relatively high materialism.  Consistent with the Upper 
Echelons Theory” (see Hambrick and Mason 1984), they expect these manifestations of CEO 
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materialism to have implications for the behavior of non-CEO executives.  Specifically, they 
examine the extent to which bank CEOs exert influence on the corporate cultures of banks by 
exploring how bank CEO materialism has evolved over time.  Further, they explore how bank 
CEO materialism is associated with observed risk management policies, the behavior of non-CEO 
executives and bank tail risk.  They find that the percentage of banks run by materialistic CEOs 
has increased during the 1994 to 2004 period and that this has coincided with a significant amount 
of deregulation in the banking industry.  Moreover, using an index that reflects the strength of 
Bank’s risk management functions (RMI), they find that RMI is significantly lower for banks with 
materialistic CEOs.  Additional, they provide evidence consistent with non-CEO executives in 
such banks being more aggressive in exploiting insider trading opportunities around government 
interventions during the financial crisis.  Finally, they find that banks with materialistic CEOs have 
considerably more downside tail risk compared to those banks with more frugal (i.e. less 
materialistic) CEOs and that the difference between downside tail risk for these two groups of 
banks increased significantly during the recent crisis.  
In a related study, Nguyen et al. (2018) explore the effect of banks’ corporate culture on bank 
lending decisions.  Using the CVF, they find that compete culture banks are associated with riskier 
lending behavior.  That is, these banks have higher approval rates, lower borrower quality, and 
fewer covenant requirements.  Further, these banks exhibit higher loan growth but incur larger 
loan losses.  As a result, they find that such banks make greater contributions to overall systemic 




2.2.2.5 Mergers and Acquisitions  
Recent papers in finance have also studied the impact of corporate culture on the likelihood and 
success of M&A activity.  For instance, Tremblay (2016) uses a textual analysis of firms’ annual 
reports to develop an estimate of the cultural similarity of combining firms.  In particular, she 
quantifies the dimensions of corporate culture by counting the frequency of words in a firm’s 10-
K filing that correspond to the competing values framework (Cameron et al., 2014).  Tremblay 
(2016) then measures the cultural similarity between two merging firms using the correspondence 
of these word counts.  Based on this measure, she finds that when the cultural distance between 
the firms is greater, this leads to higher synergistic gains post-merger, but only when the acquiring 
firm has a stronger culture than that of its target.  Further, she finds that the synergy gains are 
concentrated among deals where the acquirer’s values are not antagonistic to those of the target 
firm.   
Similarly, Bereskin et al. (2017) examine the effects of corporate cultural similarity on M&A 
decisions and outcomes.  They hypothesize that the similarity between two firms in terms of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices reflects cultural similarity between them and that 
this is positively related to the probability that such firms will form merger pairs, and that post-
merger performance will be superior.  They note that an essential feature of this hypothesis is that 
firms with analogous CSR behavior have similar corporate cultures and will experience less post-
merger integration challenges.  To measure CSR similarity they adopt a textual analysis based 
approach where they apply Jaffie’s (1986) distance measure for a given pair of firms’ CSR policies 
obtained from the KLD database.  Using this measure of firms’ CSR similarity, they find that firms 
with similar corporate culture are indeed more likely to merge.  Furthermore, consistent with the 
notion that cultural similarity eases post-deal integration, they find that these mergers are 
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associated with greater synergies, superior long-run operating performance, and fewer of write-
offs.  
 
2.3 Summary  
In this chapter, we define the term culture as a broad, inherently complex and intangible concept 
that reflects group values and decision-making environment.  In so doing, we introduce it as an 
important, economically valid and significant empirical construct, particularly at the corporate 
level, that is of increasing relevance and interest to researchers in finance and economics.  We then 
review a wide array of taxonomies for corporate (i.e. organizational) culture, where we focus on 
those better documented theoretical frameworks that have emerged in the rich organization 
behavior literature on the theme (see for example, Handy, 1976; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; 
Reynolds, 1986; Johnson, 1988; Denison, 1990, O’Reilly et al., 1991; Schein, 1990, 1992; 
Hofstede, 1980, 2001, 2011; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Cameron et al., 2014).   
Following this, we supplement our understanding of the implication of firms’ corporate culture 
by perusing and highlighting the key findings from the empirical finance related literature that 
documents the role of firms’ corporate culture as an important explanatory variable for explaining 
firms’ economic policies and outcomes.  And, as we have seen, this past literature suggests that 
corporate culture impacts firms’ level of performance (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 
2015a; Mironov 2015), firm value (Popadak, 2013; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Au et al., 
2018), earnings manipulation activity (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; 
Braguinsky and Mityakov, 2015; Davidson et al., 2015; DeBacker et al. 2015; Liu, 2016; Bhandari 
et al., 2017; Grieser et al., 2016), bank behavior (Bushman et al., 2017; Barth, 2017; Nguyen et 
 
54 
al.,2018), and merger and acquisition activity (Tremblay, 2016; Bereskin et al., 2017), among 
many other outcomes. 
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Table 2.1: Taxonomies of Corporate Culture 
This table presents a list of taxonomies and theoretical frameworks on organizational culture and hence corporate culture that have been developed 
in recent decades. 
Handy (1976) Power culture: This captures degree to which tactical and strategic decision making authority is held by a key central person or among a small group.   
Role culture: Organisations with this type of culture seek to delegate decision making authority to individuals with defined functions and specialties.   
Task culture: This indicated the degree to which decision-making authority resides with small collaborative teams with varying expertise who collectively 
solve problems and execute tasks. 
Person culture: In this cultural type, the individual is the central focal point and thus they believe themselves to be set apart from the organization.  
  
Deal and Kennedy 
(1982) 
Work-hard/ play-hard culture: Organizations with this culture focus on swift learning and rapid feedback to members as it relates to their performance; 
these members are encouraged to take low risk.    
Tough-guy/ macho culture: This type of culture emphasizes rapid learning and feedback but encourages members to take on high degrees of risk.    
Process culture: In this culture, learning and feedback is slow and members take on low risk.    
Bet-the-company culture: In this type of culture, members are encouraged to take on higher levels of risk but provides slow learning and feedback. 
 
Reynolds (1986) External versus internal domain: Organizations with greater external emphasis focus on satisfying customers and other external stakeholders, while those 
organizations with an internal emphasis concentrate on enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of internal activities.   
Task versus social domain: This dimension measures the degree to which organizations view either task completion or meeting the social needs and desires 
of members as more important.  
Risk versus safety domain: This domain captures how willing organizational members are to accept and adapt to changing environments and processes.   
Conformity versus individuality domain: This domain measures the degree to which the members or the organization are forced to conform to the group.   
Individual versus group rewards domain: This dimension captures whether the organization rewards members as a group and/or individually.   
Individual versus collective decision-making domain: This dimension measures the degree to which decisions are made by individuals or as a group.   
Centralized versus decentralized decision-making domain: This domain denotes whether decisions are made by those in senior positions in the organization 
or by those with the day to day responsibility.   
Ad hockery versus planning domain: This domain reveals the degree to which the organization develops in a highly planned or unplanned manner.  
Stability versus innovation domain: This captures whether the organization is open to adopting new and unique goods, services, and processes.   
Cooperation versus competition domain: This domain reflects the attitude of individuals towards internal competition with other members of the 
organization for rewards and status versus their attitude towards teamwork and collaboration.   
Simple versus complex organization domain: This dimension measures the degree of complexity of the internal political processes as well as the formal 
and informal structures of the organization.   
Informal versus formalize procedures domain: This reflects the tendency within the firm to have detailed rules and procedures for making decisions.   
High versus low loyalty domain: This captures the degree of loyalty individuals have to the organization compared to other relevant groups.   
Ignorance versus knowledge domain: This reveals the degree to which organizations communicate their performance expectations to members. 
 
Johnson (1988) Paradigm: This cultural element describes what the institution is all about, what it does, its values, its mission, and its objectives.   
Control systems: This element of organization culture captures the degree to which processes are put in place to monitor internal activities.  
Organizational structures: This defines the internal reporting lines that describe the way that work flows through the organization.  
Power structures: This is the degree to which individuals or groups of individuals make the decisions in the organization.   
Symbols: This includes the organizational logos and designs as well as those internal symbols of power.   
Rituals and routines: These are those habitual organizational practices that occur as a matter of habit rather than necessity.   
Stories and myths: This cultural element refers to those narratives accumulated about people and events that communicate what is valued.   
(continued on the next page)  
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Table 2.1 cont’d. 
Denison (1990) Involvement domain: This cultural domain refers to the degree to which the organization is able to create a sense of ownership and responsibility.   
Consistency domain: This dimension captures the relationship between aspects of organizational culture and organizational effectiveness.   
Adaptability domain: This domain refers to the capacity of an organization to respond to the external environment.   
Mission domain: This dimension captures the degree to which there is a shared purpose and direction for the organization and its members.  
 
O’Reilly et al. 
(1991, 1996, 2012) 
Adaptability: This type of organization culture defines the willingness to experiment, take risk and innovate.  
Collaboration: This culture denotes the attitude individuals within the organisation have towards working with others.  
Customer-orientation: this indicates the degree to which customers are listened to.  
Detail-orientation: This type of organizational culture refers to the attention paid to detail within the organization.  
Integrity: This organizational culture signifies the regard held for honesty and high ethical standards.  
Results-orientation: This culture denotes the emphasis placed on performance within the organization.  




Artifacts: These are those cultural elements that are visible to those external to the institution.   
Espoused values: These represent those unwritten norms and customs that members understand and follow self-consciously.   
Assumptions: These are those core values that are shared by members of the group but that are often imperceptible even to these members.   
 
Hofstede (2011) Process-oriented versus results-oriented: Organisations with a process-oriented culture seek to avoid risk and focus on the technical and bureaucratic 
aspects of how the work is done. On the other hand, organizations that are results-oriented take on more risk and focus on what is to be done.    
Job-oriented versus employee-oriented: In job-oriented organizational cultures, members are held responsible for their performance without much regard 
for their individual wellbeing. In contrast, organizations with an employee-oriented culture take both performance and the welfare of members.  
Professional versus parochial: In organizations with a professional culture, members are identified with their job category/type. Conversely, in institutions 
that adopt a parochial culture, members are identified with their various organizational subunits/ groups.  
Open system versus closed system: In an open system, information is accessible to both insiders and outsiders, while in a closed system this information is 
not as accessible to outsiders.  
Tight control versus loose control: In a tight control culture, organizational members are exposed more control and discipline, while in a loose control 
culture members are expected to be less formal.  
Pragmatic versus normative: In a pragmatic culture, the organization is externally driven and focuses on satisfying end users without much regard for 




Competition culture: Organisations with this type of culture value the accomplishment of measurable and stretch goals. Such entities focus on the external 
environment and the formal control orientation reflects stability.  
Creation culture: This type of cultural form is characterized by high levels of creativity, innovation and risk-taking behavior. Organization with this culture 
focus on the external environment and the formal control orientation is one of flexibility.  
Collaboration culture: Organisations with this type of culture place emphasis on internal effectiveness, while allowing for a flexible form of control. 
Members exhibit a commitment to the organization and other members of the group. The organization also has a long-term commitment to the members.    
Control culture: Organizations with this type of culture are concerned with long-term efficiency, predictability, and stability.  The emphasis of attention 




Chapter 3  Literature Review: What is Textual Analysis, 






3.1 Introduction  
The textual analysis approach also sometimes referred to as content analysis, computational 
linguistics, information retrieval, natural language processing etc., refers to the systematic and 
objective quantification of the semantic content contained in a body of text.  This notion of parsing 
text to discover patterns allows for the unearthing of valuable information in text and has a long 
history as it has been applied in many different contexts and disciplines.  For instance, in a recent 
comprehensive review on the topic, Loughan and McDonald (2016) note that in the 1300s Catholic 
priest used a form of textual analysis to provide indexes of common biblical phrases.  However, 
Loughan and McDonald (2016) point out that it wasn’t until the 1960s that textual analysis 
achieved wider popularity with Mosteller and Wallace’s (1964) reliance on it to determine the 
disputed authorship of the Federalist Papers.   
In the years since, the publication of a large corpus of unstructured textual information that is 
available online in news articles, conference calls, Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings, and text generated by social media outlets like Twitter and Facebook, coupled with 
significant increases in computational power and the accuracy of statistical parsing techniques has 
led to researchers in finance and related fields exploring whether textual analysis can be used to 
extract valuable information from these sources (see for example, Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Das 
and Chen, 2007; Tetlock, 2007; Li, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Loughran and McDonald, 2009, 
2011, 2016; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016, Li et al., 2013a; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Hoberg 
et al., 2014; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Audi et al., 2016; Bushman et al., 2016).   
Of particular importance to researchers in finance is whether the corporate disclosures provide 
economically meaningful information.  A relationship between the textual content of firms’ 
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corporate disclosures and firms’ economic outcomes is plausible since it is likely that information 
contained in such documents provide insights into managements’ operating philosophies, societal 
norms, design and characteristics, incentives, and private information sets, which in turn guide the 
data generation process which creates the financial numbers.  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
the textual information provided in corporate disclosures offers an important context for 
interpreting the financial data produced, and can be used to answer important research questions, 
and test economically interesting hypotheses.   
To be sure, the transmission of firm-specific qualitative information to the public is of 
paramount importance for the efficiency of stock markets (Li and Ramesh, 2009; Li, 2010a; 
Feldman et al., 2010), firm’s information environment (Kothari et al., 2009) and the behavior of 
investors and financial analysts (Miller, 2010; Lehavy et al., 2011).  Textual disclosures do not 
only affect how investors react to and trade on the obtained information, but also reveal particular 
managerial characteristics (Li, 2010a, 2011), various management incentives (Simon, 1997) and 
firm’s behavior in a potentially litigious environment (Nelson and Pritchard, 2007).  Hence, 
understanding the short- and long-run value of the firm through the prism of corporate disclosures 
among other pieces of firm-related text is of broad interest both to academics and practitioners and 
has become possible due to the technological breakthrough of textual analysis techniques.  
However, to date, the application of textual analysis to analyze firm’s corporate disclosures 
remains an emerging area in the finance literature.  In the subsequent sections, we discuss the main 




3.2 Textual Analysis Techniques and Applications  
In this section, we discuss the techniques that are designed to extract relevant information 
content from a body of text and explore how these tools have been applied.  Generally, textual 
analysis can be thought of as a three-step process that involves i) collecting text data, ii) preparing 
and cleaning text data, and analyzing text data.  During the collecting phase, the researcher collates 
the necessary text data on firms from one or more of a varied range of sources (e.g. corporate 
disclosures, Twitter, web forms etc.).  After collecting the text data, which is unstructured in 
nature, the researcher pre-processes the text.  This may involve converting words into lower case 
so that capitalisation is ignored, removing (or replacing) any URLs embedded in the document to 
ensure that the analysis is not biased due to web addresses, removing (or replacing) all non–words 
and punctuations, and trimming to a single space all white spaces (e.g. tabs and newlines).  Finally, 
during the analysis phase, the researcher further processes the data using a variety of techniques 
to derive information from the body of text.  Broadly speaking, such techniques can be divided 
into two approaches; namely, lexicon-based approaches and statistical learning approaches.  Table 
3.1 presents a summary of the textual analysis techniques discussed in this chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Lexicon Based Approaches  
3.2.1.1 Readability  
Lexicon-based approaches rely on the direct use of the words contained in a body of text.  One 
such methodology makes use of the quantity and complexity of these words to examine the ease 
with which an investor can read and understand the corporate disclosures.  In so doing, these 
methods seek to quantify the readability of firms’ corporate disclosures using an algorithm that 
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produces a score based on the quantity and complexity of the words in each sentence in the text 
(see e.g. Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2014; Bonsall IV et al., 2017).  Researchers document 
that firms with reports that are difficult to read tend to exhibit higher stock volatility, analyst 
dispersion, and earnings surprises.  These implications are more likely to reflect the complexity of 
a firm’s business. 
Li (2008) introduces to finance the first well-known measure of readability for 10-K reports; 
namely, the “Fog Index”.  This index is based on the average sentence length and the percentage 
of complex words (i.e. words with more than two syllables).  They show that firms with difficult-
to-read reports exhibit lower documented earnings.  Following Li (2008), a large number of studies 
exploit the Fog Index and link it with capital investment efficiency (Biddle et al., 2009), small 
investors’ trading behavior (Miller, 2010), retail investors’ ownership (Lawrence, 2013), analyst 
coverage and dispersion (Lehavy et al., 2011).   
However, the recent study of Loughran and McDonald (2014) identify a number of weaknesses 
of the Fog Index and propose a new easy to construct and intuitive measure of readability.  In 
particular, they point out that the number of complex words and sentence length are negatively 
related to each other; hence, the Fog Index is likely to be misspecified.  Furthermore, the definition 
of complex words used by Li (2008) is more likely to reflect the industry-specific component 
rather than the complexity of 10-K reports.  For example, such words as “financial, company, 
operations, and management” can be easily digested by investors and do not reflect difficult-to-
interpret information in business documents.  Hence, as an easy to replicate and straightforward 
proxy for readability, Loughran and McDonald (2014) introduce the natural logarithm of gross 10-
K file size and show that it can serve as a good proxy.   
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Another measure of readability for financial reports was recently proposed by Bonsall IV et al. 
(2017).  Particularly, they posit the “Bog Index”, which consists of three multifaceted components 
i) average sentence length scaled by standard long sentence limit of 35 words, ii) plain English 
style problems (frequent use of passive and hidden verbs, overwriting, legal terms, clichés) along 
with word difficulty (heavy words, specialist terms), and iii) good writing attribute (frequent usage 
of names and interesting words).  The important finding of the paper is that among all readability 
measures, the Bog Index has the strongest effect on post-10-K filing stock volatility.   
 
3.2.1.2 Dictionary Methods 
Dictionary methods seek to reduce the dimensionality of a body of text by assuming that the 
order and sequence of words, as well as the context of sentences, carry no meaningful information.  
Such methods are typically termed “bag-of-words” approaches and consist of parsing the texts into 
vectors of words and word counts and the construction of a “term-document matrix”. 
Using the “term-document matrix”, a “mapping” algorithm is applied which allocates the words 
into different categories based on specifically-developed word lists.  Finally, following the 
literature on information retrieval, a term weighting scheme is routinely used to scale the raw word 
counts since these are likely to be strongly related to document length.  Further, such term 
weighting schemes also account for the word frequency by putting less weight on commonly 




3.2.1.2.1 Target Words  
The collection and processing of certain words in the text constitute one of the most 
parsimonious and powerful approaches to textual analysis.  The advantage of this approach is its 
simplicity and lower likelihood of extracting a misspecified proxy for a certain firm characteristic.  
For instance, Li et al., (2013a) derive a measure of firms’ product market competition from 10-K 
reports by counting the number of occurrences of “competition”, “competitor”, “competitive”, 
“compete”, “competing” and then scaling this count by the total number of words in the 10-K 
filings.   
 
3.2.1.2.2 Dictionaries and Word Lists 
A collection of words with similar sentiment, tone and/or meaning is typically called a 
“dictionary”, “word lists” or “lexicons”.  Put another way, a dictionary is an array of words with 
common characteristics and interpretations that are intentionally created to determine a certain 
attribute of the report.  The lexicon methodology is applied to the “term-document” matrix when 
counting the number of words pertaining to a certain lexicon category (e.g. words with positive, 
negative or neutral meaning) relative to the total number of words in the document.  This approach 
allows the researcher to gauge the tone and sentiment of a financial document, with, for example, 
higher proportion of positive words in the filing associated with a more optimistic tone of the 
report.  The dictionary approach has several advantageous properties including the applicability to 
large samples, easy replicability by other researchers; however, it is clear that the success of any 
dictionary-based procedure in extracting the meaning from the text critically depends on the 
selected dictionary (Li, 2010a; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
 
64 
The most frequently used dictionaries in finance for textual analysis are the Henry (2008) word 
list, the Harvard General Inquirer dictionaries, the Diction word list, and the Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) word list.  These dictionaries contain subcategories of words that share common 
thematic sentiments such as optimism, pessimism, uncertainty, constraints, pleasure, emotion or 
pain.  In the following sections, we will discuss each of these dictionaries, which are frequently 
used in finance to analyze the tone and sentiment of a body of text.   
 
3.2.1.2.2.1 The Harvard General Inquirer 
The most popular set of dictionaries that have been widely used by researchers in finance due 
to their rich thematic vocabulary in multiple subcategories and availability are the Harvard General 
Inquirer line of dictionaries.  Tetlock (2007), in arguably one of the more innovative papers in this 
area, use the Harvard IV-4’s (Harvard Psychological Dictionary) positive and negative lexicon 
categories to examine the prospective impact on the stock market of negative and positive words 
found in the “Abreast of the Market” Wall Street Journal (WSJ) column.  Specifically, in this 
study, Tetlock finds that when journalistic pessimism is high, this relates to both lower subsequent 
stock price returns and higher stock market volatility in later periods.  What is more, he observes 
that the pressure on stock prices is not as a result of the “Abreast of the Market” WSJ column 
revealing new value relevant information; however, he suggests that the “Abreast of the Market” 
WSJ column is nevertheless a good proxy for investor sentiment.  Following Tetlock’s (2007) 
seminal work, a number of papers use the Harvard IV-4 dictionary among other word lists to 
measure the sentiment and tone of corporate disclosures, news articles, and other pieces of 
communication (see for example, Tetlock et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2009, 2011, 2016; Hanley and Hoberg, 2010; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016; 
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Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Da et al., 2015; Heston 
and Sinha, 2015).   
For instance, using the Harvard IV-4 dictionary’s word categories, Tetlock et al. (2008) conduct 
a textual analysis on news stories for several listed S&P 500 firms that appear in WSJ and Dow 
Jones News Service.  In this work, they find that a greater frequency of negative words in firm-
specific news is associated with lower earnings in subsequent periods even after controlling for 
other well-known determinants of earnings such as prior period financial data and analyst 
forecasts.  Likewise, Kothari et al. (2009) rely on the Harvard IV-4 dictionary’s negative and 
positive word lists to analyze the information content of disclosures made by firms, analysts, and 
various media outlets.  They find that the tone of such content is related to both the volatility of 
stock returns and analyst forecast error dispersion.  In particular, they find that a more positive 
tone in such disclosures is associated with lower stock return volatility and analyst forecast error 
dispersion.  Conversely, they find that when the tone of news content in such disclosures is 
negative, then this is associated with significantly higher stock return volatility and analyst forecast 
error dispersion.   
Furthermore, Hanley and Hoberg (2010) use the Harvard IV-4 dictionary’s negative and 
positive word categories to explore the impact on future stock price returns of the tone of the initial 
prospectus form (Form S-1) for a large sample of initial public offerings (IPOs).  They find that 
the tone of this form impacts stock price returns on the first day of trading.  Specifically, they 
locate in the “Risk Factors” section of the initial prospectus form, a link between firms with an 
increasingly positive score on their net tone measure, computed as the percentage of positive tone 
words minus the percentage of negative tone words, and lower stock price returns on the first day.  
Furthermore, they find a positive relationship between this measure of net tone and smaller 
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changes in the offer price revision.  Their finding suggests that investors, likely reassured that 
managers and underwriters face strict legal penalties for material misstatements when making 
IPOs, take a favorable view of the content contained in the initial prospectus form, and in particular 
the Risk Factors section, when the tone of such disclosure is positive. 
Da et al. (2015) use the Harvard IV-4 dictionary (and the Lasswell Value Dictionary) to 
construct their Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index.  They argue 
that the FEARS index is able to capture investor sentiment.  They operationalize the FEARS index 
by collating the volume of queries documented by Google Trends that relate to the Harvard IV-4 
dictionary words that are indicative of economic sentiment.  They find the FEARS index is able to 
predict short-term return reversal, temporary increases in stock price volatility, and mutual fund 
outflows from mutual funds to bonds and other safe havens.   
Similarly, Heston and Sinha (2015) adopt the Harvard IV-4 dictionary’s negative and positive 
word classifications to examine the effect of the sentiment of news articles published by Thomson-
Reuters and stock price returns.  Using a sample of more than 900,000 articles, they find that a 
higher score on their net tone measure, calculated as positive tone words frequencies minus 
negative tone words frequencies, relates to high stock price returns for the specific firms mentioned 
in such articles for up to one to two days after the article has been published.  On the other hand, 
they find that firms with greater negative sentiment news articles experience lower short-term 
stock price returns. 
The use of the Harvard IV-4 dictionary’s negative and positive word classification to detect 
sentiment and tone in finance-related research is not without its critics.  Some researchers suggest 
that more accurate general word lists are appropriate when seeking to capture the tone of a 
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document (see for example Rogers et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2012).  Further, some (see for example 
Li, 2010a; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) suggest that the Harvard IV-4 dictionary word list is 
not appropriate in the context of textual analysis applied to documents related to financial 
information since this word list was not designed to deal with this specialized subject area.  In 
particular, Loughran and McDonald (2011) argue that the Harvard IV-4 word list misclassifies as 
negative words such as “cost”, “depreciation”, and “liability”.  Furthermore, researchers find that 
about 75% of negative words according to the Harvard dictionary classification are typically not 
negative in the case of financial disclosures.  For example, words such as “mine, cancer, tire or 
capital” tend to describe industry-specific characteristics of the firm rather than indicate a negative 
tone, as suggested by the Harvard list, whereas such words as “felony, litigation, misstatement or 
unanticipated”, which are clearly associated with negative sentiment, are missing in the Harvard 
IV-4 lexicon.  Testing whether the proposed word classification categories indeed capture the tone 
of 10-K reports, Loughran and McDonald (2011) document strong relations between the 
constructed word lists and next-day stock returns, trading volume, return volatility, and earnings 
surprises.  For instance, portfolio sorts based on the frequency of Harvard IV-4 negative words in 
10-K filings do not generate a significant predictability for 10-K filing returns, whereas using the 
suggested financial negative word list to rank firms produces a strong return pattern. 
As a result, word list other than the Harvard IV-4 dictionary have been developed and used in 
finance research to assess the sentiment or tone of news releases, corporate disclosures, and other 
pieces of communication pertaining to the firm (Rogers et al., 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 




3.2.1.2.2.2 The Diction Word List 
In a critique of the Harvard IV-4 word list based approach to measuring the sentiment of 
financial documents, Rogers et al. (2011) suggest that the Diction Optimism and Pessimism (“the 
Diction”) word list, although not created with financial text in mind, nevertheless allows for a more 
suitable measure of tone in firms’ corporate releases.  In their paper, Rogers et al. (2011) rely on 
this word list to study the relationship between net tone and the likelihood of shareholder litigation.  
They find that firms with higher positive net tone (i.e. more optimism), measured as the percentage 
of Diction optimism words minus the percentage of Diction pessimism words, in their earnings 
announcements experience an increased likelihood of subsequent shareholders litigation action.   
Similarly, Davis et al. (2012) use the Diction Optimism and Pessimism word list to explore the 
relationship between firms’ earnings announcements and performance as measured by return on 
assets (ROA) in subsequent quarters.  They find that firms with a more positive net tone in earnings 
releases achieve significantly higher subsequent ROA.   
What is more, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) complement the prior studies of Rogers et al. 
(2011) and Davis et al. (2012) and find an association between the net tone (using the Diction word 
list) of the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of firm’s 10-K and ROA in 
subsequent periods.  In particular, they find that the more negative (i.e. more pessimistic) this 
section of a firm’s 10-K is, the poorer ROA results are for the firm. 
As with the use of the Harvard IV-4 dictionary word list, several authors in finance criticize the 
practice of using the Diction Optimism and Pessimism word list to measure tone since this list has 
not been developed to specifically deal with financial information (Li, 2010a; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 2015).  Loughran and McDonald (2011) suggest that 
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in fact some Diction word list positive (optimism) words, for example “necessary”, “power”, and 
“trust” do not usually have a positive connotation in financial disclosures, while words that are 
classified as negative (pessimism), such as “gross”, “no”, and “not”, do not typically have negative 
meanings in financial releases.  These authors (among others) call for the use of finance specific 
word lists when undertaking a textual analysis of finance-related disclosures.    
 
3.2.1.2.2.3 The Henry (2008) Word List 
Perhaps the earliest example of a word list specifically developed to detect tone in financial 
disclosures is the Henry (2008) word list.  In particular, Henry (2008) develops her financial 
dictionary for words classification in earnings press releases for high-tech industries.  Since its 
introduction, this word list has been shown to provide valuable insight into managerial sentiment 
particularly during conference calls.  For instance, Price et al. (2012) find that when presenters 
adopt a more positive tone in the question-and-answer segments of the conference calls, then such 
firms exhibit significantly higher stock price returns during both three-day and two-month 
windows.  On the other hand, Price et al. (2012) find that when presenters adopt a more negative 
tone during this segment, such firms suffer negative abnormal stock price returns.  Similarly, 
Doran et al. (2012) utilize the Henry (2008) word lists to study the effect of the tone of earnings 
conference calls for Real Estate Investment Trusts on stock price returns.  Like Price et al. (2012), 
they find that the tone of earnings conference calls is related to stock price returns and that this is 
so even during the conference call when they control for earnings surprises. 
However, despite being more appropriate for finance related studies, Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) note several limitations of the use of the Henry (2008) word lists to detect sentiment and 
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tone.  For instance, this word list consists of 85 words compared to the over 4,100 words that make 
up the Harvard IV-4 dictionary and Loughran and McDonald raise this limited number of words 
as a potential shortcoming.  They further point out that Henry’s (2008) word list ignores commonly 
occurring negative words in financial disclosures, such as “adverse”, “impairment”, and “loss”.   
 
3.2.1.2.2.4 The Loughran and McDonald (2011) Word List 
As an alternative to both the Harvard VI-4, Diction and Henry (2008) word lists, Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) develop what they argue is a more comprehensive taxonomy of words to capture 
the sentiment in financial disclosures and other pieces of corporate communication.  In the 
Loughran and McDonald (LM) word list, in addition to the main “positive” and “negative” word 
classifications, Loughran and McDonald also create additional word classes, namely, 
“uncertainty”, “litigious”, “strong modal” and “weak modal” words.  To produce these tonal 
classes, Loughran and McDonald (2011) develop a dictionary of words from all 10-Ks filed during 
1994 to 2008.  After carefully examining all words occurring in at least 5% of the documents they 
classify each word according to its most likely usage and sentiment in a financial context.  As such, 
those words classified as “negative” are indicative of some adverse financial implication.  
Conversely, “positive” words are those that carry a favorable connotation in business.  Those 
words classified as “uncertainty” are indicative of imprecision and/or risk, while those that reflect 
the potential for legal contestation are denoted as “litigious”.  Those words that express either 
strong or weak levels of confidence are classified as strong modal and weak modal words.1  The 
LM word list was then used by them to evidence a relationship between managerial sentiments 
                                                 
1 In later work, Bodnaruk et al. (2015) adopt a similar methodology to that used in Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
and propose “constraining” words, which are those words that suggest some financial constraint, for inclusion in the 
Loughran and McDonald word list. 
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detected in firms’ 10-K reports and market reaction around the 10-K filing date, trading volume, 
unexpected returns, and subsequent stock price volatility. 
Since its release, the LM word list has seen widespread acceptance and application in a range 
of finance and accounting related research (Feldman et al., 2010; Dougal et al., 2012; Garcia 2013; 
Solomon et al., 2014; Kearney and Liu 2014; Chen et al., 2017).  For example, Feldman et al. 
(2010) use the LM word list to explore market reaction to changes in the sentiment and tone of the 
Management, Discussion, and Analysis (the “MD&A”) section of firm’s 10-K/Q filings.  They 
find that even after controlling for known determinants of stock price changes, when the tone of 
the MD&A section of 10-K/Qs is more positive a firm’s stock price return is higher immediately 
after the 10-K/Q release.   
Similarly, Dougal et al. (2012), expanding on the work of Tetlock (2007), use the LM word list 
to consider the relationship between the authorship of the WSJ’s “Abreast of the Market” column 
and stock market reaction.  They find that individual journalists who are associated with more 
pessimistic column tone are related directly to more negative stock market returns on the day 
following the column’s publication.   
The LM word list has also been applied to uncover the tone of news releases beyond the WSJ’s 
“Abreast of the Market” column.  For instance, Garcia (2013) use it to measure the sentiment of 
two columns in the New York Times (NYT) for the period 1905–2005.  He finds that the tone of 
these columns predict future stock price returns and that this is especially true during recessionary 
periods.  Similarly, Chen et al. (2017) use the LM word list to explore the link between stock price 
returns and the tone of the commentary section of the Seeking Alpha (SA) website.  They find that 
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the tone of opinions contained in the SA commentary is related to future stock price returns and 
subsequent earnings surprises.   
In works reminiscent of Hanley and Hoberg (2010), Ferris et al. (2013) and Loughran and 
McDonald (2013) both use the LM word list to explore the impact of the tone in IPO prospectus 
releases.  Ferris et al. (2013) investigate the impact of IPO prospectus “conservatism” on IPO 
pricing and subsequent operating performance and stock price returns, where they define 
conservatism as the proportion of negative LM words to the total words contained in the 
documents.  In this work, they find that IPO prospectus conservatism is positively related to IPO 
under-pricing and that this is more pronounced for technology firms.  Further, they find that when 
nontechnology IPO prospectuses are more conservative, this has a negative impact on firm’s post-
IPO operating performance.  In addition, they find evidence that for nontechnology firms’ IPOs 
conservatism is negatively related to abnormal stock price returns in the post-IPO period.   
In this same direction, Loughran and McDonald (2013) used the LM word list to investigate the 
relation between IPO prospectus “uncertainty” and firms’ first-day returns, offer price revisions, 
and aftermarket volatility.  They proxy uncertainty as the document frequencies of weak modal 
and negative words and using this measure find that when firms’ IPOs prospectuses have high 
levels of uncertainty in the text, such firms tend to experience greater first-day returns.  They also 
find a positive relationship between text uncertainty and absolute offer price revisions and 
subsequent volatility. 
Further consideration of investors’ reaction to news tone is provided by Solomon et al. (2014), 
who use the LM word list to explore the relation between newspaper sentiment and investors’ 
proclivity to invest in particular funds.  They find that when funds receive newspaper coverage 
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that is more positive in tone this results in them receiving higher capital inflows.  In a similar 
fashion, Hillert et al. (2014) use the LM word lists to measure the tone of mutual fund letters to 
shareholders and find that they are responsive to the tone of these letters.     
What is more, Ahern and Sosyura (2014) use the LM word list to explore whether the tone of 
firm press releases can affect stock prices of acquiring firms during merger negotiations.  They 
find that some bidders try to increase the value of their stock prices during the private negotiation 
phase by making press releases.  In particular, they note that press releases by bidders can result 
in increased media coverage that is, in fact, more positive in tone and this in turn slightly increases 
the bidder’s stock price.  These findings have motivated additional research activity into whether 
and how managers’ tone can inform or mislead investors by the tone of the language used in press 
releases (see, for example, Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012; Huang et al., 2014b). 
 
3.2.1.2.3 Term Weighting Schemes  
The development of tailored dictionaries, that become suitable for financial documents, makes 
the word classification process easier, faster and more transparent.  However, once the words are 
classified into different thematic subcategories, it is crucial to impose a proper normalization on 
the word counts.  Loughran and McDonald (2011) demonstrate that the attenuation bias caused by 
misclassifications can be considerably reduced by applying a term weighting scheme to word 
occurrences.  More specifically, as shown by Loughran and McDonald (2011), some negative 
words appear very frequently in 10-K reports (e.g. “loss” appears 179,000 times), while the word 
“aggravates” appears only 10 times.  Term weighting helps to dampen the effect of high-frequency 
words on sentiment measurement and put more weight on rare but important words in 10-K filings.  
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Researchers exploit a log transformation of the word count and adjust the document for its length.  
This weighting scheme takes into account the relevance of a term in a document, the document 
length and significance of a term in the entire corpus.  In this case, the log transformation of raw 
word count and average word count in the document mitigate the effect of high-frequency words, 
whereas the log difference between the total number of 10-Ks in the sample and the number of 
documents with at least one occurrence of a term changes the effect of a word based on its 
commonality. 
In summary, the dictionary-based approach has proved a very popular technique for textual 
analysis in finance; however, one noted limitation is that such approaches tend to ignore the context 
of the document.  Furthermore, such word-lists have been criticized for frequently misclassifying 
words due to the limited availability of thematic dictionaries for corporate statements (Li, 2010a).   
 
3.2.2 Statistical Learning Approaches  
In this section, we discuss alternative techniques for textual analysis by focusing on statistical 
and machine learning approaches such as Naïve Bayes (Antweiler and Frank, 2004) and semantic 
analysis (Boukus and Rosenberg, 2006; Blei et al., 2003) that classify a message based on the 
grammatical structure of the language.  Compared to lexicon approaches, these statistical 
methodologies extract the relevant information content from a document by learning the latent 
structure in the text data.  For instance, when applied to sentiment analysis, algorithms undertake 
in-sample training to “learn” grammar dependent classification rules and then define the positive, 
negative or neutral tone of the out-of-sample message by examining the distance between 
word/phrase and grammar vectors that capture these tones, or a discriminant function based on 
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word counts (Das and Chen, 2007).  In the following subsections, we will provide a brief 
description of various statistical methods for analyzing text.  
 
3.2.2.1 Naïve Bayes 
According to Huang et al. (2014a), Naïve Bayes classification is a statistical learning method 
that can be used to categorize text documents into their most likely class based on a statistical 
relation (i.e. model), that is based on words and category relations that is learned from a training 
sample of text documents.  The algorithm is called naïve since it ignores the word sequence and 
treats each word independently.  Hence, like the dictionary-based approaches this method 
disregards the grammatical structure of the document; however, it enables the researcher to process 
huge volumes of qualitative data, accurately measure the context of documents through training 
the Naïve Bayes learning algorithms, and classify the entire document and or sentences into 
positive, negative or neutral categories.  In particular, this procedure can be considered as a 
prediction algorithm since it maximizes the probability that a message belongs to a certain category 
or type conditional on the stream of words in the document. 
The input parameters in this algorithm, the likelihood of word occurrences conditional on the 
particular category, are obtained through training on an initial dataset, which usually represents a 
limited number of randomly selected sentences from financial reports.  As a result of this in-sample 
learning, the Naïve Bayes model is developed and is then used to classify out-of-sample sentences 
in reports as either negative, positive or neutral.   
In an early and important study that asks the question “does message tone matter?”, Antweiler 
and Frank (2004) apply Naïve Bayes to explore the influence of “Yahoo Finance” message boards 
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postings for companies listed on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Dow).  In particular, they use 
this approach to classify tone of the posted messages.  They find that these financial messages do 
indeed matter and they can predict the volatility of the index as a small degree of negative return 
predictability is generated by bullishness, while disagreement among messages generates higher 
trading activity.  
Another important study in this area by Huang et al. (2014a) exploit the Naïve Bayes learning 
approach to measure the sentiment from more than 350,000 analyst reports.  In fact, their training 
procedure processed about 27 million sentences from analyst reports.  The findings from this large-
scale study illustrate that even a few positive sentences make a significant impact on the earnings 
growth rate of a company. 
 
3.2.2.2 Semantic Analysis 
Another method for classifying the content of documents into certain thematic groups, which 
is free of using any lexicon is semantic analysis.  This approach is specifically designed to define 
the themes within a corpus of reports by reducing the dimensionality of the term-document matrix 
through the assignment of each word to latent factors.  The most frequently used techniques for 
semantic analysis are latent semantic indexing, which reduces the dimension of the term-document 
matrix using singular value decomposition (SVD), and latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), that 
utilizes a Bayesian model with a variety of latent topics. 
In particular, latent semantic analysis reduces the dimension of the “term-document” matrix 
using singular value decomposition.  Applying a latent semantic analysis, Boukus and Rosenberg 
(2006) investigate market reaction to Federal Reserve policy as reflected in the Federal Open 
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Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes.  They show that themes, derived from the minutes, 
are correlated with current and future macroeconomic and financial indicators, with, for instance, 
FOMC minutes strongly affecting Treasury yields.   
Similarly, latent Dirichlet allocation aims to discern the latent structure from the array of 
documents by applying the Bayesian model to shrink the dimensionality of the “term-document” 
matrix.  This procedure helps to analyze a large corpus of lengthy documents in a clear and 
replicable manner and infer the content of documents with multiple topics.  The recent study by 
Dyer et al. (2017) examine the changing content of 10-K filings and demonstrates that these reports 
become more lengthy, redundant, sticky, less readable and specific.  Bellstam et al. (2017) propose 
a new measure of text-based innovation by applying a topic modeling tool such as latent Dirichlet 
allocation to the large corpus of financial reports and capture innovation by the intensity with 
which analysts mention innovation topics in the reports.  The paper finds that this proxy for 
innovation is strongly related to R&D expenditures and forecasts future R&D spending. 
 
3.2.2.3 Similarity Analysis 
There also exist tools that aim to measure the semantic similarity across documents.  For 
example, Hoberg and Phillips (2016) establish new time-varying measures of product similarity 
based on firms’ 10-K product descriptions.  In particular, Hoberg and Phillips (2016) construct 
proxies of product similarity across firms using 10-K product descriptions and cosine similarity 
measure.  To explore the relatedness between firms, researchers collect unique words in 10-K 
business descriptions that specify the characteristics of firm’s products and estimate pair-wise 
word similarity scores for each pair of companies within a year.  These researchers document that 
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a higher firm’s expenditure on R&D is associated with a significant decrease in measures of 
product similarity and a substantial increase in future profitability. 
Similarly, Cohen et al., (2016) propose the use of various measures of document similarity to 
capture the effect of active changes in firm’s reports on asset prices.  Specifically, Cohen et al. 
(2016), using the history of 10-K and 10-Q reports over the period from 1995-2014, examine the 
changes in the language structure of corporate reports across time by applying four commonly 
used similarity measures; namely, cosine similarity, Jaccard similarity, minimum edit distance and 
simple similarity.  The essence of these measures lies in converting two documents into vectors of 
word counts (or a number of occurrences of a certain term) and exploiting various geometrical 
formulas for measuring the closeness of two vectors.  This paper finds a strong return predictability 
pattern stemming from firms that change significantly their reporting style. Particularly, a portfolio 
that buys “non-changers” and short “changers” generate a monthly abnormal return of 30-60 basis 
points. 
 
3.3 Can Textual Analysis be used to Measure Corporate Culture? 
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, corporate culture remains a difficult to observe and measure 
force within firms that explains variations in firms’ performance and other corporate behavior.  In 
fact, one reason often given for the limited empirical research that concerns the role of corporate 
culture has been the absence of large-scale samples with high-quality data about this construct 
(Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b; Graham et al., 2017).  Traditionally, 
corporate culture has been measured using various survey instruments that seek to capture 
managements’ and /or employees’ perceptions and opinions about the firm (Guiso et al., 2015a, 
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Graham et al., 2017).  This approach for detecting corporate culture is a commonly used research 
strategy as it allows for easy comparisons and the appearance of authoritativeness (Saunders et al., 
2016).   
For instance, Graham et al. (2017) conduct a survey and interview-based analysis of 1,348 
North American firms to investigate the question, “does corporate culture matter?”, and use this 
information to consider whether differences in corporate culture explains why similar firms 
experience divergence in terms of success and failure.  However, although the survey designs 
adopted by Graham et al. (2017) allows researchers to capture corporate culture from a relatively 
large cross-section of respondents, in practice this approach is limited due to the response 
availability of survey participants and the costs of administering questionnaires on a large scale.  
Further, sampling and non-sampling errors pose a challenge to the accuracy of the results.  What 
is more, disadvantages stemming from the social interaction of the researcher and the respondents 
and the potential inaccuracy of responses all remain potential sources of errors for survey research 
designs.  
In addition to survey-based methods, the textual analysis of firms’ corporate disclosures and 
other documents has emerged as an increasingly popular approach to quantify various aspects of 
corporate culture (Popadak, 2013; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Barth, 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017; 
Nguyen et al., 2018).  This is because, unlike the survey approach, this method to quantifying 
firms’ corporate culture is more practical for large-scale research studies as it allows for the 
measurement of the key dimensions of the construct in a manageable and objective way using 
firms’ archival documents.  Furthermore, given the large increase in the number of corporate 
disclosures and other related documents in recent years, it should come as no surprise that this has 
led to researchers in finance leveraging tools developed in computer science and linguistics to 
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parse the words contained in these documents to unearth firm features and traits.  In doing so, 
researchers actively adopt the assumption that the expressions and words chosen by management 
in producing firms’ disclosures are representative of firms’ culture that has been developed.  Thus, 
the finance-related literature on corporate culture has begun to make increasing use of various 
textual analysis techniques in order to understand how a firm’s culture relates to various economic 
phenomena.   
For instance, Popadak (2013) applies a textual analysis approach to an original dataset 
consisting of over 1.8 million employee reviews to quantify corporate culture based on the 
O’Reilly et al. (1991, 1996, 2012) model.  Similarly, Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) utilize the textual 
analysis method to measure corporate culture from firms’ readily available corporate reports (i.e. 
the 10-K filings).  In doing this, Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) adopt the competing values framework 
of culture. 
In fact, the ease and extendibility of the approach taken by Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) have 
seen their textual analysis based approach to quantifying culture become increasingly popular with 
researchers in finance.  For example, Barth (2016) and Nguyen et al. (2018) utilize this method to 
explore the role played by corporate culture in banks, while Bhandari et al. (2017) adopt a similar 
textual analysis approach to examine the impact of firms’ corporate culture on earnings 
management practices. 
Hence, given the previous studies (Popadak, 2013; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Barth, 2016; 
Bhandari et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018), it seems reasonable to suggest that a textual analysis 
of certain firm related documents represents a suitable approach to measuring corporate culture; 
however, it should also be mentioned that this approach to capturing corporate culture has also 
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been criticized.  For example, Guiso et al (2015b) shed some doubt on whether firms stated values, 
such as those contained in firms’ disclosures, should be used to measure firms’ corporate culture 
as they find that firms’ stated values are in fact not indicative of corporate culture.   
Furthermore, the finding that firms’ proclaimed values should be viewed with suspicion is also 
supported by the prior work of Loughran et al. (2009) who investigate the occurrence of ethics-
related terms in firms’ 10-K reports and find that firms that use more ethics-related terms in these 
reports are more likely to have an unethical corporate culture.  That is, these firms are more prone 
to be the subject of class action lawsuits, and are expected to have inadequate corporate 
governance policies (e.g. entrenched managers).  Their results suggest that managers who portray 
their firm as being more “ethical” in 10-K reports are in fact more likely to be systematically 
misleading the public.  
Nevertheless, despite these limitations in this thesis we adopt a textual analysis based approach 
to quantify firm’s competition culture as we maintain, consistent with past literature (see e.g. 
Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Barth, 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018) that the textual 
analysis of firm’s 10-K filings represents an efficient way of capturing the latent (and proclaimed) 
values of management.  Furthermore, this method allows us to exploit a large corpus of archival 
data that are available for firms and thereby overcome the severe data limitation problem that 





3.4 Summary  
In summary, textual analysis has recently been proven to be a valuable tool in finance to 
measure relevant information from various texts (see e.g. Antweiler and Murray, 2004; Tetlock, 
2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Hoberg and Hanley, 2010; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Li, 2008; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Audi et al., 2016).  Further, we have 
discussed the relevance of this approach for quantifying corporate culture and although it remains 
questionable as to whether corporate culture is best measured using this approach, it seems 
reasonable since the words used by the management of a firm and the meanings that they carry 
should reflect the values that these individuals have developed over time.  Therefore, by analyzing 
the corporate disclosures produced by the firm, we argue that we are able to detect the elusive but 
distinctive features of firms’ corporate culture that are reflected in such documents.
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Table 3.1: Textual Analysis Techniques 
This table presents a summary of selected textual analysis techniques that are designed to extract the relevant information content from a body of 
text and explore. 
Lexicon Based Approaches: These approaches rely on the direct use of the words contained in a body of text. 
 Readability: When measuring readability the quantity and complexity of the words used are to examine to gauge the ease with which a reader (i.e. investor) can read 
and understand the corporate disclosures. 
o Li (2008) introduces the first well-known measure of readability for 10-K reports; namely, the “Fog Index”.   
o Loughran and McDonald (2014) propose the use of the natural logarithm of gross 10-K file size and show that it can serve as a good proxy of readability.   
o Bonsall IV et al. (2017) posit the “Bog Index” as a new more accurate measure on readability.  
 Dictionary Methods: These approaches seek to reduce the dimensionality of a body of text by assuming that the order and sequence of words, as well as the context of 
sentences, carry no meaningful information. These methods are typically termed “bag-of-words” approaches 
o Target Words: The collection and processing of certain words in the text constitute one of the most parsimonious and powerful approaches to textual analysis.  
o Dictionaries and Word Lists: A collection of words with similar sentiment, tone and/or meaning is typically called a “dictionary”, “word lists” or “lexicons”.  
Hence, this approach entails the use of an array of words with common characteristics and interpretations that are intentionally created to determine a certain 
attribute of the report.  
o The most frequently used dictionaries in finance for textual analysis are the Henry’s (2008) word list, the Harvard’s General Inquirer dictionaries, the Diction 
word list, and the Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) word list. These dictionaries contain subcategories of words that share common thematic sentiments such 
as optimism, pessimism, uncertainty, constraints, pleasure, emotion or pain.  In the following sections, we will discuss each of these dictionaries, which are 
frequently used in finance to analyze the tone and sentiment of a body of text.  
Statistical Learning Approaches: Compared to lexicon approaches, statistical methodologies extract the relevant information content from a document by learning the latent 
structure in the text data.   
 Naïve Bayes: According to Huang et al. (2014a), Naïve Bayes classification is a statistical learning method that can be used to categorize text documents into their most 
likely class based on a statistical relation, i.e. model, that is based on words and category relations that is learned from a training sample of text documents. The algorithm 
is called naïve since it ignores the word sequence and treats each word independently.  Hence, like the dictionary-based approaches this method disregards the 
grammatical structure of the document; however, it enables the researcher to process huge volumes of qualitative data, accurately measure the context of documents 
through training the Naïve Bayes learning algorithms and classifying the entire document and or sentences into positive, negative or neutral categories. In particular, 
this procedure can be considered as a prediction algorithm since it maximizes the probability that a message belongs to a certain category or type conditional on the 
stream of words in the document 
 Semantic Analysis: This approach is specifically designed to define the themes within a corpus of reports by reducing the dimensionality of the term-document matrix 
through the assignment of each word to latent factors. The most frequently used techniques for semantic analysis are latent semantic indexing, which reduces the 
dimension of the term-document matrix using singular value decomposition (SVD), and latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), that utilizes a Bayesian model. 
 Similarity Analysis: This approach measures the semantic similarity across documents. For example, Hoberg and Phillips (2016) establish new time-varying measures 
of product similarity based on firms’ 10-K product descriptions. In particular, Hoberg and Phillips (2016) construct proxies of product similarity across firms using 10-
K product descriptions and cosine similarity measure. Similarly, Cohen et al., (2016) propose the use of various measures of document similarity to capture the effect 
of active changes in firm’s reports on asset prices. Specifically, Cohen et al. (2016), using the history of 10-K and 10-Q reports over the period from 1995-2014, 
examining the changes in the language structure of corporate reports across time by applying four commonly used similarity measures; namely, cosine similarity, Jaccard 
similarity, minimum edit distance and simple similarity.  
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In recent decades, a growing literature has emphasized the importance of corporate culture for 
influencing a firms economic outcomes (see, for example, Cronqvist et al., 2007; Popadak, 2013; 
Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015; Callen and Fang, 
2015; Erhard et al., 2016; Grieser et al., 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017).  However, very little work 
has explored the antecedence of firms’ corporate culture and in this chapter, we extend the existing 
literature in this direction by investigating whether the composition of the institutional investor 
base influences corporate competition culture.  To do this, we utilize textual analysis of 10-K 
filings to develop a measure of corporate competition culture using the competing values 
framework of corporate culture (e.g., Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983).  In 
so doing, we also follow recent studies that aim to contribute to the understanding of institutional 
investors’ preferences and interventions on firms’ governance (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2015; 
Giannetti and Yu, 2016; McCahery et al., 2016; Harford et al., 2017). 
The competing values framework emerged from studies of the factors that account for highly 
effective organizational performance and has been named as one of the 40 most important 
frameworks in the history of business (Ten Have et al., 2003).  This framework (Quinn and 
Cameron, 1983; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Hartnell et al., 2011; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; 
Cameron et al., 2014) theorizes the competition culture of a firm to be a concatenation of attributes 
that focus on achieving superior financial performance by assimilating external information and 
catering to capital market expectations.  The competition culture of a firm indicates its aggressive 
and the forceful pursuit of profitability.  Hence, speed of action to achieve results characterize 
firms with a competition culture (Cameron et al., 2014).  In that vein, such firms have a proclivity 
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towards being aggressive and moving fast, while assessing success based on indicators such as 
increased profitability.   
Following the growing literature that applies textual analysis in finance research (see, for 
instance, Tetlock, 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2009; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016; Li et 
al., 2013a; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kearney and Liu, 2014), we develop a measure for corporate 
competition culture using information in the 10-K filings for the period 19942014.  We adopt 
this measurement approach as it provides an efficient way of measuring firms’ competition culture 
by exploiting a large corpus of archival data that describe the current and future operations of US-
listed firms.  Further, by relying on the information environment portrayed in the 10-K filings 
creates a leeway to circumvent severe data limitation problems that are associated with the 
measurement of latent corporate characteristics, like the competition culture considered in this 
chapter.  We operationalize our measure by parsing 10-K filings to identify a set of lexical items 
relating to attributes that shape firms’ competition culture.  In particular, we focus on attributes 
that feature firms’ external effectiveness to pursue enhanced competitiveness, emphasized 
organizational achievements, setting of goals and being aggressive, growth in profitability, 
superior financial performance, etc.  For instance, it is sensible to expect firms using in their 10-K 
filings a relatively high frequency of words pertaining to “achievement”, “aggressive”, “compete”, 
“goal”, “profits”, and “performance”, among others, to be highly driven by corporate attributes 
geared towards the competition culture.   
Having developed our text-based measure, we consider the overarching question; “what is the 
influence of a firm’s institutional investor base on its competition culture?”, as this question is 
intriguing in many aspects.  For instance, it can inform recent literature that documents strong links 
between institutional ownership and organizational outcomes such as earnings manipulation, R&D 
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investments, M&As, and financing (see, for example, Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; 
Elyasiani et al., 2010; Harford et al., 2017), as well as between institutional ownership and 
financial performance (see, for example, Gompers and Metric, 1998; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; 
Cai and Zheng, 2004; Giannetti and Yu, 2016).  However, unlike the prior literature that remains 
rather silent on exactly how institutional investors affect corporate outcomes and performance, we 
advance firms’ competition culture as a channel through which institutional investors appear to 
influence corporate philosophy, decision-making, and outcomes.  This proposition is consistent 
with recent evidence documenting that institutional investors regularly engage with management 
and the board of directors in behind-the-scene interventions that can shape corporate objectives 
(Edmans, 2014, Bebchuk et al., 2015; Brav et al., 2015; McCahery et al., 2016, among others), 
and that the composition of firms’ institutional investor base can create (or mitigate) implicit 
incentives for managers to over-allocate effort towards improving current performance, potentially 
at the expense of shareholder value creation (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Dikolli et al., 2009).  Further, it 
is well known that corporate goals and decision-making processes can be altered so as to reflect 
certain (desired) sets of management behaviors, priorities, shared norms and beliefs (Guiso et al., 
2015b; Giannetti and Yu, 2016), and if institutional investors engage with management to change 
their decision-making environment via their “voice” and “exit” then it is conceivable that these 
investors affect firms’ outcomes via alteration to firms’ decision-making environment.  Based on 
these arguments, institutional investors could, therefore, influence firms’ competition culture so as 
to fulfil their own objectives and thereby leave an indelible mark on firms’ values and norms.  
Hence, it is important to trace the effects of institutional investors’ interventions on firms’ culture 
since this details the context in which organizational members (particularly managers) prioritize 
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activities that could deliver lucrative (or devastating) financial results to investors (O’Reilly et al., 
1996; Hartnell et al., 2011).  
Our investigation provides robust causal evidence that transient institutional ownership has a 
strong positive relation to the one-year-ahead level of corporate competition culture.  As transient 
institutional investors invest based on the likelihood of reaping short-term trading profits (Bushee, 
1998, 2001) this evidence supports that they intervene and exert pressure on managers to intensify 
their firms’ competition culture, perhaps aiming for results-right-now and more immediate 
financial performance.  As such, the management of a firm with more transient institutional 
investors would succumb to such pressures under the threat that if these institutional investors 
become unhappy they will forcefully exit by selling shares, thereby suppressing the firm’s stock 
price (Bernardo and Welch, 2004, Fos and Kahn, 2015).  Indeed, Graham et al. (2005) report that 
the majority of managers would avoid commencing projects with positive NPVs and sacrifice 
long-term shareholder value creation for short-term profits in exchange for being able to cater to 
investors’ expectations.  
Conversely, we demonstrate that dedicated institutional ownership has a negative relation to 
the firm’s one-year-ahead level of firm’s competition culture.  This evidence supports that 
dedicated institutional investors also intervene and influence managers but instead to lessen firms’ 
competition culture, perhaps following their incentives to monitor and offset managerial myopia 
and to assess financial performance by relying on information beyond that provided in the current 
earnings period to assess managers’ performance (Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007, Harford 
et al., 2017).  Complementary, this evidence might reveal that the managers of firms with more 
dedicated institutional investors feel less pressure to consistently cater to investors and ease their 
thrust of being aggressive and forceful in the pursuit of performance as they are less concerned 
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about the possibility of large price drops spurred by the exit-selling strategies of these investors.2  
Overall, this evidence lends further credence to the view that institutional investors are far from 
homogeneous, whereby their investment horizon and performance-related objectives and 
preferences incentivize them to exert much different governance on firms’ operating philosophy, 
priorities and decision-making processes.  
In terms of econometric methods, our regression approaches are carefully implemented to 
tackle identification issues that may cloud the interpretation of the results.  For instance, since 
firms’ competition culture and the level of institutional ownership are rather persistent over time, 
following prior studies that derive their key variables using textual analysis (e.g., Hoberg and 
Phillips, 2010; Li, 2010c; Li et al., 2013a; Hoberg et al., 2014), we utilize pooled cross-sectional 
models for our primary analyses including time and industry fixed effects. 3  At the same time, in 
the spirit of the competing values framework, we adopt a scaling scheme designed to account for 
other corporate cultures that may co-exist with the competition culture, to mitigate omitted variable 
issues.  In addition, to safeguard against simultaneous causality issues, our main baseline 
regression models rely on a one-year time-lag between the independent and dependent variables. 
Additionally, we conduct further analysis to confirm the causal relationship by ranking firms into 
deciles based on their competition culture at time t and test whether institutional ownership 
                                                 
2 This is reasonable since a large proportion of dedicated investors are in fact passive investors who simply invest in 
firms (directly or indirectly) based on an index. These investors are therefore usually unable or unwilling to directly 
sell specific firms that comprise the index. As a result, managers at firms with more dedicated investors are 
increasingly less likely to be concerned by selling pressure brought about by initial signals of underperformance (Cella 
et al., 2013; Giannetti and Yu, 2016).   
3 We also conduct random effects estimates for the main relations, as this approach allows us to capture the effects of 
slow-moving variables and permits an efficient estimation of model parameters. For our analysis, we refrain from 
relying on firm fixed-effect estimations, which depend solely on within-firm variations and are thus inapplicable in 
our case due to the slow-changing behavior of some of our main variables. Such behaviors resemble, for example, the 
well-known stickiness nature of the corporate governance attributes, in which, following the intuition in Wintoki et 
al. (2012), the firm fixed-effects approach is also not the optimal choice. However, for the sake of completeness, we 
report firm fixed-effects in Appendix A which show similar conclusions, lending in this way more credence to the 
overall conclusions of this chapter.  
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structure can explain the t to t+1 changes in a firm’s decile rank of competition culture.  We also 
adopt an instrumental variables approach by using a firm’s inclusion or exclusion in the Russell 
1000/2000 indexes as a source of exogenous variation in institutional ownership (Crane et al., 
2015; Appel et al., 2016).  In addition, we estimate additional instrumental variable models, 
dynamic panel generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation, as well as firm random- and 
fixed-effects estimation.  Irrespective of the approach, all econometric estimates confirm the 
robustness of our main findings and lend credence to the idea that the composition of the 
institutional investor base influences the firms’ competition culture. 
Our study contributes to the literature as follows.  First, our main finding that the composition 
of institutional ownership base impacts firms competition culture and hence managers’ operating 
philosophy and decision-making, adds direct knowledge to our understanding of how institutional 
investors engage with managers and reveal their interactions in behind the scenes interventions 
that leave an indelible mark on firms’ corporate culture.  As such, our findings complement other 
recent studies (e.g., Edmans, 2014; Bebchuk et al., 2015; Brav et al., 2015; McCahary et al., 2016) 
that endeavor to provide direct evidence of institutional investors’ preferences and actions on their 
portfolio of firms.  Second, it contributes to the settling of the ongoing debate regarding the benefits 
and costs of institutional investors on corporate decision making (e.g., Massa et al., 2015; Giannetti 
and Yu, 2016; Harford et al., 2017) by investigating the impact of transient and dedicated investors 
on firms’ competition culture, which inherently encapsulates the managers’ decision-making 
environment instead of relying only on corporate outcomes like R&D, dividends, investments, 
financial fraud, etc.  Also, as it is frequently very hard to measure corporate characteristics, we 
show how to operationalize such an empirical construct using textual analysis of the 10-K reports 
for all firms with such reports in the SEC Edgar database.  Further, we also complement other 
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recent studies as in our analysis we demonstrate that firms’ competition culture remains distinct 
from other conceptualizations of market competitiveness that center on product market 
competition (for example, Li et al., 2013a; Bushman et al., 2016). 
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows: the hypotheses are developed in Section 
4.2, details of the data and summary statistics are presented in Section 4.3; Sections 4.4 presents 
the empirical results, and Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Measurement and Hypotheses  
4.2.1 Measuring Competition Culture  
It has long been argued that corporations are micro-societies that have the ability to shape 
distinct norms, values and practices i.e. cultures (Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015).  
These principles shape the essence of a company’s identity as defined by beliefs, priorities and 
operating philosophy.  In measuring such corporate culture, a strand of the literature relies on the 
competing values framework (CVF) (see, for example, Hartnell et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2013; 
Cameron et al., 2014).  This framework differentiates between competing values that emphasize 
an external orientation from those that focus on internal capability, integration, and effectiveness 
– the external-internal domain.  Further, it distinguishes between corporate attributes that 
emphasize effectiveness criteria that focus on flexibility and discretion from those that are centered 
on stability and internal control – i.e. the flexibility-stability domain.  These two dimensions 
intersect to define four distinct types of orientations that comprise the CVF, namely the 
competition culture, creation culture, collaboration culture, and control culture.  Schematic 
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representations of the attributes that characterize the competing values associated with the CVF 
are depicted in Figure 4.1. 
Organizations with the competition culture are externally focused and performance-driven and 
are therefore more likely to encourage organization-wide generation, dissemination, and 
integration of external environmental information in the pursuit of profitability (Kohli and 
Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990).  Success is assessed on the basis of indicators such as 
increased revenues and profitability.  As a result, corporate attributes of this kind are strongly 
associated with financial effectiveness and are important determinants of reported financial 
performance (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Harris and Ogbonna, 2001).  Overall, speed is an 
indispensable component in maintaining a competitive edge, so results-right-now is a 
characteristic demand; hence, firms with an orientation towards the competition culture emphasize 
competitiveness and the aggressive pursuit of profits (Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh, 1983; Hartnel et al., 2011; Cameron et al., 2014).  
As a comparison, corporate attributes associated with the creation culture are focused externally 
and center on creating future opportunity through innovation and cutting-edge output. These 
elements within the organization are supported by a flexible organizational structure which 
stipulates freedom of thought and action among employees and allows the firm to effectively 
handle discontinuity, change, and risk (Hartnell et al., 2011; Cameron et al., 2014).  Conversely, 
the collaboration and control cultures are internally focused and place emphasis on integration.  
However, while the collaboration culture stresses employee development and consensus building 
that is facilitated by a flexible organizational structure aiming to support long-term development, 
corporate attributes that pertain to the control culture focus on creating value through internal 
improvements in efficiency supported by a stable organizational structure driven by strong internal 
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control mechanisms (Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Hartnell et al., 
2011; Cameron et al., 2014).    
In this chapter, we measure corporate attributes relating to a firm’s competition culture using a 
textual analysis of 10-K filings obtained from the SEC’s Edgar database.  Textual analysis permits 
the systematic and objective quantification of semantic content recited in a specific body of text.4  
As such, we assume that the 10-K filings encapsulate useful information regarding corporate 
values that firms have developed over time which is not easy to observe using secondary data 
sources.  Thus, parsing 10-K filings for specific lexical items allows us to quantify corporate 
attributes associated with the four cultures exemplified by the CVF.   
To estimate annual frequencies for each firm’s competition culture, we create a list of selected 
lexical items that best describe this culture, as theorized in the CVF.  This is achieved by a two-
step procedure that minimizes subjectivity in the selection process (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014).  
First, we select certain keywords suggested by Cameron et al. (2014) to identify corporate 
attributes associated with the competition culture.  Second, all keywords selected in the first step 
are looked up in the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary to identify other synonyms.  For 
instance, a relatively high frequency of keywords in 10-Ks describing “achievement”, “profit”, 
“performance”, “competitiveness”, “market”, etc should be associated with the competition 
culture.  In that respect, the set of synonyms comprises the bag of words that describe the firms’ 
competition culture.  We account for suffixes (forming grammatical and derivational variants of 
the same lexical item) by reducing these words to their stemmed form (e.g. “competitiveness” 
becomes “compet*”).  This helps to ensure that when we conduct our word search, we count all 
                                                 
4 There are numerous empirical studies to suggest that textual analysis of the 10-K filings is a source of semantics 
with useful information for finance and accounting research (refer to the review study by Loughran and McDonald 
(2016) and references therein). 
 
94 
variants of words that make up our list.  We then investigate the items so as to exclude terms 
consistent with firm names, industries and other words likely to systematically bias our results.  
We follow similar steps to create the corresponding bag of words for the other three corporate 
cultural orientations (creation culture, collaboration culture, and control culture) as theorized by 
the CVF.  The bag of words with all lexical items used to parse the 10-Ks are listed in Appendix 
A.  
Specifically, we measure competition culture (COMP) by counting the number of times that the 
lexical items included in the bag of words describing corporate attributes for the competition 
culture are found in the 10-K filings.  Since firms’ 10-Ks can reflect other corporate attributes 
associated with collaborate, control and create orientations, we likewise apply our word count 
algorithm to also estimate frequencies on these alternative orientations and scale our measure as 
follows:5 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 =
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 





As we have discussed in Chapter 3, similar textual analysis approaches have been shown to 
extract valuable information from firms’ reports (Li, 2010a, 2010b; Li et al., 2013a; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011, 2016; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Audi et al., 2016; 
Bushman et al., 2016).  What is more, some authors (e.g. Li et al, 2013a; Bushman et al., 2016) 
have used textual analysis to measure product market competition, which is a concept close in 
terminology to our own.  These studies capture the relevant information extracted from discussions 
                                                 
5 While conducting our count we exclude negation of the lexical items by ignoring occasions when the word is 
preceded by “no”, “non”, “not”, “less”, “few” or “limited” by three or fewer words.  
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of competition in the 10-K filings primarily by counting the number of occurrences of word 
inflections relating to the lexical item “competition”.6  
However, unlike these prior works we carefully construct our measurement approach to capture 
corporate attributes that describe a firm’s competition culture by using a comprehensive bag of 
words that elicit the full array of firms’ corporate cultures as theorized under the CVF in Cameron 
et al. (2014) and Hartnell et al. (2011).  Scaling the frequency of lexical items describing a firm’s 
competition culture by the total number of lexical items in the bags of words for all four cultural 
orientations allows us to construct a relative intensity measure of the competition culture that does 
not neglect the intensity of the rest of the corporate cultures that exist within firms.   
Figure 4.2 presents some of the properties of our measure.  In particular, it highlights the 
frequency of the competition culture related words used per 10-K report.  We observe lexical items 
such as customer*, market*, result*, and performanc* ranking highest, with 10 to 15 occurrences 
on average per 10-K report. This distribution across words is consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings in the CVF and is suggestive that our empirical measure is able to capture important 
facets of the competition culture.  
Further, we consider the relationship between our measure of competition culture and Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) sentiment classifications.  Accordingly, we carefully compare our lexical 
items to the words found in the classification taxonomy reported in Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) so as to investigate the possibility that COMP may proxy for some persistent tone and 
sentiment of the corporate 10-K reports.7  Figure 4.3 presents the competition culture words 
                                                 
6 The studies by Li et al. (2013a) and Bushman et al. (2016) rely on a measure that counts the number of occurrences 
of the words, competition, competitor, competitive, compete and competing, and scaled by the total number of words 
in the document. 
7The LM (2011) word list is available at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html 
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classified into the main sentiment/tone classifications found in Loughran and McDonald (2011).  
We note that the overlap between the lexical items for COMP and the tone classifications is 
minimal, as the majority of words that comprise our lexical items are not classified.  More 
importantly, COMP does not present any important correlation with the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) tone measures; for instance, the correlation of COMP with the Fin-Neg list is 0.04 and with 
the Fin-Pos is 0.02.  Thus, we are confident that COMP does not overlap with other renowned 
business word lists, which are widely applied in finance and accounting research.  
In introducing our measure we do not claim that our method or chosen framework represents 
the one best approach to assess culture in firms.  To do so would be of course unreasonable since 
as we have discussed in Chapter 2 other authors have proposed alternative approaches to 
measuring organizational culture (see for example, Handy, 1976; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; 
Reynolds, 1986; Johnson, 1988; Denison, 1990, O’Reilly et al., 1991, 1996; Schein, 1990, 1992; 
Hofstede, 1980, 2001, 2011).  However, we argue that our technique is practical as it allows us to 
quantify the key dimensions of organizational culture that have been found to matter and to do so 
in a manageable way for a large sample of firms.  Further, our approach is objective as it permits 
the capture of firms’ competition culture in a manner that is unlikely to be influenced by subjective 
biases.  What is more, our measure and the framework upon which it is built do not only make 
sense but they are both valid.  In particular, the competing values framework is supported by 
empirical literature and the underlying dimensions have a verified scholarly foundation (Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh, 1983).  Beyond this, we assess the validity of our measure of firms’ competition 
culture by relating it to other measures of firms’ competition culture.  Further, we show that our 
measure of competition culture is distinct from managerial short-termism and does not 
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significantly overlap with product-market competition as captured by Li et al.’s (2013a) text-based 
firm-specific competitive environment measure. 8   
 
4.2.2 Hypotheses  
In this study, we use our measure of competition culture to investigate whether and how 
transient and dedicated institutional ownership is related to firms’ competition culture.  Based on 
past literature and our own reasoning we expect that since transient institutional owners emphasize 
short-term performance, these investors should propel a firm towards adopting a more competition 
culture relative to the other cultural orientations.  Furthermore, consistent with past literature, we 
argue that such investors are more likely to intervene and exert pressure on managers to intensify 
their competition culture, aiming for results-right-now and more immediate financial performance 
(Bernardo and Welch, 2004, Fos and Kahn, 2015).  Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that 
the management of a firm with more transient institutional investors will yield to such pressures 
in order to avoid these investors becoming unhappy and forcefully exiting the firm, thereby 
suppressing the firm’s stock price.  Hence, we propose the following hypothesis in alternate form; 
H1: Transient institutional ownership is positively associated with firm’s competition 
culture. 
  
Conversely, it is widely accepted that dedicated institutional investors are more likely to stress 
long-term performance (see e.g. Bushee, 1998).  Thus, we can expect that these investors will be 
                                                 




motivated to dampen a firm’s competition culture when management’s overinvestment in this type 
of operating environment is likely to undermine the long-term performance and success of the 
firm.  This proposition is plausible since it supports the notion that dedicated institutional investors 
also intervene and influence managers, but unlike transient investors, do so in line with their 
incentives to monitor and offset managerial myopia and to assess financial performance based on 
information beyond the current period (Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007, Harford et al., 2017).  
Thus, we propose the following hypotheses in alternate form; 
H2: Dedicated institutional ownership is negatively associated with firm’s competition 
culture. 
 
4.3 Data, Variables and Sample Selection  
4.3.1 Data 
To conduct our empirical analysis, we build a unique dataset by merging information from 
various data sources.  We obtain annual firm-level data of US publicly traded firms for the period 
1994 to 2014 from Compustat.  To measure the competition culture through textual analysis we 
obtain firms’ 10-K reports from the SEC’s Edgar database.  For the institutional ownership 
variables, we employ data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings Database.  Finally, 
we acquire Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 index constituents for the period 2003 until 2006 from 
the Russell Corporation. 
Our analysis is carried out on all firms included in the Compustat database excluding financials 
(SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999).  To limit survivorship bias, firms that are inactive 
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and/or acquired by another firm during the period of study are retained in the sample.  We also 
delete from our sample all firm-year observations with missing data on the variables of interest.  
This results in a final main sample consisting of 31,223 firm-year observations. Table 4.1 reports 
the definition of all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Measuring Institutional Ownership  
We adopt two measures of institutional ownership, namely transient and dedicated institutional 
ownership, as in Bushee (1998) and subsequently studied in numerous works.9  Transient 
institutional ownership, TRA, is defined as the percentage of stock ownership in the firm by short-
term institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding.  Transient investors focus on short-
term performance and invest based on the likelihood of earning short-term trading profits (Bushee, 
1998, 2001; Callen and Fang, 2013).  Dedicated institutional ownership, DED, is defined as the 
percentage of stock ownership in the firm by long-term institutional investors relative to total 
shares outstanding.  Dedicated investors are defined as those that hold large stakes in a limited 
number of firms and have strong incentives to monitor the long-term performance of management 
(Bushee, 1998, 2001; Chen et al., 2001). 
 
                                                 
9 An incomplete list of studies includes Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Gompers and Metrick (1998), Bushee (2001), Cai 
and Zheng (2004), Gaspar et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2007), Yan and Zhang (2009), Elyasiani and Jia (2010), Elyasiani 
et al. (2010), Callen and Fang (2013), Andreou et al. (2016) and Andreou et al. (2017). 
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4.3.3 Control Variables  
We carefully select control variables for our empirical work based on the extant literature 
(Bushee, 1998, 2001; Chen et al., 2001; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Callen and Fang, 2013).  To 
begin with, we include in all specifications controls to capture firm-specific characteristics.  In 
particular, we include the following: the number of years since the firm was first included in the 
CRSP database, AGE; financial leverage as indicated by total liabilities to total assets, LEV; market 
value of equity to book value of equity, MTB; return on total assets, ROA; and the natural logarithm 
of market value of equity, SIZE.  
Further, in our main specifications, we control for investor heterogeneity since it is argued that 
this construct influences both variables.  We control for investor heterogeneity by including the 
detrended average weekly stock trading volume, DTURN, average weekly returns, RET, and 
volatility of weekly returns, STDEV, over the fiscal year (Hong and Stein, 2003; Bushman et al., 
2016).  
 
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis.10  In 
particular, the mean value of our competition culture variable, COMP, is 0.49.  The institutional 
ownership variables TRA and DED have respective mean values of 0.15 and 0.06.  We observe 
that the summary statistics on the variables are largely comparable to the values reported in 
previous studies using these data (Bushee, 2001; Callen and Fang, 2013; Andreou et al., 2017). 
                                                 
10 To mitigate the effects of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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We compute Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in our empirical analysis 
and report these in Table 4.3.  Some of the more interesting correlations include the relation 
between COMP and TRA (DED), where we find a positive and significant correlation between 
COMP and TRA (correlation = 0.0958) and a negative and significant correlation between COMP 
and DED (correlation = -0.0621).  These results are consistent with our expectations that transient 
institutional ownership intensifies the firm’s competition culture, while dedicated institutional 
ownership diminishes it.  
  
4.4 Empirical Results  
In this section, we report our multivariate results based on the empirical approaches adopted to 
deal with the practical challenges associated with our research design.  In particular, based on the 
extant literature, we would expect to observe rather persistent levels of competition culture over 
time (Cameron et al., 2014; Guiso et al., 2006; Hartnell et al., 2011; Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b).  
What is more, previous works also suggest that the level of transient (dedicated) institutional 
ownership should change rather slowly from year to year (Bushee, 1998, 2001).  
We investigate these expectations in Table 4.4 which present average annual transition 
probabilities by deciles of competition culture (COMP) (Panel A), transient institutional ownership 
(TRA) (Panel B), and dedicated institutional ownership (DED) (Panel C).  We observe that firms 
in the lowest (1st) decile of COMP in any one year have a 67% chance of remaining in the lowest 
COMP decile the following year, while firms in the highest (10th) decile remain in that decile in 
the following year with a probability of 66%. Similarly, firms in the 1st decile of TRA have a 49% 
probability of remaining in that decile the following year; meanwhile, firms in the 10th decile of 
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TRA remain in that decile the following year with a probability of 47%. In addition, those firms in 
the 1st decile of DED have a 45% likelihood of remaining in the 1st decile the following year, and 
firms in the 10th decile of DED remain in that decile the next year with a probability of 58%. High 
persistence is also preserved for the other deciles in each case. These results suggest that observed 
COMP, TRA, and DED are indeed rather persistent over time. 
Consequently, since our key variables do not show significant within-firm variation, we adopt 
cross-sectional OLS estimators as the primary regression tool for our empirical analysis.  In 
addition, we provide generalized least square random effects (GLS-RE) regression estimates as 
supplementary results, as they are well-suited to this type of analysis since they allow for the 
inclusion of slow-moving or sluggish covariates without destabilizing the estimates of the effect 
of these variables.  To be clear, we adopt OLS and GLS-RE regressions since, unlike fixed effects 
estimators, they are able to provide valid estimates of parameters that appear to change sluggishly 
or even depict a time-invariant behavior. 
Next, we test H1 and H2 by investigating whether transient and dedicated institutional 
ownership are related to firms’ competition culture.  We expect that since transient institutional 
owners emphasize short-term performance, these investors should propel a firm towards adopting 
a competition culture.  Meanwhile, since dedicated institutional investors are more likely to stress 
long-term performance, we expect that these investors will dampen a firm’s competition culture.  
To test empirically whether transient (dedicated) institutional ownership is positively (negatively) 
related to competition culture, we estimate the following regression model: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1   =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 
                                             +  𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.2) 
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where COMP represents the level of firm’s competition culture.  The variables of interests TRA 
(DED) represent firm’s level of transient (dedicated) institutional ownership.  We include control 
variables that capture firm-specific characteristics.  We adopt these control variables to ensure that 
the impact of our institutional ownership variables on the competition culture is not driven by other 
factors.  Also, we include year dummies in all regressions to control for unobserved time-invariant 
year effects.  In addition, the estimates include dummies based on Fama and French’s (1997) 48 
industry classifications to control for fixed industry effects.  The standard errors are corrected for 
firm clustering to control for potential bias in the estimates that occur when the residuals are 
correlated across firms.  
Further, we explore whether changes in a firm’s competition culture are related to its 
composition of institutional ownership.  For this, we rank firms into deciles based on their 
competition culture at time t and test whether institutional ownership structure can explain the t to 
t+1 changes in a firm’s decile rank of competition culture.  Given the premise that transient 
institutional owners pressure a firm’s management to adopt greater competition culture, we test 
empirically whether transient institutional ownership is significantly related to an increase in the 
firm’s decile rank of competition culture by estimating the following regression model: 
∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1    =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 
                                                                                + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡   
                                                                          + 𝛼10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.3) 
where ΔCOMP_INC is an indicator variable that is set equal to one if the firm experiences an 
increase in the decile rank of COMP from last year, and is zero otherwise.  In this model, TRA 
represents our variable of interest, while the control variables are used to capture firm-specific 
characteristics. As before, we include year dummies to control for unobserved time-invariant year 
 
104 
effects.  In addition, we include dummies based on Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry 
classifications to control for fixed industry effects.  The standard errors are clustered by firm.  
Furthermore, since dedicated institutional investors are argued in H2 to be more likely to 
dampen a firm’s competition culture, we investigate whether a firm’s composition of dedicated 
institutional ownership is significantly related to a decrease in the firm’s decile rank of competition 
culture.  We test this empirically by estimating the following model:   
∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑡+1   =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 
                                                                               + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡   
                                                                         + 𝛼10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.4) 
where ΔCOMP_DEC is an indicator variable set equal to zero if the firm experiences a decrease 
in the decile rank of COMP from the past year, and is one otherwise.  The variable of interests 
DED represents a firm’s level of dedicated institutional ownership, and as before we include 
control variables that capture firm-specific characteristics.  Also, year and industry dummies are 
included to control for unobserved time-invariant year and industry effects.  The standard errors 
are corrected for firm clustering to control for potential bias in the estimates that occur when the 
residuals are correlated across firms.  
The estimates of Eq.’s (4.2) to (4.4) are provided in Table 4.5. The coefficient of interest is 𝛼2, 
which is expected to be positive (negative) in the case of the relationship between transient 
(dedicated) institutional ownership and COMP.  Consistent with H1 (H2), in Table 4.5 column (1) 
of Panel A (Panel B) we find that the coefficient term on the 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡 (𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡) is 0.053 (-0.021) and 
significant at the 1 percent (10 percent) level with a t-value of 5.01 (1.89).  Not only are these 
results statistically significant, they are also economically significant.  In particular, the coefficient 
value 0.053 on the 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡 variable implies that an one standard deviation increase in transient 
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institutional ownership leads to an approximate 0.106 (= [0.053 × 0.12]/ 0.06) increase in a firm’s 
competition culture than would otherwise be the case, and given a mean for competition culture of 
0.49, this represents an approximate 22% increase in its value. 
Furthermore, our GLS-RE estimates of Eq. (4.2), as shown in column (4) of Panel A (Panel B), 
provide additional empirical support that transient (dedicated) institutional ownership increases 
(decreases) a firm’s competition culture.  Besides this, our logistic regression estimates of Eq.’s 
(4.3) and (4.4), are presented in column (7) of Panel A (Panel B).  These present further evidence 
consistent with H1 (H2) of the causal relationship between transient (dedicated) institutional 
ownership and increases (decreases) in a firm’s competition culture. These results provide 
compelling evidence in support of our argument that transient institutional investors exert pressure 
on management to shift a firm’s competition culture. 
In further tests of the main hypotheses, we estimate models to examine the relationship between 
lagged values and differences in our institutional ownership variables and competition culture.  
These tests examine whether and how institutional ownership impacts a firm’s competition culture 
at spans greater than one year.  Regressions that examine the long-run relationship can help to 
further mitigate potential simultaneity issues and shed light on the direction of the relationship 
between institutional ownership and competition culture.  If transient (dedicated) institutional 
ownership is positively (negatively) related to levels of competition culture and increases 
(decreases) in a firm’s decile rank of competition culture in two and three years’ time, it is more 
likely that transient (dedicated) institutional ownership alters a firm’s competition culture than the 
inverse.  In particular, we estimate the following empirical models: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1    =  𝛼1  + 𝛼2∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  +  𝛼3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1)  
                                                                      + 𝛼4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼5𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡   
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                                                                +  𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡   +  𝑡, (4.5) 
 
∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1    =  𝛼1  + 𝛼2∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1  
                                                                                                   + 𝛼4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  
                                                                                                   +  𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+  𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡   
                                                                                             + 𝛼11𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.6) 
 
∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑡+1    =  𝛼1  + 𝛼2∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1  
                                                                                                    + 𝛼4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  
                                                                                                    +  𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+  𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡   
                                                                                              + 𝛼11𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.7) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1      =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  + 𝛼3∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1(𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1) +  𝛼4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−2(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−2)  
                                           + 𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡    
                                     + 𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼12𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝑡, (4.8) 
 
∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑡+1     =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼3∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−2 
                                                                                      + 𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡  + 𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝛼9𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 
                                                                                      + 𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼12𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  
                                                                                + 𝑡, (4.9) 
and 
∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃_𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑡+1     =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡  + 𝛼3∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−2 
                                                                                      + 𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡  + 𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝛼9𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 
                                                                                      + 𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼12𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  
                                                                                + 𝑡. (4.10) 
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The estimates for the above specifications are reported in Table 4.5.  We find for Eq. (4.5) that 
the coefficient term 0.064 (-0.023) for 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 (𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1), which is provided in Table 4.5 column 
(2) in Panel A (Panel B), is significantly positive (negative) at the 1 percent (10 percent) level with 
a t-value of 4.93 (1.75); similar results hold for ∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡 (∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡), where the coefficient and t-value 
are 0.031 (-0.014) and 4.37 (1.74), thereby indicating a significantly positive (negative) relation 
between the change in transient (dedicated) institutional ownership and competition culture  at the 
1 percent (10 percent) level.  Besides this, based on Eq. (4.8), in column (3) the coefficient is 0.066 
(-0.029) on the 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−2 (𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−2) variable, suggesting a positive (negative) and significant 
relationship between transient (dedicated) institutional ownership and firms’ disposition to 
compete three years into the future at the 1 percent (5 percent) level given a t-value of 4.53 (1.96). 
Further, the coefficients of ∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡 and ∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 are positive and significant at the 1 percent level 
in column (3) with coefficient terms of 0.030 and 0.048, and t-values of 4.30 and 5.29, respectively.  
The fact that first and second differences in transient institutional ownership help to predict future 
competition culture suggests that not only the level but also the change in transient institutional 
ownership propels a firm’s competition culture.  Similar long-run estimates of Eq.’s (4.5) and (4.8) 
are produced using the GLS-RE estimator.  These results are provided in Table 4.5 columns (5) 
and (6) and are consistent with the pooled OLS estimates of these equations.  Moreover, the long-
run estimates for the impact of transient (dedicated) institutional ownership on increases 
(decreases) in a firm’s decile rank of competition culture, as specified in Eq.’s (4.6), (4.7), (4.9) 
and (4.10) are consistent with the prior estimates.  These results are given in Table 4.5 columns 
(8) and (9) of Panels A and B and offer further evidence in support of our argument that transient 
institutional investors are able to pressurize management to increase a firm’s competition culture, 
while dedicated institutional investors lessen it.  In addition, for completeness, fixed effects 
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estimates of Eq.’s (4.2), (4.5), and (4.8) are provided in Appendix A.  These results are consistent 
with our previous findings. 
As a further test of H1 (H2), we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach to identify the 
causal effect of transient (dedicated) institutional ownership on firms’ competition culture based 
on the composition of the popular Russell indexes.  To do this, we note that each May 31st, Russell 
1000/2000 indexes are formed based on firms’ market capitalization rankings, where the largest 
thousand firms constitute the Russell 1000, while the next two thousand firms comprise the Russell 
2000.  Since firms are unable to control small variations in their market capitalization, and thus 
Russell rankings at the cutoff point, assignment to Russell 1000 or Russell 2000 is practically 
random.  This random assignment to Russell 1000 or Russell 2000 near the threshold leads to large 
differences in index weights for firms around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff point.  Prior literature 
has noted that the discontinuity in the Russell 1000/2000 indexes drives a substantial difference in 
institutional ownership, since institutional investors are known to benchmark against the Russell 
1000/2000 indexes, and hence are more likely to hold big positions in components that are assigned 
the largest index weights in order to reduce index-tracking error.  Further, these differences in 
institutional ownership are likely to be unrelated to firm characteristics, since near the cutoff point 
observed differences in market capitalization are a small proportion of return variance (Crane et 
al., 2015; Appel et al., 2016).  
Thus, our identification strategy is to use inclusion in the Russell 1000 or Russell 2000 as a 
source of exogenous variation in the institutional ownership structure of the firm.  Consistent with 
prior literature, we posit that our instrument is correlated with variations observed in the transient 
and dedicated institutional ownership structures and that it meets the exclusion requirement, in that 
it should only affect the level of firms’ competition culture via changes in transient and dedicated 
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institutional ownership.  We take advantage of this exogenous variation to test whether transient 
(dedicated) institutional investors have a positive (negative) influence on a firm’s competition 
culture. To do this, we estimate the following: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡          =     𝛼1 + 𝛼2?̂?𝑅𝐴(𝑜𝑟 ?̂?𝐸𝐷𝑡) + 𝛼3𝑅2000𝑡 × 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑅𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡   
                                          + 𝛼5𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.11a) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  =  𝛾1 + 𝛿1𝑅2000𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅2000𝑡 × 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑅𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡  
                                                    + 𝛽3𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑡  +  𝜇𝑡, (4.11b) 
where R2000 is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is assigned to the Russell 2000 index 
and is zero if the firm is assigned to the Russell 1000 index, RANK is the firm’s ranking order 
within the Russell index, measuring the distance from the index cutoff each year, which is based 
on firm’s market capitalization, MRKCAP is firms’ market capitalization on May 31st each year, 
and FLOAT is the difference between rank implied by the observed market capitalization and the 
rank assigned by Russell in June.  
The results of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) test for weak instruments (see Table 4.6 Panel B) 
indicate that R2000 is a valid instrument and thus we adopt R2000 as an instrument for transient 
(dedicated) institutional ownership. Table 4.6 Panel A reports the IV estimates, and the sign and 
significance of the fitted values of TRA (DED) are consistent with a causal relationship between 
transient (dedicated) institutional ownership and firms’ competition culture in the direction that 
we postulate in H1 (H2). 
In further support of our IV approach, we estimate a second IV model, which investigates the 
relation between one-year-ahead COMP and institutional ownership as measured in year t: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1        =      𝛼1 + 𝛼2?̂?𝑅𝐴(𝑜𝑟 ?̂?𝐸𝐷𝑡) + 𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡   
                                               + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  + 𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (4.12a) 
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𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  =  𝛾1 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑆𝑃500𝑡 
 
                                                       + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 
 
                                                 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡, (4.12b) 
 
where consistent with prior work in this area (see, for example, Bushee, 2001; Callen and Fang, 
2013), we adopt DYIELD, RET, SGROWTH, and SP500 as instruments for dedicated and transient 
institutional ownership (refer to Table 4.1 for variable definitions).  Compared to our prior 
instrumental variable estimation found in Table 4.6, where we instrument institutional ownership 
using inclusion in the Russell 2000 index, this approach allows us to conserve more of the main 
sample data and thereby increase the power of the analysis.   
These estimates are provided in Table 4.7, where sign and significance of the fitted values of 
TRA (DED) are consistent with H1 (H2) and are in keeping with those presented in our previous 
analysis, according to which we find a positive (negative) relationship between competition culture 
and transient (dedicated) institutional ownership.  Indeed, these instrumental variable results 
provide even stronger evidence in support of the relation between competition culture and our 
measures of institutional ownership, as we are also able to take into account the possibility that 
endogeneity affects the results.  The results of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) test for weak instruments 
indicate that the instruments used are appropriate. 
Finally, we estimate a dynamic panel GMM model, since it is plausible that the relationship 
between COMP and TRA (DED) is in fact dynamically endogenous.  Thus, it is possible that 
causation runs both ways and that current levels of competition culture could affect both future 
institutional ownership and competition culture.  Hence, to control for potential dynamic 
endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and simultaneity, we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) by 
adopting the dynamic panel GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
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and Bond (1998).  This approach allows us to explicitly control for lagged values of COMP.  What 
is more, we are able to use the firms’ information within our dataset as instruments.  We estimate 
the following empirical model: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  =   𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  +  𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡   
                                          + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡   
                                    + 𝛽8𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 +  𝑡, (4.13) 
where we first-difference Eq. (4.13) to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and potential omitted 
variable bias.  Next, we estimate the first-differenced model by GMM using lagged values (and 
differences) of competition culture and other firm characteristics as instruments.  By using lagged 
variables as instruments, we control for potential simultaneity and reverse causality.  
The results of the system GMM estimates are presented in Table 4.8.  Consistent with the 
previously mentioned results, we evince a positive (negative) relationship between competition 
culture and transient (dedicated) institutional ownership.  Further to the previous analyses, the 
GMM approach allows us to treat all independent and control variables as endogenous.  In fact, in 
our empirical analysis, we assume that only firm age and the year dummies are exogenous.  The 
AR(1) and AR(2) serial correlation tests results suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation.  Further, we apply Hansen’s (1982) test for overidentification, as in Arellano 
and Bond (1991) to assess the validity of our instruments, and based on the results we do not reject 
the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid.  In addition, we conduct the difference-in-
Hansen test of exogeneity in a manner like Bond et al. (2001) to determine whether the subset of 
instruments used in the level equation is exogenous.  Again, we do not reject the null hypothesis 
that our instruments are exogenous.  All told, the results of these specification tests lead us to 
conclude that our dynamic GMM regressions are valid and lend further credence to our arguments. 
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In summary, we provide robust evidence that transient ownership positively influences a firm’s 
competition culture.  This finding suggests that transient institutional owners pressurize managers 
to propel their firms’ corporate culture toward the competition culture possibly in the pursuit of 
short-term financial objectives that may be harmful to the long-term value of the firm. 
Furthermore, we demonstrate that dedicated ownership lessens a firm’s competition culture, and 
this is suggestive of dedicated institutional investors acting as effective monitors of management, 
thereby pushing managers to adopt a less intensive competition culture.  
 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter investigates the important role institutional ownership plays in determining firms’ 
corporate culture.  More specifically, we investigate how a firm’s competition culture is influenced 
by institutional investors.  Using a text-based measure of firms’ competition culture, we document 
robust evidence that transient institutional ownership increases a firm’s competition culture, while 
dedicated institutional ownership diminishes it.  These results suggest that transient institutional 
ownership reinforces managements’ competition culture, while dedicated institutional ownership 
helps to soothe it. 
Our results have important implications of interest to academics and the wider business 
community.  This is because the effect of institutional ownership on competition culture has 
implications for the manner in which firms are governed and managed.  Our main findings should 
be of interest to boards of directors, who have a responsibility to eliminate any pressures on 
managers from outside investors to increase their competition culture in order to achieve short-
term financial objectives.  At the same time, boards should be savvy in designing strategies to 
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attract institutional investors, since we observe that their investment horizons can have an impact 




Figure 4.1: Schematic Representation of the Four Corporate Cultures 
Associated with the Competing Values Framework (CVF) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Cameron et al. (2014)  
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Figure 4.2: Lexical Items per 10-K Report for a Firm’s Competition Culture  

















































































































































































































Figure 4.3: Classifications of Competition Words 
This graph highlights the compete culture keywords classified into the main tonal classes identified in 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Bodnaruk et al. (2015), computed as a percentage of total competition 
culture words.  Loughran and McDonald (2011) develop a dictionary of words from all 10-K filings during 
1994 to 2008.  After carefully examining all words occurring in at least 5% of the documents they classify 
each word according to its most likely usage and sentiment in financial documents.  As such, those words 
classified as “Negative” are indicative of some adverse implication.  Conversely, “Positive” words are those 
that carry a favorable connotation in business.  Those words classified as “Uncertainty” are indicative of 
imprecision and/or risk, while those that reflect the potential for legal contestation are denoted as 
“Litigious”.  Those words that express either strong or weak levels of confidence (i.e. strong and weak 
modal words) are grouped and classified here as “Model”.  Adopting a similar methodology used by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), Bodnaruk et al. (2015) classify “Constraining” words as those that suggest 


























Table 4.1: Definition of Variables 
 Symbol   Definitions 





COMP = the intensity of a firm’s competition culture  estimated for each fiscal 
year using the text-analysis approach; 
Institutional ownership  
  
 
TRA = the percentage of stock ownership in the firm by transient 




the percentage of stock ownership in the firm by dedicated 
institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding; 




AGE = number of years since the firm first appears in CRSP; 
 
 
DTURN = average monthly turnover for the current fiscal year, minus the 
average monthly share turnover for the previous year; 
 
 
DYIELD = annual dividend yield; 
 
 
FLOAT = the difference between rank implied by the observed market 
capitalization and the rank assigned by Russell in June; 
 
 
HHI = the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration ratio computed using total 
assets for each firm by FF 48 index and state;  
 
 
LEV = long-term debt by total assets; 
 
 




MTB = market to book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year; 
 
 
RANK = the rank order of the Russell index based on market capitalizations 
on May 31 of each calendar year; 
 
 
RET = average weekly returns for the fiscal year;  
 
 
ROA = return on assets defined as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets; 
 
 
R2000 = equal to 1 if the firm is in the Russell 2000 index and is 0 if the firm 
is a member of the Russell 1000 index; 
  
 
SGROWTH = sales for the fiscal year divided by sales for the prior fiscal year; 
 
 








STDEV = the volatility of firm-specific weekly returns. 
 




Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables used in the Empirical Analyses 
This table presents the mean, median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, and the number of observations for 
the variables used in the study for the period 1994 to 2014. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
COMP 31,223 0.49 0.06 0.45 0.49 0.54 
TRA 31,223 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.22 
DED 31,223 0.06 0.09 0 0.01 0.09 
AGE 31,223 23.64 12.98 14 20 32 
DTURN 31,223 1.19 23.18 –5.97 0.4 7.76 
DYIELD 31,223 0.01 0.05 0 0 0.01 
FLOAT 2,608 103.45 132.92 -485 3 78 
HHI 31,223 0.43 0.29 0.2 0.35 0.6 
LEV 31,223 0.47 0.29 0.28 0.46 0.62 
MKTCAP 2,900 20.66 1.57 16.91 19.53 20.41 
MTB 31,223 3.38 55.44 1.32 2.13 3.58 
RANK 2,900 413.88 830.87 -999 -314 415 
RET 31,223 –0.2 0.21 –0.25 –0.12 –0.06 
ROA 31,223 0.01 0.26 0 0.05 0.08 
R2000 2,900 0.65 0.48 0 0 1 
SGROWTH 30,910 1.37 21.47 1 1.09 1.23 
SIZE 31,223 6.29 1.78 5.02 6.2 7.43 
SP500 31,223 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 
STDEV 31,223 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 
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Table 4.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical analyses.  The bold figures indicate significance at the 10 
percent level or better.  
COMP TRA DED AGE DTURN DYIELD FLOAT HHI 
TRA 0.0958        
DED -0.0621 -0.0114       
AGE -0.1571 -0.1061 0.0644      
DTURN -0.0259 0.1298 -0.0062 0.0112     
DYIELD -0.0286 -0.0468 0.0052 0.0831 0.0039    
FLOAT 0.0124 0.1529 -0.0713 -0.2818 0.1225 -0.0747   
HHI -0.0776 -0.0928 -0.0228 0.1830 0.0026 0.0466 -0.0369  
LEV -0.0876 -0.0055 0.0588 0.1012 0.0261 0.0409 -0.0665 0.0779 
MKTCAP -0.0238 -0.1210 0.0323 0.2523 -0.0163 0.0152 -0.1697 0.0826 
MTB 0.0019 0.0071 0.0039 0.0032 0.0006 0.0011 -0.0177 -0.0040 
PCTCOMP 0.1389 0.0012 0.0651 -0.1616 -0.0315 -0.0575 0.0705 -0.0745 
RANK 0.0532 -0.0177 -0.1236 -0.4013 0.0181 0.0034 0.5787 -0.0897 
RET -0.1054 -0.0803 0.0322 0.2821 -0.1528 0.0776 -0.2513 0.1216 
ROA -0.0239 0.0465 0.0243 0.1305 0.0498 0.0451 -0.0707 0.0702 
R2000 0.0538 0.1221 -0.1499 -0.3297 0.0778 -0.0121 0.4682 -0.0903 
SGROWTH 0.0278 -0.0028 -0.0046 -0.0109 0.0115 -0.0037 0.0040 -0.0075 
SIZE -0.0512 0.2368 0.0241 0.2867 0.0792 0.0151 -0.4069 0.0122 
SP500 -0.1022 0.0626 0.0881 0.4053 0.0245 0.0330 -0.3701 0.0565 
STDEV 0.1141 0.1165 -0.0271 -0.3387 0.1427 -0.0965 0.2944 -0.1413 
(continued on the next page)  
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Table 4.3 cont’d 
 LEV MKTCAP MTB RET ROA R2000 SGROWTH SIZE SP500 
LEV          
MKTCAP 0.0460         
MTB 0.0035 0.0158        
RANK -0.1815 -0.3372 -0.0445       
RET 0.0512 0.1404 -0.0085       
ROA -0.3109 0.0986 -0.0032 0.2943      
R2000 -0.1415 -0.2984 -0.0461 -0.3223 -0.1942     
SGROWTH 0.0004 -0.0025 0.0000 -0.0045 -0.0057 -0.0230    
SIZE 0.0994 0.4559 0.0205 0.3559 0.2017 -0.7712 0.0068   
SP500 0.1399 0.3268 0.0046 0.2191 0.1060 -0.6470 0.0078 0.6406  






Table 4.4: Transition Matrices 
This table presents average annual transition matrices between year t and year t+1 deciles of competition culture [Panel A]; transient institutional 
ownership [Panel B]; and dedicated institutional ownership [Panel C]. The diagonal elements are presented in bold figures.  
Panel A: Competition culture  
     COMPt + 1 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 COMPt  
Lowest  1 0.6712 0.1907 0.0617 0.0301 0.0183 0.0092 0.0078 0.0034 0.0050 0.0026 
 2 0.2148 0.4020 0.2124 0.0841 0.0414 0.0191 0.0135 0.0080 0.0032 0.0016 
 3 0.0642 0.2418 0.2990 0.2031 0.1057 0.0449 0.0229 0.0091 0.0057 0.0036 
 4 0.0234 0.0917 0.2232 0.2876 0.1903 0.1030 0.0490 0.0198 0.0080 0.0041 
 5 0.0132 0.0435 0.1002 0.2175 0.2519 0.2007 0.0992 0.0471 0.0181 0.0085 
 6 0.0066 0.0198 0.0505 0.0956 0.2225 0.2666 0.1886 0.0991 0.0425 0.0082 
 7 0.0060 0.0081 0.0213 0.0489 0.1033 0.2074 0.2793 0.2087 0.0932 0.0237 
 8 0.0047 0.0076 0.0105 0.0230 0.0424 0.0924 0.2241 0.3142 0.2241 0.0568 
 9 0.0029 0.0032 0.0037 0.0107 0.0184 0.0377 0.0944 0.2251 0.3889 0.2149 
Highest 10 0.0043 0.0024 0.0016 0.0037 0.0062 0.0112 0.0268 0.0677 0.2121 0.6640 
Panel B: Transient institutional ownership 
     TRAt + 1 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 TRAt  
Lowest 1 0.4942 0.2250 0.1081 0.0600 0.0395 0.0249 0.0184 0.0118 0.0096 0.0086 
 2 0.2079 0.3168 0.1814 0.1055 0.0658 0.0416 0.0300 0.0212 0.0172 0.0127 
 3 0.0969 0.1810 0.2493 0.1690 0.1037 0.0728 0.0467 0.0355 0.0262 0.0189 
 4 0.0502 0.0974 0.1732 0.2113 0.1542 0.1201 0.0797 0.0545 0.0373 0.0223 
 5 0.0334 0.0617 0.1077 0.1666 0.1913 0.1481 0.1173 0.0838 0.0555 0.0346 
 6 0.0208 0.0406 0.0715 0.1152 0.1622 0.1822 0.1540 0.1205 0.0852 0.0477 
 7 0.0130 0.0254 0.0453 0.0756 0.1193 0.1675 0.1918 0.1647 0.1242 0.0731 
 8 0.0089 0.0170 0.0273 0.0487 0.0794 0.1280 0.1789 0.2055 0.1892 0.1170 
 9 0.0061 0.0101 0.0196 0.0312 0.0509 0.0757 0.1247 0.1973 0.2645 0.2200 
Highest 10 0.0054 0.0087 0.0132 0.0178 0.0300 0.0442 0.0679 0.1158 0.2279 0.4691 
Panel B: Transient institutional ownership 
     DEDt + 1 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 DEDt  
Lowest 1 0.4490 0.1694 0.1078 0.0651 0.0589 0.0495 0.0317 0.0250 0.0255 0.0180 
 2 0.1774 0.3205 0.1666 0.1107 0.0757 0.0458 0.0395 0.0285 0.0192 0.0161 
 3 0.0881 0.1801 0.2711 0.1597 0.1087 0.0758 0.0490 0.0331 0.0208 0.0134 
 4 0.0578 0.0991 0.1678 0.2444 0.1523 0.1056 0.0709 0.0490 0.0355 0.0177 
 5 0.0406 0.0572 0.1028 0.1539 0.2234 0.1602 0.1085 0.0808 0.0476 0.0248 
 6 0.0357 0.0361 0.0536 0.1028 0.1604 0.2222 0.1674 0.1134 0.0770 0.0314 
 7 0.0262 0.0324 0.0414 0.0613 0.1046 0.1630 0.2243 0.1774 0.1138 0.0556 
 8 0.0238 0.0233 0.0259 0.0422 0.0641 0.0953 0.1876 0.2543 0.1974 0.0862 
 9 0.0210 0.0186 0.0169 0.0243 0.0335 0.0581 0.0992 0.1908 0.3276 0.2101 




Table 4.5: OLS, Random Effects and Logistic Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture 
This table presents OLS (columns 1 - 3), GLS-RE (columns 4 - 6) and logistic regression (columns 7 – 9) estimates used to investigate the impact 
of transient (TRA) [Panel A] and dedicated (DED) [Panel B] institutional ownership on the level of firms’ competition culture (COMP) (columns 1 
– 6) and increases (ΔCOMP_INC) or decreases (ΔCOMP_DEC) in the decile rank of firm’s competition culture (columns 7 – 9).  All regressions 
include year fixed effects, while the OLS and logistic regression estimates also include industry fixed effects.  The standard errors are all clustered 
at the firm-level.  
Panel A. The effect of transient institutional ownership on competition culture. 
 COMPt + 1      ΔCOMP_INCt + 1   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
TRAt 0.053***     0.022***   0.066***      
(5.01)                            (3.10)   (3.03)     
ΔTRAt   0.031*** 0.030***  0.011** 0.009*   0.056** 0.058** 
    (4.37)                             (4.30)                              (2.02) (1.79)   (2.26) (2.33) 
TRAt – 1   0.064***    0.034***    0.074***   
    (4.93)                               (3.67)    (2.92)   
ΔTRAt – 1     0.048***   0.023***    0.083*** 
      (5.29)                               (3.22)    (2.84) 
TRAt – 2     0.066***   0.035***    0.069** 
      (4.53)                               (3.25)    (2.49) 
AGEt –0.087*** –0.085*** –0.085*** –0.143*** –0.141*** –0.141*** 0.049** 0.050** 0.049** 
  (6.06)                             (5.97)                             (5.97)                             (9.47) (9.34) (9.34) (2.34) (2.35) (2.32) 
DTURNt –0.019*** –0.019*** –0.018*** –0.004 –0.004 –0.003 0.015 0.015 0.01 
  (4.26)                             (4.27)                             (4.07)                             (1.22) (1.32) (0.98) (0.69) (0.70) (0.44) 
LEVt –0.057*** –0.057*** –0.057*** –0.01 –0.009 –0.009 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 
  (4.85)                             (4.81)                             (4.81)                             (1.08) (1.00) (1.00) (0.94) (0.93) (0.94) 
MTBt –0.012 –0.011 –0.011 –0.009* –0.009* –0.009 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024  
(1.32)                             (1.22)                             (1.19)                             (1.78) (1.67) (1.62) (1.45) (1.46) (1.45) 
RETt –0.065** –0.070** –0.069** –0.054*** –0.059*** –0.058*** -0.223*** -0.226*** -0.227*** 
  (2.26)                             (2.44)                             (2.41)                             (2.80) (3.03) (2.97) (3.13) (3.14) (3.16) 
ROAt –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.017*** –0.017*** –0.017*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.35)                             (0.35)                             (0.34)                             (2.69) (2.72) (2.69) (0.27) (0.28) (0.30) 
SIZEt –0.013 –0.017 –0.017 0.039*** 0.034** 0.034** -0.027 -0.027 -0.025 
  (0.83)                             (1.06)                             (1.05)                             (2.81) (2.41) (2.40) (1.13) (1.16) (1.07) 
STDEVt –0.043 –0.049 –0.048 –0.054** –0.059*** –0.058*** -0.227*** -0.230*** -0.230*** 
  (1.27)                             (1.43)                             (1.40)                             (2.42) (2.63) (2.59) (2.88) (2.89) (2.89) 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N 31,223 31,223 31,223 31,223 31,223 31,223 13,034             13,034 13,034 
 (continued on the next page)  
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Table 4.5 cont’d. 
Panel B. The effect of dedicated institutional ownership on competition culture. 
 COMPt + 1      ΔCOMP_DECt + 1   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
DEDt –0.021*     –0.022***   -0.036      
(1.89)                         (2.68)   (1.64)     
ΔDEDt   –0.014* –0.012  –0.016*** –0.016***   -0.074*** -0.075*** 
    (1.74)                             (1.55)                              (2.67) (2.64)   (2.62) (2.66) 
DEDt – 1   –0.023*    –0.025**    -0.01   
    (1.75)                               (2.44)    (0.36)   
ΔDEDt – 1     –0.006   –0.014*     -0.021 
      (0.59)                               (1.78)     (0.75) 
DEDt – 2     –0.029**   –0.032***     -0.004 
      (1.96)                               (2.69)     (0.13) 
AGEt –0.094*** –0.094*** –0.094*** –0.147*** –0.147*** –0.146*** -0.02 -0.019 -0.02 
  (6.58)                         (6.58)                             (6.57)                             (9.75) (9.74) (9.71) (0.95) (0.91) (0.92) 
DTURNt –0.014*** –0.014*** –0.013*** –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 0.040* 0.039* 0.039* 
  (3.15)                             (3.14)                             (3.09)                             (0.69) (0.68) (0.64) (1.90) (1.87) (1.86) 
LEVt –0.056*** –0.056*** –0.056*** –0.009 –0.009 –0.009 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 
  (4.76)                             (4.75)                             (4.71)                             (1.02) (1.01) (0.98) (0.65) (0.75) (0.78) 
MTBt –0.013 –0.013 –0.013 –0.009* –0.009* –0.009* -0.063 -0.061 -0.061  
(1.37)                             (1.38)                             (1.44)                             (1.67) (1.68) (1.73) (1.30) (1.28) (1.28) 
RETt –0.031 –0.031 –0.031 –0.044** –0.044** –0.044** -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 
  (1.08)                             (1.09)                             (1.09)                             (2.26) (2.27) (2.28) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) 
ROAt –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.016** –0.016** –0.016** -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.13)                             (0.13)                             (0.13)                             (2.49) (2.50) (2.48) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
SIZEt 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.041* 0.039* 0.039 
  (0.65)                             (0.66)                             (0.72)                             (3.75) (3.76) (3.79) (1.75) (1.66) (1.63) 
STDEVt –0.005 –0.006 –0.006 –0.044* –0.044** –0.045** -0.026 -0.024 -0.024 
  (0.15)                             (0.17)                             (0.18)                             (1.95) (1.97) (1.98) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30) 
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N 31,223 31,223 31,223 31,223 31,223 31,223 13,037 13,037 13,037 
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.6: Instrumental Variable Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture  
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) regressions of the relationships between transient (TRA) and 
dedicated (DED) institutional ownership and competition culture (COMP) [Panel A], and the results of a 
Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instruments test [Panel B].  The regressions include year and industry fixed 
effects and the standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Panel A. IV regression first and second stage results. 
  1st stage: TRAt  COMPt  1st stage: DEDt  COMPt  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
TRAt 
 





















R2000t 0.263***  
 





 (3.78)  
 
R2000t×RANKt -0.350***  0.012**  -0.641**  -0.006  
(10.09)   (2.16)  (2.04)  (1.31) 
MRKCAPt -0.068***  0.001  -0.007  -0.002  
(5.73)  (0.48)  (0.86)  (1.03) 
FLOATt 0.957***  -0.005**  -0.039  -0.001  
(5.38)  (2.05)  (0.23)  (0.79) 
R2 0.18   
 
 0.08   
 
N 2,440  2,440  2,440  2,440 
 





F – Statistic 
Critical 
value 
TRAt R2000t 50.46 16.38 
DEDt R2000t 60.21 16.38 




Table 4.7: Instrumental Variable Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture  
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) regressions used to investigate the relationship between 
transient (TRA) and dedicated (DED) ownership and competition culture (COMP).  The regressions include 
year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by firm. 
  1st stage: TRAt  COMPt + 1  1st stage: DEDt  COMPt + 1 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
TRAt   0.197***     
 
                       (4.14)     
DEDt       –0.296* 
 
                           (1.79) 
DYIELDt –0.106***    –0.029***   
                    (12.57)                         (3.78)   
SGROWTHt 0.026***    –0.021***   
                      (4.18)                         (3.77)   
SP500t –0.252***                           0.036    
                      (7.27)                         (1.24)   
RETt 0.527***    0.152***   
                    (21.12)                         (6.64)   
AGEt –0.090***  –0.062***  –0.025**  –0.102*** 
                       (7.94)                       (3.77)                       (2.31)                       (6.45) 
DTURNt 0.090***  –0.031***  0.003  –0.013*** 
                     (16.61)                       (4.84)                       (0.81)                       (2.93) 
LEVt 0.016  –0.059***  0.035***  –0.047*** 
                       (1.62)                       (4.87)                       (3.85)                       (3.53) 
MTBt 0.002  –0.012  –0.026***  –0.020*  
                     (0.24)                       (1.22)                       (3.79)                       (1.80) 
ROAt 0.041***  –0.019*  –0.007  –0.008 
                       (4.65)                       (1.75)                       (1.00)                       (0.72) 
SIZEt 0.429***  –0.058***  0.105***  0.039* 
                     (29.24)                       (2.59)                       (9.23)                       (1.78) 
STDEVt 0.599***  0.009  0.102***  0.012 
                    (22.03)                       (0.74)                       (3.85)                       (0.76) 
R2                        0.33                            0.38    
N 30,910  30,910  30,910  30,910 
 






F – Statistic 
Critical 
value 
TRAt DYIELDt;  SGROWTHt;  SP500t;  RETt 183.72 10.27 
DEDt DYIELDt;  SGROWTHt;  SP500t;  RETt 18.33 10.27 





Table 4.8: Dynamic System GMM Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture  
This table presents dynamic panel GMM estimates of the relationship between transient (TRA) and 
dedicated (DED) ownership and competition culture (COMP).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation.  The 
Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid.  The Diff-in-Hansen test 
exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous.   
COMPt 
  (1) (2) 
TRAt 0.098** 
 







      (1.68) 
AGEt –0.031 –0.071** 
  (1.62)       (2.53) 
DTURNt –0.035 –0.014 
  (0.96)                                               (0.42) 
LEVt –0.096** –0.064 
  (2.18)                                               (0.96) 
MTBt –0.038 0.025 
  (0.93)                                               (0.51) 
RETt –0.063 0.071 
  (0.43)                                               (0.45) 
ROAt –0.029 0.028 
  (0.59)                                               (0.49) 
SIZEt 0.124** 0.063 
  (2.54)                                               (0.79) 
STDEVt –0.025 0.063 
  (0.16)                                               (0.38) 
COMPt – 1 0.580*** 0.428*** 
  (6.22)                                               (4.18) 
COMPt – 2 0.152** 0.121 
  (1.98)                                               (1.61) 
AR(1) test p-value 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test p-value 0.46 0.44 
Hansen test for over-identification p-value 0.71 0.27 
Diff–in–Hansen tests of exogeneity p-value 0.81 0.34 
N 15,993 15,993 




Chapter 5  The Effect of Firms’ Competition Culture on 







5.1 Introduction  
A number of recent studies have explored the importance of firms’ corporate culture for 
predicting various economic outcomes (see, for example, Cronqvist et al., 2007; Popadak, 2013; 
Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015; Callen and Fang, 
2015; Erhard et al., 2016; Grieser et al., 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017).  In this chapter, we extend 
this literature by investigating whether and how firms’ competition culture influences the 
propensity to meet and/or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, and whether and how competition 
culture relates to firm-specific stock price crash risk.  Furthermore, we explore whether firm’s 
competition culture is a channel through which institutional investors are able to affect firm’s crash 
risk.   
To conduct this study, we perform a textual analysis of 10-K filings to measure firms’ 
competition culture based on the competing values framework (CVF) (e.g., Quinn and Cameron, 
1983; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Cameron et al., 2014).  In doing so, we follow a growing body 
of literature that applies textual analysis of firms’ 10-K filings in finance-related research (see, for 
instance, Tetlock, 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2009; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016; Li et 
al., 2013a; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kearney and Liu, 2014).  We adopt this measurement approach 
because past literature suggests that it provides an efficient way of capturing firms’ values related 
to the competition culture for a large number of US publicly listed firms (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 
2014; Bhandari et al., 2017).  Hence, as described in Chapter 4 and consistent with past works we 
operationalize our measure of competition culture by parsing 10-K filings to identify a set of 
lexical items relating to attributes that shape firms norms and values. 
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As we have mentioned, Cameron et al. (2014) define the competition culture as a type of 
corporate value that focuses the firm on achieving superior financial performance by assimilating 
and responding to external environmental information.  Further recall that the competing values 
framework postulates competition culture as an important corporate value that impacts corporate 
decision-making.  Thus, within this framework, the competition culture of a firm is said to 
encapsulate those value-creating activities that are empowered by the forceful pursuit of 
profitability and financial performance.  Hence, firms with an intensified competition culture are 
argued to have a proclivity towards meeting and beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Equally, 
when a firm’s competition culture is excessive, it could be argued that the management can become 
highly susceptible to engaging in bad news hoarding and/or making suboptimal investment 
decisions that can potentially harm shareholder value creation. 
Thus, having established the influential role of institutional investors on a firm’s competition 
culture in Chapter 4 of this thesis, we argue that firms with greater levels of competition culture 
should be motivated to consistently meet and/or beat analysts’ earnings expectations.  In particular, 
we contend that the thrust towards being more aggressive in the pursuit of profitability, a 
theoretical core trait of firms with high levels of competition culture, increases the probability that 
such firms are able to meet and/or beat their earnings forecast.  In this vein, we make use of our 
measure of competition culture to investigate whether firms, which place more emphasis on this 
cultural orientation, are indeed more likely to meet and/or beat analysts’ forecasts.  Consistent with 
our expectations, we find a significantly greater tendency to meet and/or beat analysts’ forecasts 
for firms with greater competition culture. 
Further, if firms with a greater competition culture exhibit much higher proclivity to meet and/ 
or beat earnings expectations, then it is possible that this is achieved by being more secretive and 
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by concealing negative information about the firm, as documented by Andreou et al. (2017).  If 
this is so, then, on average, we would also expect firms with greater competition culture to be 
prone to firm-specific stock price crashes.  Given this, we investigate the relation between 
competition culture and a firm’s proclivity to engage in bad news hoarding that results in stock 
price crashes.  In general, managers have financial incentives and other career motives to overstate 
performance by opportunistically suppressing bad news while accelerating the release of good 
news in the hoping that a firm’s current poor performance will be masked by better future 
performance (Kim and Zhang, 2011a, 2011b, 2015).  However, such practices make firms 
vulnerable to adverse economic outcomes in the form of large idiosyncratic stock price declines, 
known as crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009; Callen and Fang, 2013, 2015; Andreou et al., 2017).  For 
firms with an intense competition culture, managerial incentives to conceal negative information 
would be naturally heightened, since such firms need to consistently deliver superior results as 
they inherently have an inclination to assimilate and cater to external market expectations.  Thus, 
after controlling for known crash risk determinants, we empirically test this proposition and show 
a strong positive relation between competition culture and one-year-ahead crash risk.  As crash 
risk associated with stock price drop, this evidence corroborates that on average competition 
culture appears to be harmful to firms’ shareholder value creation. 
Combining the result that transient (dedicated) institutional ownership intensifies (lessens) 
firms’ competition culture (please see Chapter 4) with the evidence that such behavior leads to an 
increased propensity for crash risk, we suspect that competition culture is a channel through which 
institutional ownership can indirectly influence a firm’s policies and outcomes.  To further 
investigate this, we conduct subsample and mediation analyses and the results are consistent with 
our expectations.  For instance, we find that the positive relation between competition culture and 
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the one-year-ahead crash risk is present only within the subsample of firms that is dominated by 
high levels of transient institutional ownership and low levels of dedicated institutional ownership.  
This analysis shows that competition culture is in and of itself not value-destroying; rather, the 
striking result is that the competition culture becomes harmful only when it is associated with a 
high proportion of transient and a low proportion of dedicated ownership.  Thus, taken altogether, 
we conclude that institutional investors constitute a key corporate governance mechanism which 
can (either curb or) exacerbate a firm’s competition culture, that can then give rise to the 
opportunistic behavior of managers to strategically withhold and accumulate negative information 
pertaining to their firms’ poor performance which impacts its policies and outcomes.   
To safeguard against the possibility that our analyses are negatively affected by simultaneous 
causality issues, all of our baseline regression models rely on a one-year time-lag between the 
independent and dependent variables.  Thus, our models are less susceptible to the presence of a 
contemporaneous feedback mechanism (i.e., reverse causality) between the key variables.  Further, 
to mitigate other endogeneity concerns, we re-estimate all of our empirical models using an 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis and we reach similar, and in certain cases even stronger results.  
Our study contributes to the recent literature by first demonstrating that firms with a dominate 
competition culture are more inclined to achieve earnings expectations; however, we also reveal a 
dark-side to competition culture: as greater competition culture results in increased firm-specific 
stock price crash risk, especially when a firm’s investor base is represented by high (low) levels 
of transient (dedicated) institutional investors.  In so doing, we contribute in the burgeoning 
literature that focuses on the impact of firms’ organizational norms and principles to policies and 
economic outcomes (see, for example, Loughran et al., 2009; Popadak, 2013; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 
2014; Guiso et al., 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Zingales, 2015; Callen and Fang, 2015; Erhard et al., 2016) 
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by introducing competition culture as another organizational effectiveness factor that links to 
shareholder value creation.   
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows: Section 5.2 develops the main hypotheses; 
details of the data and summary statistics are presented in Section 5.3; Sections 5.4 present the 
empirical results; and Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses  
In this chapter, we first investigate the impact of competition culture on firms’ propensity to 
meet and/or beat analysts’ earnings expectations.  Theory and prior empirical works suggest that 
managers at firms with greater levels of the competition culture are more motivated towards the 
aggressive pursuit of superior financial results for investors (Hartnell et al., 2011; Cameron et al., 
2014).  Hence, consistent with this past literature and our own reasoning within the CVF, we argue 
that the pressure towards being more forceful in the quest for financial performance should result 
in such firms consistently meeting and/or beating analysts’ forecasts expectations.  Consequently, 
we posit the following hypothesis in alternative form; 
H1: Competition culture is positively associated with meeting/ beating analysts’ earnings 
forecast. 
 
What is more, if managers at firms with high competition culture are more likely to cater to 
investors and the capital markets by consistently meeting and/or beating earnings expectations, it 
is plausible that this is achieve, in part, by being more secretive and by concealing negative 
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information about the firm (Andreou et al., 2017).  If this is so, then, on average, we would also 
expect firms with greater competition culture to be more prone to experience firm-specific stock 
price crashes (e.g. Kim and Zhang, 2011a, 2011b, 2015) as bad news hoarding make firms 
vulnerable to adverse economic outcomes in the form of large idiosyncratic stock price declines, 
when such bad news is eventually revealed to the market (Hutton et al., 2009; Callen and Fang, 
2013, 2015; Andreou et al., 2016, 2017).  Consequently, we posit the following hypothesis in 
alternative form; 
H2: Competition culture is positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. 
 
5.3 Data, Variables and Sample  
5.3.1 Data 
Ours is a unique dataset built by merging information from a number of publicly available data 
sources.  We obtain annual firm-level data of US publicly traded firms for the period 1994 to 2014 
from Compustat. To measure the competition culture through textual analysis we obtain firms’ 10-
K reports from SEC’s Edgar database.  For the institutional ownership variables, we employ data 
from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings Database.  We obtain analyst forecast data from 
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database provided by the Thomson Reuters 
Corporation. 
We perform analysis on all firms included in the Compustat database excluding financials (SIC 
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999).  Also, to limit survivorship bias, firms that are inactive 
and/or acquired by another firm during the period of study are retained in the sample. Further, we 
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also delete from our sample all firm-year observations with missing data on the variables of 
interest.  This results in a final main sample consisting of 31,223 firm-year observations. Table 5.1 
reports the definition of all the variables used in the analysis. 
 
5.3.2 Measuring Competition Culture  
In this study, we measure corporate attributes relating to a firm’s competition culture using a 
textual analysis of 10-K filings obtained from SEC’s Edgar database.  As we have mentioned, 
textual analysis permits the systematic and objective quantification of the information content 
present in a specific body of text.  Hence, we assume that the 10-K filings encapsulate useful 
information regarding the corporate culture that firms have developed over time which is not easy 
to observe using secondary data sources.  Thus parsing 10-K filings for specific lexical items 
allows us to quantify corporate attributes associated with the four cultures exemplified by the CVF.  
Hence, as in Chapter 4, we measure a firm’s competition culture (COMP) by counting the number 
of times that the lexical items included in the bag of words describing corporate attributes for the 
competition culture are found in the 10-K filings and scale our measure by counts of the lexical 
items that describe the other cultural orientations as follows:11 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 =
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 





As has been noted in Chapter 3, similar textual analysis approaches have been shown to extract 
valuable information from firms’ reports (Li, 2010a, 2010b; Li et al., 2013a; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011, 2016; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Audi et al., 2016; 
                                                 
11 While conducting our count we exclude negation of the lexical items by ignoring occasions when the word is 
preceded by “no”, “non”, “not”, “less”, “few” or “limited” by three or fewer words.  
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Bushman et al., 2016).  In this work, we carefully construct our measurement approach to capture 
corporate attributes that describe a firm’s competition culture by using a comprehensive bag of 
words that elicit the full array of firms’ cultural orientations as theorized under the CVF in 
Cameron et al. (2014) and Hartnell et al. (2011).  Scaling the frequency of lexical items describing 
a firm’s competition culture by the total number of lexical items in the bag of words for all four 
cultural orientations allows us to construct a relative measure of the competition culture that does 
not neglect the intensity of the rest of corporate cultures that exist within firms.   
 
5.3.3 Measuring Meeting/ Beating Earnings Forecasts  
We employ analysts’-forecast-based measures to capture firms’ propensity to meet and/ or beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  In particular, we follow Cheng and Warfield (2005) to develop 
measures that are based on meeting and beating analysts’ consensus forecasts.  Specifically, we 
compute these measures by taking the difference between actual earnings per share and the 
consensus of analysts’ forecasts.  If earnings meet analysts’ forecasts, we assign the indicator 
variable, MEET, a value of one, and zero otherwise.  If earnings meet or beat the consensus forecast 
by at most 1 cent, then the indicator variable MB_1 is assigned the value one, and zero otherwise.  
Finally, if the difference between analysts’ forecasts and earnings is at most (positive) 2 cents we 
assign the indicator variable, MB_2, a value of one, and zero otherwise. 
 
5.3.4 Measuring Stock Price Crash Risk  
We estimate the following three firm-specific measures of stock price crash risk, namely 
DUVOL, ESIGMA, and NCSKEW.  Each of these measures reflects different aspects of the 
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distribution of returns (Chen et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2009; Callen and Fang, 2013; Andreou et 
al., 2016, 2017) and is computed by estimating firm-specific weekly returns using the following 
expanded index model regression: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑤 =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑤−2 + 𝛽2,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑤−1 + 𝛽3,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑤 + 𝛽4,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑤+1 + 𝛽5,𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑤+2 + 𝑗,𝑤 , (5.2) 
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑤 is the return on the stock of firm j in the week w and 𝑟𝑚,𝑤  is the CRSP value-weighted 
market index for the week w.  We permit non-synchronous trading by including lead and lag terms 
for the market index as in Dimson (1979).  Further, our regression removes market-wide return 
movements from firm returns, and thus the residuals of our model is able to capture the weekly 
firm-specific returns.  As the residuals from Eq. (5.2) are skewed, we compute the firm-specific 
weekly return for firm j in week w (𝑅𝑗,𝑤) as the natural logarithm of the residual plus one.  
The DUVOL stock price crash risk measure is computed for each firm j over a fiscal year t, 
where all weeks with firm-specific returns that are below the annual mean are separated from those 
above the annual mean.  DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of the weeks 
below the mean (DOWN) over the weeks above the mean (UP), and is computed as follows: 
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = log{(𝑛𝑢 − 1) ∑ 𝑅𝑗,𝑤
2
DOWN







where 𝑛𝑢 and 𝑛𝑑 are the number of UP and DOWN weeks of the fiscal year t.  
The ESIGMA stock price crash risk measure is the negative of the worst standard deviation of 
firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific weekly return divided by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns. We compute ESIGMA for a given firm in a fiscal year 
as follows: 








where ?̅?𝑗 and 𝜎𝑅𝑗 are the mean and standard deviation of the firm-specific weekly returns 𝑅𝑗,𝑤  for 
the firm j over the fiscal year t. 
The NCSKEW stock price crash risk measure is defined as the negative of the third moment of 
firm-specific weekly returns for each firm-year divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific 
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where n is the number of observations of firm-specific weekly returns during the fiscal year t. The 
denominator in Eq. (5.5) is a normalization factor.  
Larger values of DUVOL, ESIGMA, and NCSKEW signify greater crash risk. 
 
1.1.1 Measuring Institutional Ownership  
In this study, we adopt two measures for firms’ institutional ownership structure, namely 
transient and dedicated institutional ownership (Bushee, 1998).  Transient institutional ownership, 
TRA, is the percentage of stock ownership in the firm by stort-term investors relative to total shares 
outstanding.  Transient investors focus on short-term performance and invest based on the 
likelihood of earning short-term trading profits (Bushee, 1998, 2001; Callen and Fang, 2013).  
Dedicated institutional ownership, DED, is defined as the percentage of stock ownership in the 
firm by long-term institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding.  Dedicated investors 
are defined as those that hold large stakes in a limited number of firms, invest of the long term, 
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and therefore have strong incentives to monitor the long-term performance of management 
(Bushee, 1998, 2001; Chen et al. 2001). 
 
5.3.5 Control Variables  
We carefully select control variables for our empirical work based on the extant literature 
(Bushee, 1998, 2001; Chen et al., 2001; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Callen and Fang, 2013).  To 
begin with, we include in all specifications controls to capture firm-specific characteristics.  In 
particular we include the following: the number of years since the firm was first included in the 
CRSP database, AGE; financial leverage as indicated by total liabilities to total assets, LEV; market 
value of equity to book value of equity, MTB; return on total assets, ROA; and the natural logarithm 
of market value of equity, SIZE.  
Further, when investigating the relation between competition culture and firms’ proclivity to 
meet analysts’ expectations, we include controls that are likely to be correlated with the indicators 
of meeting and/or beating analysts’ forecasts that have been adopted in prior studies (Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005).  In particular, we include implicit claims, ICLAIM, since according to Bowen et 
al. (1995) the implicit claims between the firm and shareholders can be negatively affected (due 
to adverse publicity) should the firm not meet analysts’ forecasts.  In addition, we include net 
operating assets, NOA, as Barton and Simko (2002) find that firms with higher beginning-of-period 
net operating assets are less likely to meet analysts’ forecasts.  We also include controls for the 
number of analysts, NUMEST, and the dispersion of their forecast, CVAF.  We include these 
variables because it has been argued that incentives to meet analysts forecast increase according 
to the number of analysts following the firm and the consensus of their estimates (Payne and Robb, 
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2000).  Finally, we include sales growth, SGROWTH, since incentives to meet analysts’ 
expectations are usually higher for growth firms (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). 
Similarly, in our specifications that include crash risk as a dependent variable, we control for 
investor heterogeneity since it is argued that this construct influences both variables.  We control 
for investor heterogeneity by including the detrended average weekly stock trading volume, 
DTURN, average weekly returns, RET, and volatility of weekly returns, STDEV, over the fiscal 
year (Hong and Stein, 2003; Bushman et al., 2016).  
 
5.3.6 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis.12  In 
particular, the mean value of our competition culture variable, COMP, is 0.49, and the mean values 
of the meeting and beating analysts’ forecasts variables, MEET, MB_1, and MB_2 are 0.14, 0.28, 
and 0.36, respectively.  Our stock price crash risk measures DUVOL, ESIGMA, and NCSKEW have 
mean values of –0.04, 2.61, and 0.04, respectively.  We observe that the summary statistics on the 
variables are largely comparable to the values reported in previous studies using these data 
(Bushee, 2001; Callen and Fang, 2013; Andreou et al., 2016). 
We compute Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in our empirical analysis 
and report these in Table 5.3. Some of the more interesting correlations include the relation 
between COMP and two of our meet and/or beat analysts’ forecasts variables, MB_1 and MB_2.  
                                                 
12 To mitigate the effects of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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Principally, we observe a positive and significant correlation between COMP and MB_1 
(correlation = 0.0277), and between COMP and MB_2 (correlation = 0.0365).  
Pearson correlation results consistent with our expectations are also found for the relationship 
between COMP and the crash risk measures DUVOL, ESIGMA, and NCSKEW. Specifically, we 
find positive and significant correlations between COMP and the various measures of crash risk, 
with 0.0179 correlation coefficient for DUVOL, 0.0278 correlation coefficient for ESIGMA and 
0.0250 correlation coefficient for NCSKEW, all indicating that higher levels of COMP induce 
higher crash risk.  
 
5.4 Empirical Results  
In this section, we report our multivariate results based on empirical approaches adopted to deal 
with the practical challenges associated with our research design.  Specifically, based on the extant 
literature (and our past results in Chapter 4), we expect and observe rather persistent levels of 
competition culture over time (Cameron et al., 2014; Guiso et al., 2006; Hartnell et al., 2011; Guiso 
et al., 2015a, 2015b).  As a result, we adopt cross-sectional OLS estimators as the primary 
regression tool for our empirical analysis.  In addition, we provide generalized least square random 
effects (GLS-RE) regression estimates as supplementary results (provided in Appendix B), as they 
are well-suited to this type of analysis since they allow for the inclusion of slow-moving or sluggish 




5.4.1 Competition Culture and Meeting/ Beating Earnings Forecast  
First, to test H1 we explore the relationship between COMP and firms’ propensity to meet and/ 
or beat firms’ analysts’ consensus forecasts.  We consider this relation since it is plausible that 
managers at firms with a strong competition culture are more driven to achieve superior financial 
performance and therefore should be more likely to meet if not beat analysts’ expectations.  Hence, 
we test whether competition culture is positively related to one-year-ahead analysts’ consensus 
forecasts.  To do this, we estimate the following regression models:  
𝐴𝐹𝑡+1  =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐶𝑉𝐴𝐹𝑡  +  𝛼5𝐼𝐶𝐿𝐴𝐼𝑀𝑡  +  𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 
                                           + 𝛼8𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡   
                                     + 𝛼12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝑡, (5.6) 
 
where the variable AF is measured by one of MEET, MB_1 or MB_2.  To ensure that the impact 
of competition culture on firms’ inclination to meet and/ or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts is 
not as a result of other factors, we include control variables that capture firm-specific 
characteristics.  In addition, the regression models include year and industry dummies to control 
for unobserved year and industry factors; further, the standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.  
Our coefficient of interest is 𝛼2, and we expect this to be positive and significant. 
The results are provided in Table 5.4, where the coefficients terms 0.060, 0.059, and 0.070 on 
the COMP variable in columns (1), (3), and (5) capture the effect of competition culture on the 
firm-level measures of meeting/ beating analysts’ forecasts.  Consistent with our expectations, we 
find evidence that this relationship is positive and significant at the 10 percent (columns 1), 5 
percent (column 3) and 1 percent (column 5) levels with t-values of 1.73, 2.10, and 2.62, 
respectively.  We repeat these estimates using the GLS-RE regressions (please see Appendix B) 
and find similar results.  In addition, Table 5.4 columns (2), (4), and (6) report the odds ratios 
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(ORs) with indicate that relationship between competition culture and our firm-level measures of 
meeting/ beating analysts’ forecasts is indeed economically significant.  For instance, our OR in 
column (2) of 2.751 (0.876 – 8.638) indicates that a unit increase in COMP increases the chance 
of meeting analysts’ earnings forecast by 2.751 times than would otherwise be the case.   
The relationship between competition culture and meeting and/or beating analysts’ forecasts 
could suffer from simultaneity bias.  This is because it is plausible that in addition to competition 
culture driving firms to meet investor and capital market expectations, managements’ disposition 
to the competition culture could also be affected by firms’ past ability to meet and/or beat analysts’ 
forecasts.  As a result, we estimate the following instrumental variable model to allow for potential 
endogeneity: 
𝐴𝐹𝑡+1  =   𝛼1  + 𝛼2?̂?𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐶𝑉𝐴𝐹𝑡  +  𝛼5𝐼𝐶𝐿𝐴𝐼𝑀𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  
                               + 𝛼8𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡  
                         + 𝛼12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝑡, (5.7a) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  =  𝛾1 + 𝛿1𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑆𝑃500𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑉𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐶𝐿𝐴𝐼𝑀𝑡  
                                   + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  
                             + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡, (5.7b) 
 
where AF represents MEET, MB_1, and MB_2.  To estimate the above empirical models, we adopt 
HHI, STATE, and SP500 as instruments for competition culture.  These instruments are consistent 
with the prior work of (Bushman et al., 2016), and the results of the Stock and Yogo (2005) test 
for weak instruments suggest that they are suitable.  
The results of the Hausman (1978) tests for endogeneity suggest that we should reject the null 
hypothesis that COMP is exogenous.  Table 5.5 provides estimates for the first and second stage 
regressions; the results are consistent with H1 and those in the main analysis, where we found that 
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competition culture heightens managers’ tendency to meet and/or beat analysts’ earnings 
expectations.   
 
5.4.2 Competition Culture and Stock Price Crash Risk  
Next, we consider the relation between firms’ competition culture and firm-specific stock price 
crash risk.  Given that our prior results, it is also likely that firms with a strong competition culture 
are more prone to stock price crashes when bad news, which was once concealed, is released to 
the market.  Thus, to test H2 which states that competition culture is indeed positively related to 
firm-specific stock price crash risk, we estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡+1 =  𝛼1   +  𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 
                                            + 𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (5.8) 
 
where CRASH is used to denote our stock price crash risk measures, DUVOL, ESIGMA, and 
NCSKEW.  As with our prior analysis, we account for the impact of other factors by including 
control variables that capture relevant firm-specific characteristics known to affect crash risk.  We 
also include in our estimates year and industry dummies in all specifications to control for 
unobserved time-invariant year and industry effects.  The coefficient of interest, 𝛼2, is predicted 
to be positive and significant.  
Table 5.6 presents the empirical analysis conducted to assess this relationship, where the 
coefficient terms 0.015, 0.018, and 0.019 on the COMP variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate 
the nature of the link between competition culture and firm-specific crash risk.  In particular, we 
find evidence of a positive and significant relation between competition culture and future crash 
risk at the 10 percent (column 1) and 5 percent levels (columns 2 and 3) with t-values equal to 
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1.82, 2.14, and 2.26, respectively.  Furthermore, we note that our results are also economically 
significate as in column (1) the coefficient of 0.015 suggest that a one standard deviation increase 
in competition culture redounds to a 0.00243 (=[0.015 ×0.06]/ 0.37) or 6% increase in the mean 
level of firm specific stock price crash risk as indicated by DUVOL.  We also provide in Appendix 
B GLS-RE regression estimates of Eq. (5.8) and OLS re-estimates of the same where we also 
include controls for managers’ short-term incentives.  The nature of our results remains unchanged.  
Further, we estimate instrumental variables models to allow for potential endogeneity in the 
relation between competition culture and stock price crash risk.  Specifically, we estimate the 
following: 
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡+1   =   𝛼1 + 𝛼2?̂?𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  + 𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡+ 𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡   
                                    + 𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (5.9a) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  =  𝛾1  + 𝛿1𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑆𝑃500𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡  
                               + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  +  𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡, (5.9b) 
 
where CRASH denotes our stock price crash risk variables DUVOL, ESIGMA, and NCSKEW, 
while the variables HHI, STATE, and SP500 instrument for competition culture.  The Hausman 
(1978) tests suggest that COMP is endogenous, and the results are consistent with those presented 
in the prior analysis, where we argued and found that competition culture increases firm-specific 
stock price crash risk.   
Our empirical findings presented in Table 5.7 support the notion that firms with a more 
intensified corporate culture to compete tend to also be more prone to stock price crashes.  Overall, 
the results are consistent with those presented in the previous analysis, where we argue and find 




5.4.3 Does Competition Culture Mediate the Relationship between 
Institutional Ownership and Stock Price Crash Risk?  
Finally, we investigate whether firms’ competition culture is a channel through which 
institutional ownership affects crash risk.  Our previous findings in Chapter 4 suggest that transient 
(dedicated) institutional ownership intensifies (diminishes) firms’ competition culture and that 
such firms are more likely to meet/ beat analyst’ earnings forecasts and experience stock price 
crashes.  Consistent with these observations and prior work in this area (Bushee, 1998, 2001; 
Callen and Fang, 2013; Andreou et al., 2016), we argue that since transient institutional owners 
exert pressures on the firm to achieve short-term performance objectives (at the expense of long-
term value), this serves to enhance competition culture, which in turn increases firm-specific crash 
risk.  Further, since dedicated institutional investors appear to serve as effective monitors of the 
firm, this scrutiny serves to dampen excessive orientation toward the competition culture and 
thereby firm-specific crash risk.  
To explore this, we re-estimate Eq. (5.8) for subsamples of TRA and DED that are sorted into 
subsamples of HIGH and LOW transient and dedicated institutional ownership.  We define a 
subsample group as HIGH (LOW) if it is above (below) the yearly median of our institutional 
ownership measures.  Thus, if competition culture serves the purpose that we describe, we would 
expect to observe that the relationship between competition culture and crash risk is stronger for 
those firms with above yearly median TRA and below yearly median DED (i.e. HIGH TRA and 
LOW DED).  We expect this because a significant presence of transient institutional owners is 
likely to pressurize managers to emphasize short-term performance objectives.  This coupled with 
an absence of dedicated investors, who tend to focus on long-term firm value, creates a less-than-
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effective counter to managerial myopia in firms with greater competition culture, which in turn 
triggers higher instances of stock price crashes for such firms. 
The results of this subsample analysis are presented in Table 5.8, where we find that competition 
culture increases future firm-specific crash risk only for those firm-years where transient 
institutional ownership is above, and dedicated institutional ownership below, the yearly median 
(i.e., first quadrant in Table 5.8 labelled “HIGH TRA & LOW DED”).  This result is exactly as we 
expect and suggests a strong interrelationship between institutional ownership, competition 
culture, and stock price crash risk.  In addition to the OLS estimates presented in Table 5.8, we 
provide GLS-RE estimates of these relations in Appendix B.  These estimates also suggest a 
statistically significant relationship between COMP and our measures of stock price crash risk 
only when transient institutional ownership is above and dedicated ownership below, the yearly 
median.  We find these results indeed striking, as they show that competition culture in and of 
itself is not value destroying; rather, these results suggest that competition culture becomes 
harmful only when it is associated with a high proportion of transient and a low proportion of 
dedicated ownership.    
As an additional check, we conduct further empirical analysis to investigate whether 
competition culture does indeed mediate the relationship between institutional ownership and 
stock price crash risk.  To do this, we estimate the following system of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SURs) to allow for correlations across error terms: 
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡+1  = 𝛼1  + 𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑅𝐴(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡) + 𝛼4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  + 𝛼5𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡   
                                       + 𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡+ 𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼11𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  
                                 + 𝑡, (5.10a) 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡     =          𝛽1   +  𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐴(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  +  𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  
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                                    + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡  +  𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (5.10b) 
where all variables are as previously defined and we include in our SUR estimates year and 
industry dummies.  To shed further light as to whether competition culture mediates the 
relationship between transient and dedicated institutional ownership and firm-specific crash risk, 
we compute the Sobel test (with delta-method standard errors). 
Table 5.9 presents our SUR estimates and Sobel test results.  We observe significant test results 
for the indirect relationship between transient institutional ownership and stock price crash risk as 
indicated by ESIGMA (p-value = 0.09) and NCSKEW (p-value = 0.09) in Panel A.  These findings, 
coupled with our subsample analysis results, suggest that a firm’s competition culture is a channel 
through which institutional ownership affects future firm-specific stock price crash risk.  
 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we explore the role that firms’ competition culture plays in determining 
corporate policies and outcomes.  More specifically, we investigate whether and how firms’ 
competition culture is related to firms’ propensity to meet and/or beat analysts’ forecasts, and 
whether and how firms’ competition culture is associated with adverse outcomes such as an 
increase in future firm-specific crash risk.  Using a text-based measure of firms’ competition 
culture, we find that firms with greater competition culture exhibit higher incidence of meeting 
and/or beating analysts’ forecasts but are more prone to stock price crashes.   
Overall, our results primarily suggest that firm’s competition culture can lead to incentives for 
managers to extend themselves in an endeavor to meet and/or beat the consensus earnings 
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forecasts.  However, we note that such behavior on average increases firms’ stock price crash risk.  
Further, we find that although the competition culture can result in increased stock price crashes, 
this behavior is only observed for those firms with above median levels of transient and below 
median levels of dedicated institutional ownership.  This result suggests that firms’ competition 
culture is a channel through which institutional ownership affects crash risk; a finding that is 
supported by further mediation tests. 
The results of the chapter have important implications of interest to academics and the wider 
business community.  In particular, the influence of competition culture on firms’ ability to meet 
and/ or beat analysts’ forecasts and stock price crash risk has repercussions for investor activity.  
In this vein, our results can be used by investors to screen firms, thereby reducing the potential 
that they will experience value destroying stock price crashes, and by regulators forming policies 




Table 5.1: Definition of Variables 
 Symbol   Definitions 





COMP = the firm’s competition culture  estimated for each fiscal year 
using the text-analysis approach; 
Meeting/ beating earnings forecasts   
  
 
MEET = an indicator that is equal to 1 if earnings meet analysts’ 
forecasts and is 0 otherwise; 
 
MB_1 = an indicator that is equal to 1 if earnings meet or just beat by 
a maximum of 1 cent of analysts’ forecasts and is 0 
otherwise; 
 
MB_2 = an indicator that is equal to 1 if earnings meet or just beat by 
a maximum of 2 cents of analysts’ forecasts and is 0 
otherwise; 
Crash risk  
  
 
DUVOL = for each firm over a fiscal year, all the weeks with firm-
specific returns below the annual mean are separated from 
those firm-specific weekly returns which are above the 
annual mean; we categorize these weeks as "down weeks" 
and "up weeks", respectively. DUVOL is the log of the ratio 
of the standard deviations of the two subsamples, the one for 
the "down weeks" over the standard deviation of the "up 
weeks"; 
 
ESIGMA = the negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns from the average firm-specific weekly return divided 
by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns; 
 
NCSKEW = the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly 
returns for each firm and year by the standard deviation of 
firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power; 





TRA = the percentage of stock ownership in the firm by transient 
institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding; 
 
 
DED = the percentage of stock ownership in the firm by dedicated 
institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding; 




AGE = number of years since the firm first appears in CRSP; 
 
 
CVAF = the coefficient of variation (standard deviation scaled by the 
mean) of the consensus forecast; 
 
 
DTURN = average monthly turnover for the current fiscal year, minus 
the average monthly share turnover for the previous year; 
 
 
HHI = the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration ratio computed 
using total assets for each firm by FF 48 index and state;  
 
 
ICLAIM = implicit claim proxied by labor intensity, calculated as 1 
minus the ratio of gross property plant and equipment to total 










Table 5.1 cont’d. 
   
 









NOA = net operating asset (i.e., shareholders’ equity minus and 
marketable securities, plus total debt) at the end of the 




NUMEST = number of analysts whose forecast are included in the 
consensus forecast; 
   
 




ROA = return on assets defined as income before extraordinary 









SIZE = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the 




SP500 =  equal to 1 if the firm is included in the S&P 500 index, 




STATE = equal to 1 if firms in the state have above median 
competition culture, and is 0 otherwise; and 
   
 




Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables used in the Empirical Analyses 
This table presents the mean, median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, and the number of observations for 
the variables used in the study for the period 1994 to 2014. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
COMP 31,223 0.49 0.06 0.45 0.49 0.54 
MEET  26,331 0.14 0.34 0 0 0 
MB_1 26,331 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
MB_2 26,331 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
DUVOL 31,223 –0.04 0.37 –0.29 –0.05 0.19 
ESIGMA  31,223 2.61 0.76 2.08 2.44 2.97 
NCSKEW  31,223 0.04 0.84 –0.41 –0.01 0.42 
TRA 31,223 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.22 
DED 31,223 0.06 0.09 0 0.01 0.09 
AGE 31,223 23.64 12.98 14 20 32 
CVAF 22,863 0.06 0.92 0 0.04 0.1 
DTURN 31,223 1.19 23.18 –5.97 0.4 7.76 
HHI 31,223 0.43 0.29 0.2 0.35 0.6 
ICLAIM 31,100 0.51 0.38 0.31 0.6 0.8 
LEV 31,223 0.47 0.29 0.28 0.46 0.62 
MTB 31,223 3.38 55.44 1.32 2.13 3.58 
NOA 31,022 2.66 127.98 0.3 0.51 0.81 
NUMEST 26,389 7.52 6.4 3 6 10 
RET 31,223 –0.2 0.21 –0.25 –0.12 –0.06 
ROA 31,223 0.01 0.26 0 0.05 0.08 
SGROWTH 30,910 1.37 21.47 1 1.09 1.23 
SIZE 31,223 6.29 1.78 5.02 6.2 7.43 
SP500 31,223 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 
STATE 30,478 0.51 0.5 0 1 1 
STDEV 31,223 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 
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Table 5.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical analyses.  The bold figures indicate significance at the 10 
percent level and above. 
 COMP MEET  MB_1 MB_2   DUVOL ESIGMA  NCSKEW TRA DED AGE CVAF DTURN 
MEET  0.0048            
MB_1  0.0277 0.6496           
MB_2 0.0365 0.5282 0.8132          
DUVOL 0.0179 0.0015 –0.0017 –0.0040         
ESIGMA  0.0278 –0.0133 –0.0223 –0.0242 0.7837        
NCSKEW 0.0250 0.0000 –0.0045 –0.0080 0.9531 0.8308       
TRA 0.0958 0.0211 0.0645 0.0766 0.1261 0.0832 0.1232      
DED –0.0621 0.0581 0.0701 0.0624 0.0026 –0.0188 0.0007 –0.0114     
AGE –0.1571 0.0319 0.0418 0.0374 –0.0006 –0.0343 –0.0241 –0.1061 0.0644    
CVAF –0.0073 –0.0052 –0.0050 –0.0047 0.0049 0.0043 –0.0002 –0.0049 0.0018 0.0091   
DTURN –0.0259 –0.0092 –0.0099 –0.0131 0.0465 0.0307 0.0469 0.1298 –0.0062 0.0112 0.0072  
HHI –0.0776 –0.0020 –0.0147 –0.0160 –0.0143 –0.0028 –0.0235 –0.0928 –0.0228 0.1830 0.0005 0.0026 
ICLAIM 0.2689 0.0265 0.0466 0.0579 0.0384 0.0709 0.0539 0.1037 –0.0300 –0.1770 –0.0189 –0.0117 
LEV –0.0876 –0.0381 –0.0612 –0.0681 –0.0268 –0.0214 –0.0297 –0.0055 0.0588 0.1012 –0.0040 0.0261 
MTB 0.0019 0.0033 0.0112 0.0099 0.0120 0.0132 0.0129 0.0071 0.0039 0.0032 0.0043 0.0006 
NOA –0.0137 –0.0057 –0.0089 –0.0097 0.0132 0.0143 0.0159 –0.0061 –0.0084 –0.0157 –0.0037 –0.0028 
NUMEST –0.0331 0.0445 0.0767 0.0920 0.0859 0.0332 0.0629 0.1481 –0.0162 0.1382 –0.0019 0.0093 
RET –0.1054 0.0146 0.0154 0.0220 0.0610 0.0288 0.0148 –0.0803 0.0322 0.2821 0.0206 –0.1528 
ROA –0.0239 0.0552 0.0809 0.0890 0.0827 0.0452 0.0539 0.0465 0.0243 0.1305 0.0465 0.0498 
SGROWTH –0.0055 –0.0034 –0.0053 –0.0065 0.0011 –0.0008 0.0032 –0.0028 –0.0046 –0.0109 0.0017 0.0115 
SIZE –0.0512 0.0469 0.0774 0.0925 0.1751 0.0876 0.1370 0.2368 0.0241 0.2867 0.0049 0.0792 
SP500 –0.1022 0.0671 0.0907 0.0967 0.0365 –0.0119 0.0156 0.0626 0.0881 0.4053 0.0037 0.0245 
STATE 0.1467 –0.0017 0.0150 0.0249 0.0103 0.0219 0.0191 0.0141 0.0393 –0.1119 0.0010 –0.0322 
STDEV 0.1141 –0.0139 –0.0171 –0.0246 –0.0593 –0.0240 –0.0090 0.1165 –0.0271 –0.3387 –0.0172 0.1427 





Table 5.3 cont’d. 
 HHI ICLAIM LEV MTB NOA NUMEST RET ROA SGROWTH SIZE SP500 STATE 
ICLAIM –0.0642            
LEV 0.0779 –0.1759           
MTB –0.0040 0.0007 0.0035          
NOA –0.0120 –0.0043 0.0088 –0.0004         
NUMEST –0.0757 –0.0242 0.0424 0.0139 –0.0042        
RET 0.1216 –0.1192 0.0512 –0.0085 –0.0170 0.2011       
ROA 0.0702 –0.0424 –0.3109 –0.0032 –0.0280 0.1278 0.2943      
SGROWTH –0.0075 0.0022 0.0004 0.0000 –0.0004 0.0057 –0.0045 –0.0057     
SIZE 0.0122 –0.0106 0.0994 0.0205 0.0034 0.7334 0.3559 0.2017 0.0068    
SP500 0.0565 –0.0591 0.1399 0.0046 0.0008 0.5407 0.2191 0.1060 0.0078 0.6406   
STATE –0.1998 0.1375 –0.0973 0.0136 0.0047 0.0256 –0.0735 –0.0606 –0.0056 –0.0374 –0.0382  
STDEV –0.1413 0.1332 –0.0691 0.0045 0.0161 –0.2357 –0.9629 –0.2903 0.0055 –0.4243 –0.2758 0.0883 
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Table 5.4: Logistic Regressions of Competition Culture on Meet/Beat Earnings Forecasts 
This table presents logistic regression estimates (with odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals) used to investigate the relationship between 
competition culture and meeting and/or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Columns (1), (3) and (5) present the logistic regression coefficients and t-
statistics in parentheses, while columns (2), (4) and (6) show the odds ratios with the 95% confidence intervals given in parentheses.  All regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. 
  MEETt + 1   MB_1t + 1   MB_2t + 1  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
COMPt   0.060*           2.751   0.059**          2.716   0.070***          3.294   
 (1.73)                           (0.876-8.638)   (2.10)                           (1.069-6.897)   (2.62)                           (1.348-8.046)  
AGEt  0.024          1.002   0.009          1.001   0.005          1.000   
 (0.69)                           (0.997-1.007)   (0.27)                           (0.996-1.006)   (0.17)                           (0.996-1.005)  
CVAFt  –0.026          0.932   –0.028          0.929   –0.011          0.971   
 (0.98)                           (0.809-1.073)   (1.29)                           (0.831-1.039)   (0.58)                           (0.879-1.073)  
ICLAIMt  0.007          1.021   0.046          1.141   0.05          1.154   
 (0.15)                           (0.781-1.335)   (1.14)                           (0.91-1.432)   (1.33)                           (0.935-1.426)  
LEVt  –0.095***          0.655   –0.123***          0.580   –0.135***          0.550   
 (2.65)                           (0.479-0.895)   (4.09)                           (0.446-0.752)   (4.78)                           (0.43-0.703)  
MTBt  0.095***          1.024   0.073***          1.019   0.065***          1.017   
 (2.99)                           (1.008-1.041)   (2.86)                           (1.006-1.032)   (2.67)                           (1.004-1.029)  
NOAt  –0.003          0.996   –0.028          0.963   –0.008          0.990   
 (0.10)                           (0.912-1.087)   (0.92)                           (0.89-1.043)   (0.27)                           (0.921-1.064)  
NUMESTt  0.119***          1.019   0.119***          1.019   0.130***          1.021   
 (2.86)                           (1.006-1.032)   (3.26)                           (1.008-1.031)   (3.63)                           (1.01-1.032)  
ROAt  0.161***          3.301   0.178***          3.747   0.168***          3.455   
 (4.29)                           (1.912-5.696)   (5.81)                           (2.399-5.852)   (5.91)                           (2.29-5.215)  
SGROWTHt  –0.078***          0.782   –0.044*          0.871   –0.063***          0.820   
 (2.60)                           (0.649-0.941)   (1.79)                           (0.749-1.013)   (2.71)                           (0.71-0.947)  
SIZEt  0.007          1.005   0.079*          1.052   0.094**          1.062   
 (0.14)                           (0.944-1.069)   (1.81)                           (0.996-1.111)   (2.21)                           (1.007-1.12)  
R2 / Pseudo R2   0.05                             0.06                               0.07                              
N  13,068   13,141   13,141  




Table 5.5: Instrumental Variables Regressions of Competition Culture on Meet/Beat 
Earnings Forecasts 
This table presents instrumental variable estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition 
culture and meeting/ beating analysts’ forecasts [Panel A], and the results of a Stock and Yogo (2005) weak 
instruments test [Panel B].  The regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors 
are clustered by firm. 
Panel A. OLS first stage (column 1) and Probit regression second stage estimates (columns 2 - 4). 
   1st stage: COMPt  MEETt + 1  MB_1t + 1  MB_2t + 1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
COMPt  
 
 0.036*  0.039**  0.045*** 
  
 
                    (1.94)                     (2.32)                     (2.72) 
HHIt  0.021        
                    (1.12)       
STATEt  0.198***        
                    (6.83)       
SP500t  –0.118**        
                    (2.21)       
AGEt  –0.025  0.011  0.003  0.001  
                    (1.28)                     (0.57)                     (0.15)                     (0.07) 
CVAFt  0.006  –0.013  –0.015  –0.006  
                    (0.81)                     (0.93)                     (1.22)                     (0.51) 
ICLAIMt  0.221***  0.011  0.032  0.039*  
                    (9.94)                     (0.45)                     (1.41)                     (1.76) 
LEVt  –0.018  –0.052***  –0.073***  –0.082***  
                    (1.10)                     (2.74)                     (4.26)                     (4.87) 
MTBt  –0.016  0.049***  0.041***  0.037**  
                    (1.31)                     (2.77)                     (2.69)                     (2.51) 
NOAt  0.084***  –0.002  –0.016  –0.003  
                    (5.50)                     (0.11)                     (0.92)                     (0.20) 
NUMESTt  –0.013  0.064***  0.072***  0.080***  
                    (0.64)                     (2.79)                     (3.29)                     (3.63) 
ROAt  0.013  0.080***  0.098***  0.096***  
                    (0.91)                     (4.07)                     (5.69)                     (5.85) 
SGROWTHt  0.016*  –0.041**  –0.025*  –0.036***  
                    (1.70)                     (2.48)                     (1.73)                     (2.63) 
SIZEt  –0.011  0.003  0.044*  0.055** 
                     (0.39)                     (0.10)                     (1.70)                     (2.12) 
R2  0.25       
N  13,141                  13,068                   13,141                   13,141  
 





F – Statistic 
Critical 
value 
COMPt  HHIt;  STATEt;  SP500t  16.8061 9.08 





Table 5.6: OLS Regressions of Competition Culture on Stock Price Crash Risk 
This table presents OLS estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition culture and 
crash risk.  All regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level.  
DUVOLt + 1  ESIGMAt + 1  NCSKEWt + 1 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
COMPt 0.015*    0.018**   0.019**   
(1.82)                              (2.14)                              (2.26)                             
AGEt –0.036***  –0.031***  –0.040***  
(4.18)                              (3.54)                              (4.64)                             
DTURNt 0.025***  0.022***  0.022***  
(3.26)                              (2.78)                              (2.87)                             
LEVt –0.023***  0.002  –0.015*  
(2.65)                              (0.29)                              (1.78)                             
MTBt 0.003  –0.002  0.002  
(0.35)                              (0.31)                              (0.22)                             
RETt 0.146***  0.092***  0.155***  
(5.33)                              (3.37)                              (5.70)                             
ROAt 0.068***  0.055***  0.052***  
(7.85)                              (5.94)                               (5.77)                            
SIZEt 0.177***  0.095***  0.164***  
(18.11)                            (9.80)                             (16.92)                           
STDEVt 0.156***  0.102***  0.192***  
(5.08)                              (3.34)                              (6.28)                             
R2 0.05  0.03  0.05 
N 18,654  18,654  18,654 
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.7: Instrumental Variable Regressions of Competition Culture on Stock Price Crash 
Risk 
This table presents estimates from instrument variable regressions used to investigate the relationship 
between competition culture and crash risk [Panel A], and the results of a Stock and Yogo (2005) weak 
instruments test [Panel B].  The regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors 
are clustered by firm. 
Panel A. IV regression first and second stage results. 
  1st stage: COMPt  DUVOLt + 1  ESIGMAt + 1  NCSKEWt + 1 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
COMPt   0.167**  0.228***  0.187*** 
                   (2.35)                  (3.11)                  (2.62) 






































AGEt –0.095***  –0.019  –0.008  –0.021*  
                  (5.58)                  (1.61)                  (0.64)                  (1.77) 
DTURNt –0.025***  0.029***  0.027***  0.027***  
                  (4.44)                  (3.66)                  (3.36)                  (3.33) 
LEVt –0.040***  –0.015  0.013  –0.007  
                  (2.79)                  (1.57)                  (1.36)                  (0.71) 
MTBt –0.019**  0.005  0.001  0.005  
                  (1.64)                  (0.68)                  (0.14)                  (0.58) 
RETt –0.010  0.145***  0.091***  0.154***  
                  (0.26)                  (5.16)                  (3.20)                  (5.50) 
ROAt 0.001  0.069***  0.055***  0.052***  
                  (0.11)                  (7.57)                  (5.61)                  (5.57) 
SIZEt 0.051**  0.173***  0.089***  0.160***  
                  (2.38)                (16.74)                  (8.39)                (15.35) 
STDEVt –0.001  0.153***  0.099***  0.189*** 
                   (0.03)                  (4.85)                  (3.09)                  (5.98) 
R2                    0.19        
N 18,654  18,654  18,654  18,654 
 





F – Statistic 
Critical 
value 
COMPt HHIt;  STATEt;  SP500t   25.31 9.08 





Table 5.8: Subsample Analyses of Competition Culture on Stock Price Crash Risk 
This table presents OLS estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition culture and crash risk for subsamples of firms.  All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. 
Panel A. The effect of competition culture on crash risk for subsamples of high transient and low (or high) dedicated ownership firms. 
 HIGH TRA & LOW DED   HIGH TRA & HIGH DED  
  DUVOLt+1  ESIGMAt+1  NCSKEWt+1  DUVOLt+1  ESIGMAt+1  NCSKEWt+1  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
COMPt  0.051***  0.058***  0.056***  0.008  0.002  0.011  
     (2.80)       (3.06)       (3.05)       (0.42)       (0.11)        (0.56) 
AGEt –0.023  –0.002  –0.029  –0.035*  –0.017  –0.038**  
     (1.20)       (0.13)       (1.51)       (1.82)      (0.81)        (2.00) 
DTURNt 0.041***  0.036**  0.041***  0.041**  0.025  0.040**  
     (2.71)        (2.26)       (2.65)       (2.40)       (1.46)       (2.41) 
LEVt –0.043**  –0.025  –0.038**  –0.016  0.021  –0.008  
     (2.31)       (1.25)       (2.00)       (0.79)      (0.98)       (0.41) 
MTBt 0.004  0.001  0.003  0.027*  0.005  0.024  
     (0.19)       (0.06)       (0.13)       (1.81)      (0.31)       (1.51) 
RETt 0.063  –0.013  0.043  0.134*  0.137*  0.130*  
     (0.95)       (0.18)       (0.65)       (1.74)      (1.72)       (1.71) 
ROAt 0.043**  0.047**  0.034  0.048**  0.038  0.029  
     (2.15)       (2.14)      (1.55)        (2.00)      (1.41)       (1.11) 
SIZEt 0.159***  0.098***  0.132***  0.130***  0.063**  0.108***  
     (5.55)       (3.38)      (4.56)       (4.93)      (2.25)       (4.07) 
STDEVt 0.09  0.033  0.102  0.170**  0.182**  0.181**  
      (1.24)       (0.44)       (1.41)       (2.14)      (2.17)       (2.28) 
R2 0.05  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.05 
N 4,011  4,011  4,011  3,575  3,575  3,575 





Table 5.8 cont’d. 
Panel B. The effect of competition–orientation on crash risk for subsamples of low transient and low (or high) dedicated ownership firms. 
 LOW TRA & LOW DED   LOW TRA & HIGH DED  
  DUVOLt + 1  ESIGMAt + 1  NCSKEWt + 1  DUVOLt + 1  ESIGMAt + 1  NCSKEWt + 1  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
COMPt  0.008  0.004  0.01  –0.002  0.005  –0.002  
             (0.50)               (0.27)               (0.65)               (0.11)               (0.27)               (0.09) 
AGEt –0.022  –0.021  –0.022  –0.037*  –0.050***  –0.041**  
             (1.26)               (1.28)              (1.28)               (1.89)               (2.64)               (2.20) 
DTURNt –0.006  –0.012  –0.02  –0.03  –0.027  –0.035  
             (0.36)               (0.75)               (1.25)               (1.22)               (1.07)               (1.44) 
LEVt –0.005  0.019  0.005  –0.011  –0.001  –0.01  
             (0.28)               (1.18)               (0.29)               (0.55)               (0.03)               (0.49) 
MTBt 0.002  0  0.004  –0.001  0  –0.008  
             (0.10)               (0.01)               (0.25)               (0.05)               (0.01)               (0.45) 
RETt 0.07  0.072  0.082*  0.160**  0.039  0.167**  
             (1.39)               (1.49)               (1.68)               (2.15)               (0.53)               (2.33) 
ROAt 0.063***  0.048***  0.050***  0.076***  0.076***  0.057**  
             (4.04)               (2.97)               (3.25)               (3.48)               (3.43)               (2.51) 
SIZEt 0.216***  0.131***  0.205***  0.107***  0.038*  0.107***  
           (10.06)               (6.26)               (9.61)               (4.58)               (1.74)               (4.64) 
STDEVt 0.074  0.069  0.118**  0.129  0.017  0.175**  
             (1.29)               (1.27)               (2.10)               (1.63)               (0.22)               (2.26) 
R2 0.08  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.04 
N 4,505  4,505  4,505  3,088  3,088  3,088 




Table 5.9: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of Institutional Ownership, Competition Culture, and Stock Price Crash Risk  
This table presents seemingly unrelated regression estimates and Sobel test results used to investigate the indirect relationship between transient and 
dedicated institutional ownership and crash risk as mediated by competition culture.  All regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the 
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. 
Panel A. The indirect effect of transient institutional ownership on crash risk. 
  COMPt   DUVOLt + 1   COMPt   ESIGMAt + 1   COMPt   NCSKEWt + 1 




   
0.017* 
   
0.017**    
                 (1.75) 
   
                 (1.95) 
   












                 (3.26) 
 
                  (8.32) 
 
                 (3.26) 
 
                  (5.87) 
 
                 (3.26) 
 












               (10.74) 
 
                  (2.84) 
 
               (10.74) 
 
                  (2.37) 
 
               (10.74) 
 












                 (4.14) 
 
                  (2.24) 
 
                 (4.14) 
 
                  (1.50) 
 
                 (4.14) 
 












                 (6.67) 
 
                 (2.71) 
 
                 (6.67) 
 
                 (0.08) 
 
                 (6.67) 
 












                 (2.23) 
 
                  (1.24) 
 
                 (2.23) 
 
                 (0.34) 
 
                 (2.23) 
 












                 (0.18) 
 
                  (3.56) 
 
                 (0.18) 
 
                  (2.51) 
 
                 (0.18) 
 












                 (0.04) 
 
                 (6.29) 
 
                 (0.04) 
 
                  (5.45) 
 
                 (0.04) 
 












                 (0.80) 
 
                (12.51) 
 
                 (0.80) 
 
                  (5.99) 
 
                 (0.80) 
 












                 (0.31) 
 
                  (3.48) 
 
                 (0.31) 
 
                  (2.63) 
 
                 (0.31) 
 
                  (4.40) 
Breusch–Pagan test chi2 0.00 
   
0.00 
   
0.00 
Breusch–Pagan test p–value 
  
                    1.00  
   
                    1.00  
   
                     1.00  
Sobel test statistic 
  
1.54 
   
1.67 
   
1.70 
Sobel test p–value 
  
                    0.12  
   
                     0.09  
   
                     0.09  
R2           0.18  
 
                    0.05  
 
                    0.18  
 
                     0.03  
 
                    0.18  
 
                     0.04  
N 15,179   15,179   15,179   15,179   15,179   15,179 
(continued on the next page)  
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Table 5.9 cont’d. 
Panel B. The indirect effect of dedicate institutional ownership on crash risk. 
  COMPt   DUVOLt + 1   COMPt   ESIGMAt + 1   COMPt   NCSKEWt + 1 




   
0.019** 
   
0.019**    
              (1.98) 
   
              (2.09) 
   












             (2.60) 
 
              (0.51) 
 
             (2.60) 
 
             (0.58) 
 
             (2.60) 
 












           (11.39) 
 
              (4.14) 
 
           (11.39) 
 
              (3.30) 
 
           (11.39) 
 












             (3.85) 
 
              (3.02) 
 
             (3.85) 
 
              (2.05) 
 
             (3.85) 
 












             (6.51) 
 
             (2.55) 
 
             (6.51) 
 
              (0.22) 
 
             (6.51) 
 












             (2.25) 
 
             (1.29) 
 
             (2.25) 
 
              (0.37) 
 
             (2.25) 
 












             (0.53) 
 
              (5.01) 
 
             (0.53) 
 
              (3.59) 
 
             (0.53) 
 












             (0.06) 
 
             (6.70) 
 
             (0.06) 
 
              (5.72) 
 
             (0.06) 
 












             (2.19) 
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Chapter 6  The Effect of Banks’ Competition Culture on 






6.1 Introduction  
A number of studies on the role of corporate culture and its effects on the economic outcomes 
of banks have surfaced in recent years (see, for example, Thakor, 2015; Barth, 2016; Song and 
Thakor, 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018).  In this chapter, we will explore whether the culture that 
theoretically should drive banks’ management to be more focused on satisfying investors and 
achieving external market expectations; namely banks’ competition culture (please see Cameron 
et al., 2014; Thakor, 2015), has implications for bank lending and loan loss provisioning.  And in 
so doing, we explore the type of bank culture that emphasizes those competitive actions that lead 
to increased profitability albeit at the expense of additional risk taking.  In keeping with prior 
literature, we term this type of organizational philosophy banks’ competition culture and consider 
the role it plays in determining banks’ lending and loan loss provisioning behavior. 
We focus our attention on the US banking industry as it has consistently grown in economic 
importance in recent decades (Antill et al., 2014).  In fact, the entire financial services industry 
represented approximately 7.9% (or $1.7 trillion) of the gross domestic product as at the year ended 
2012 and this is expected to increase to 12% of US GDP by the end of 2018.  What’s more, the 
banking industry’s unique mode of financing, regulatory peculiarities, and heighten public scrutiny 
makes it an interesting area to study the effects of corporate culture.  And, while prior studies have 
explored the effect of culture on organizational outcomes in nonfinancial firms (see., e.g. see, for 
example, Loughran et al., 2009; Edmans, 2011; Popadak, 2013; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso 
et al., 2015b; Erhard et al., 2016; among others), we argue that competition culture plays a 
particularly important role in explaining various corporate phenomenon associated with banks 
decision making, thereby making the banking industry an interesting study in its own right.  
Without a doubt, banks play a central role in the sound functioning of the entire financial system, 
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and of particular concern to bank regulators is whether and how excessive risk-taking by individual 
banks poses a threat to the financial system as a whole (see, e.g. Acharya et al., 2010; Hanson, et 
al., 2011).  In this vein, important undecided issues related to the extent to which banks’ orientation 
toward the competition culture mitigates or exacerbates incentives for marginal bank lending and 
excessive loan loss provisioning.  Furthermore, banks present a special case for understanding the 
relation between competition culture and organizational outcomes such as earnings manipulation 
since banks’ specific accruals (e.g., loan loss provisions) can be more easily isolated and modeled. 
As a result, we are motivated to consider the following research questions; “what is the relationship 
between banks’ competition culture and bank lending and loan loss provisioning?” and “how does 
banks’ pre-crisis competition culture relate to crisis period lending and loan loss provisioning?”. 
To answer these research questions, we first develop a text-based measure of competition 
culture by analyzing banks’ 10-K reports for lexical items relating to attributes that determine 
organizational culture.  We expect that those banks which use a relatively high frequency of words 
that reflect a desire to satisfy investors, achieve external market expectations and to pursue 
enhanced competitiveness in order to realize increased profitability are more likely to be driven by 
a corporate philosophy that is skewed and articulated towards the competition culture.  Hence, we 
compute the relative frequency of these words compared to lexical items that describe alternative 
organizational cultures (please see e.g. Cameron et al., 2014).  We believe that this measurement 
approach provides a practical way to quantify competition culture for a large sample of banks.  In 
addition, relying on the information provided in banks’ 10-K filings creates an opportunity to 
bypass the severe data limitation problems that have been shown to be associated with the 




In keeping with our expectations, we find evidence that banks with greater levels of competition 
culture are likely to engage in more lending and loan loss provisioning activity.  In addition, we 
find that banks’ competition culture promotes more procyclic lending and higher levels of loan 
loss provisioning during the recent economic crisis.   
In conducting our analysis, we carefully design our approach to tackling econometric issues 
that may cloud the interpretation of the results.  For instance, since banks’ competition culture is 
reported to be a rather persistent variable over time (please see Chapter 4), we utilize pooled cross-
sectional models for our primary analyses where we include time fixed effects.  We also conduct 
generalized least squares random effects (GLS-RE) estimates for the main relations, as this 
approach also allows us to capture the effects of slow-moving variables and permits an efficient 
estimation of model parameters.  In addition, to safeguard against simultaneous causality issues, 
we supplement our main baseline regressions by estimating dynamic panel generalized method of 
moments (GMM) models for the relations between banks’ competition culture and bank lending 
and loan loss provisioning. 
This study makes important contributions to the banking literature by offering an examination 
of the arguments regarding whether and how banks’ corporate culture affects banks’ lending and 
loan loss provisioning practices.  Recent studies on the effects of banks’ corporate culture have 
suggested that corporate culture has significant economically meaningful effects on bank 
managers’ propensity to engage in marginal lending activity (see e.g. Song and Thakor, 2016; 
Thakor, 2016).  Further, this stream of literature suggests that when prominent banks adopt 
corporate cultures that are overly aggressive, for instance by having higher levels of competition 
cultures, this can lead to over-lending in the entire banking system as other banks follow suit.  
Nevertheless, to date, there is little convincing evidence concerning the effects of banks’ corporate 
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culture on banks’ lending behavior, loan loss provisioning and overall banking risk.  Hence, this 
study seeks to bridge this gap.  
Furthermore, this study also has important policy implications and its findings would be of 
interest to bank regulators, bank managers, and the research community.  This is because the effect 
of banks’ competition culture on lending and loan loss provisioning has implications for the 
manner in which banks and other financial firms are governed and managed.  The insights provided 
here could be used to help reduce systematic risk, as banks manage the downside risk associated 
with the competition culture, and thereby attract additional capital to such banks, especially during 
times of economic crisis when bank capital and financing is most under threat (Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Beatty and Harris, 1999; Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Beatty and 
Liao, 2011; Beatty et al., 2012). 
The following section presents the main hypotheses.  Section 6.3 highlights the details of the 
data and summary statistics; Sections 6.4 presents the preliminary empirical results; while Section 
6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Hypotheses  
In this chapter, we use our measure of banks’ competition culture to investigate whether and 
how it is related to bank lending activity.  We expect that banks which are more orientated towards 
the competition culture should engage in more lending activity.  This proposition is reasonable 
since such banks are argued to engage in more forceful and aggressive pursuit of performance 
objectives.  In so doing, banks with a higher level of competition culture would likely be more 
willing to engage in marginal lending activity as they reach for yield (e.g., Becker and Ivashina, 
2015) thereby accepting greater levels of risks (particularly credit risk) in exchange for interest 
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revenues generated by extending such loans.  Consequently, we posit the following hypothesis in 
the alternate form: 
H1: Banks’ competition culture is positively associated with the change in banks’ lending 
activity. 
 
Next, we investigate whether banks’ competition culture is related to banks’ discretionary loan 
loss provisioning.  We expect that banks with higher competition culture will engage in more 
discretionary loan loss provisioning.  This relationship is plausible for two main reasons.  First, if 
banks with higher competition culture engage in more marginal lending activity, then it is likely 
that such banks should also engage in abnormal loan loss provisioning when compare to other 
banks on account of the elevated levels of credit risk that such banks will face.  In addition, a 
positive relation between banks’ competition culture and abnormal loan loss provisioning is 
possible since managers at high competition culture banks are more likely to pursue opportunistic 
income increasing accounting practices in an attempt to achieve targeted earnings levels.  As a 
result, we posit the following hypothesis in alternative form; 
H2: Banks’ competition culture is positively associated with banks’ discretionary loan loss 
provisioning. 
 
Further, we argue that high competition culture banks should exhibit procyclical lending 
behavior.  As a result, we expect that the positive relationships between banks’ competition culture 
and bank lending should reverse during crisis periods.  We argue that this is plausible since 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Beatty and Liao (2011) note that during periods of financial 
crisis bank lending is likely to be negatively affected since banks’ financing and capital are more 
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under threat.  This is in part due to banks’ inability to refinance during the crisis period as a result 
of severe financing frictions at these times (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  We argue that this 
phenomenon is likely to be more pronounced for those banks that adopt a higher competition 
culture since such banks should be perceived as especially risky due to their more marginal pre-
crisis period lending.  Thus, we argue that banks with higher levels of pre-crisis competition culture 
will exhibit less crisis period lending.   
Moreover, we expect that banks with higher levels of competition culture will engage in more 
discretionary loan loss provisioning during financial crisis periods.  We believe that this is possible 
since banks are known to face more severe agency problems during times of financial crisis.  In 
this vein, we argue that managers at banks with higher competition culture should be particularly 
reluctant to report “bad” news as to do so would further diminish banks’ reported performance and 
jeopardize their tenure.  Further, since such banks should engage in more marginal pre-crisis period 
lending, it is likely that during financial crises these banks engage in abnormal loan loss 
provisioning when compare to other banks on account of increased loan delinquency rates.  For 
these reasons we expect, a positive relation between banks’ pre-crisis period competition culture 
and discretionary loan loss provisioning during crisis periods.  Thus, we present in the alternative 
form the following hypotheses: 
H3: Banks’ pre-crisis period competition culture is positively associated with the change in 
banks’ lending activity during the crisis period. 
H4: Banks’ pre-crisis period competition culture is positively associated with banks’ 




6.3 Data, Variable and Sample  
6.3.1 Data  
To investigate relations between banks’ competition culture, bank lending and loan loss 
provisioning we compile a unique sample by gathering information assimilated from a number of 
data sources.  First, we obtain US publicly listed bank (SIC 6000 – 6999) accounting and market 
data from the COMPUSTAT/CRSP merge database for the period 1994 – 2014.  In addition, to 
measure competition culture, we obtain from the SEC’s Edgar database banks’ 10–K reports.  Prior 
to the data analyses, we attempt to mitigate the effects of outliers by winsorizing all continuous 
variables at the 1% and 99% levels.  Additionally, we attempt to limit survivorship bias by 
permitting banks that became inactive and/or that were acquired during the study period to remain 
in the study sample.  Also, we delete all observations with missing data on the key variables of 
interest.  Further, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recognizes the most recent 
recessionary period as occurring between 2007 and 2009 and we adopted this period as the crisis 
period for our investigations.  Definitions of the variables used in this chapter are presented in 
Table 6.1. 
 
6.3.2 Measuring Banks’ Competition Culture  
It is well known that corporate culture forms the essence of a company’s identity by defining 
the organization’s beliefs and operating philosophy.  In measuring corporate culture, some 
researchers have relied on the competing values framework (CVF) (see, e.g., Hartnell et al., 2011; 
Schneider et al., 2013; Cameron et al., 2014).  This framework differentiates between corporate 
cultures that underscore an external cultural orientation from those that are internally focused – 
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i.e. the external-internal domain.  Additionally, it differentiates between corporate cultures that 
focus on effectiveness criteria that emphasize flexibility from those that are more concerned with 
stability and internal control – i.e. the flexibility-stability domain. These two dimensions intersect 
to define four distinct types of cultural orientations that comprise the CVF, namely the; 
competition, creation, collaboration and control corporate cultures. 
Using the 10–K reports obtained from the SEC’s Edgar database, we develop a measure of 
banks competition culture by conducting a textual analysis of these documents.  This approach 
permits the quantification of semantic content found in a body of text. In keeping with recent work, 
we assume that firms’ documents (e.g. the 10–K reports) can reveal information concerning firms 
underlying culture (Guiso et al., 2015b).  To compute our measure, we first pre-process each firm-
year 10–K report to ensure that capitalization, URLs, non-words and punctuations, and white 
spaces are ignored.  Following this necessary pre-processing, we then produce our measure of 
competition culture, COMP, by counting the number of times lexical items for selected 
competition culture keywords appear in a bank’s 10-K report.  We then scale this count by the 
total number of times lexical items for the four main types of organizational culture as theorized 
by CVF appear in the report. Simply put, we apply our simple word count algorithm to estimate 
banks competition culture as follows: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 =
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 




In advancing our measure we do not claim that it or the chosen framework represent the single 
best approach to assess culture in banks, as to do so would be unreasonable given the number of 
available alternative approaches (see. e.g.,;Hofstede et al., 1990; Hofstede, 2011; O’Reilly, 2014).  
However, we argue that our technique is based on a valid theory of organizational culture, as the 
CVF is supported by empirical literature and the underlying dimensions have shown to have a 
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solid foundation (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983).  Further, we argue that our approach to 
operationalizing competition culture is reasonable as it allows us to quantify the key dimensions 
of organizational CVF for a large corpus of bank 10–K fillings.  Given all this, we are convinced 
that our approach allows us to construct a relative measure of banks’ competition culture.    
 
6.3.3 Measuring Banks’ Lending  
To capture the change in a bank’s lending activity we make use of the following simple 
measure: ΔLOAN, which is the change from the beginning of the fiscal year in the natural log of 
loans [Compustat item: lntal]. 
 
6.3.4 Measuring Banks’ Loan Loss Provisioning  
We follow prior literature in measuring banks’ discretionary loan loss provisioning (see, e.g., 
Wahlen, 1994; Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Kim and Kross, 
1998; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Beck and 
Narayanamoorthy, 2013; Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman et al., 2016).  In particular, we adopt a 
two-stage approach where we first estimate the normal or nondiscretionary component of banks’ 
loan loss provision using the empirical models listed below.  Then, we determine the discretionary 
component of loan loss provision as the absolute value of the residuals from the following models; 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡  =  𝛼1 +  𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡+1  +  𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡−1 +  𝛼5∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡−2 +  𝛼6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼7∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡 




𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡  =  𝛼1 +  𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡+1  +  𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡  +  𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡−1 +  𝛼5∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑡−2 +  𝛼6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼7∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡 
                       + 𝛼8∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼9𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼10∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑡  +  𝑡, (6.2b) 
where, we denote the absolute value of the residuals from Eq.’s (6.2a) and (6.2b) DLLPa and 
DLLPb, respectively. The variable LLP, represents a bank’s loan loss provision (COMPUSTAT 
“pll”) scaled by lagged total loans(COMPUSTAT “lntal”); ΔNPA, the change in bank’s non-
performing assets (COMPUSTAT “napt”) divided by lagged total loans (COMPUSTAT “lntal”); 
SIZE, denotes the natural log of bank total assets (COMPUSTAT “at”); the variable ΔLoan, is the 
change in total loans (COMPUSTAT “lntal”) divided by lagged total loans; ΔGDP, represents the 
change in GDP over the year; CSRET, the return on the Case-Shiller Real Estate Index over the 
year; ΔUNEMP, the change in unemployment rates over the year; and ALW, the loan loss 
allowance (COMPUSTAT “rcl”) divided by total loans (COMPUSTAT “lntal”).   
 
6.3.5 Control Variables  
Following past work in this area (see e.g. Betty and Liao, 2014), we include the following 
control variables in order to statistically control for bank-specific characteristics.  In particular, we 
include the following: CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] 
at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100. The variable ΔCAP1is the change in CAP1 of 
the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate over the 
fiscal year.  The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided 
by total assets [Compustat item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total 




6.3.6 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis.13  In 
particular, the mean value of our banks’ competition culture variable, COMP, is 0.45, the mean 
for the change in lending variable, ΔLOAN, is 4.51, and the mean values of our discretionary loan 
loss provisioning measures, DLLPa, and, DLLPb, are 0.00009 and -0.00002, respectively.  We 
observe that the summary statistics on the variables are largely comparable to the values reported 
in previous studies using these data (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 1995; Allen et al., 2012; Betty and 
Liao, 2014; Bushman et al., 2016).  
Further, we compute Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in our empirical 
analysis and report these in Table 6.3.  Some of the more interesting correlations include the 
relation between COMP and ΔLOAN, DLLPa and DLLPb, where we find a positive and significant 
correlation between COMP and ΔLOAN (correlation = 0.1601), a positive and significant 
correlation between COMP and DLLPa (correlation = 0.0589), and a positive and significant 
correlation between COMP and DLLPb (correlation = 0.0473).  These results are consistent with 
our expectations that banks’ competition culture increases bank lending and abnormal loan loss 
provisioning activity.   
 
                                                 
13 To mitigate the effects of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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6.4 Empirical Results  
In this section, we report the results of the multivariate analysis pertaining to our examination 
of the relationship between banks’ competition culture, lending and abnormal loan loss 
provisioning.   
 
6.4.1 Banks’ Competition Culture and Bank Lending Behavior 
First, we investigate whether banks’ competition culture is related to bank lending activity.  As 
proposed in H1, we expect that banks which are more orientated towards the competition culture 
should engage in more aggressive lending activity.  To empirically test this we estimate the 
following regression model: 
∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡  =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡  +  𝛼4∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼5∆𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 
                                      + 𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1  +  𝑡, 
 
(6.3) 
where all other variables are as previously defined.  In addition, we include year dummies to 
control for unobserved time-invariant year factors in this and all subsequent models.  
In further tests of H1, we estimate models to examine the relationship between lagged values 
and differences in our measure of competition culture and bank lending activity.  These tests 
examine whether and how bank competition culture impacts changes in bank lending in future 
periods.  Regressions that examine the long-run relationship can help to further mitigate potential 
simultaneity issues and shed light on the direction of the relationship between banks’ competition 
culture and banks’ lending activity.  If banks’ competition culture is positively related to changes 
in bank lending in future periods, it is more likely that banks’ competition culture affects bank 
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lending activity rather than the opposite.  In particular, we estimate the following empirical 
models: 
∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡  =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−1  +  𝛼4𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡  +  𝛼5∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼6∆𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 




∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡  =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 +  𝛼5𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡  +  𝛼6∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼7∆𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 
                            + 𝛼8𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1  +  𝑡. (6.5) 
Table 6.4 presents the results where we find evidence consistent with high competition culture 
banks engaging in more lending activity.  In particular, we report the coefficients term 0.045 on 
the 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 variable in column (1).  This coefficient captures the effect of competition culture on 
the change in bank lending activity and consistent with our expectations and H1, we find evidence 
that this relationship is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (t-value=4.13).  What’s more, 
we find that this relationship is not only statistically significant but is also economically significant 
since a one standard deviation increase firms’ competition culture implies a 0.03% ([0.045 × 0.06]/ 
1.8 =0.0015; 0.0015/ 4.51 = 0.03%) increase in the mean change in banks’ lending activity.  
Further, we find for Eq. (6.4) that the coefficient term 0.039 for 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−1, in column (2) is 
significantly positive at the 1 percent level (t-value = 3.06).  Besides this, estimates of Eq. (6.5), 
presented in column (3) document a coefficient of 0.037 on the 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−2,variable, suggesting a 
positive and significant relationship between competition culture and changes in bank lending 
activity two years into the future at the 5 percent level given a t-value of 2.44.  Furthermore, the 
coefficients of ∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 in column (2) and ∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 and ∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 in column (3) are positive 
and significant with coefficient terms of 0.023, 0.028, and 0.048, and t-values of 2.30, 2.50 and 
3.70, respectively.  The fact that first and second differences in competition culture help to predict 
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future changes in banks’ lending behavior suggests that not only the level but also the change in 
banks’ competition culture effects lending.  Similar long-run estimates of Eq.’s (6.3) to (6.5) are 
produced using the GLS-RE estimator.  These results are provided in columns (4) to (6) and are 
consistent with the pooled OLS estimates of these equations.  Furthermore, we re-estimate Eq.’s 
(6.3) to (6.5) where we include controls for a bank’s state of origin and find similar results.  These 
results are presented in Appendix C. 
Besides this, we estimate a dynamic panel GMM model to further examine the relationship 
between banks’ competition culture and banks’ lending activity.  We adopt this estimation 
approach to control for the possibility that the relationship between COMP and ∆LOAN is 
dynamically endogenous.  To be clear, if the relationship between COMP and ∆LOAN is in fact 
dynamically endogenous then this implies that the causal relationship between COMP and ∆LOAN 
runs in both directions, thereby biasing our previous estimates.  Furthermore, in spite of the fact 
that we carefully select control variables to capture firm-specific effects, our prior results are open 
to the criticism that they are biased due to omitted variables.  Hence, to control for potential 
dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and simultaneity, in the relationship between 
COMP and ∆LOAN we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) by adopting the dynamic panel GMM model 
as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  This approach allows 
us to explicitly control for lagged values of ∆LOAN.  In addition, we are able to use firm 
information within our dataset as instruments.  We estimate the following empirical model: 
∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡    =   𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛾1∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛽2∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛽3∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡  
                                             + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 +  𝑡, (6.6) 
where we first-difference Eq.’s (6.6) to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and potential omitted 
variable bias.  Then, we estimate the first-differenced model by GMM using lagged values (and 
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differences) of ∆LOAN and the controls as instruments.  By using lagged variables as instruments, 
we control for potential simultaneity and reverse causality.  
The system GMM estimates are presented in Table 6.5, where consistent with the previous 
results, we find a positive relationship between banks’ competition culture and change in bank 
lending activity.  When estimating the GMM model we assume that only the year dummies are 
exogenous.  The AR(1) and AR(2) serial correlation tests results suggest that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  Further, we apply Hansen’s (1982) test for 
overidentification, as in Arellano and Bond (1991) to assess the validity of our instruments, and 
based on the results we do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid.  In addition, 
we conduct the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity in a manner like Bond et al. (2001) to 
determine whether the subset of instruments used in the level equation is exogenous.  Again, we 
do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous.  All told, the results of these 
specification tests lead us to conclude that our dynamic GMM regressions are valid and lend 
further support to our argument that banks’ competition culture, in fact, increases bank lending 
activity.  
 
6.4.2 Banks’ Competition Culture and Bank Loan Loss Provisioning  
Next, we investigate whether banks’ competition culture is related to banks’ discretionary loan 
loss provisioning.  As stated in H2, we expect that banks that are more orientated towards the 
competition culture will engage in more aggressive loan loss provisioning.  We believe that this 
relationship is plausible since such banks should face elevated levels of credit risk due to more 
marginal lending, and because managers at banks with a strong competition culture should be more 
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sensitive to capital market expectations and should, therefore, be more motivated/ incentivized to 
manage earnings via banks loan loss provision.  We estimate the following empirical model to test 
this proposition: 
𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡  =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡  +  𝛼4∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼5∆𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 
                                    + 𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1  +  𝑡, (6.7) 
where, DLLP, represents the discretionary component of loan loss provisioning estimate as the 
absolute value of the residuals using Eq. (6.2a) and (6.2b).  
Table 6.6 presents the empirical results where we find evidence that high competition culture 
banks engage in more discretionary loan loss provisioning behavior, where the coefficients terms 
0.045 and 0.035 on the COMP variable in columns (1) and (2) capture the effect of competition 
culture on banks’ discretionary loan loss provisioning.  Consistent with our expectations, we find 
evidence that this relationship is positive and significant at the 5 percent (columns 1) and 1 percent 
(column 2) levels with t-values of 2.79 and 2.28, respectively.  Further, we find that this relation 
is economically significant as in the case of column (1) a standard deviation increase in 
competition culture leads to a 0.27 (=[0.045 × 0.06]/ 0.01) increase in banks’ discretionary loan 
loss provisioning than would otherwise be the case, while in column (2) this it redounds to a 0.21 
(=[0.035 × 0.06]/ 0.01) increase.  In addition, we repeat these estimates using the GLS-RE 
estimator.  These regressions are presented in columns (3) and (4) and we find similar results.  We 
also re-estimate Eq. (6.7) by including state dummies to control for fixed effects due to a bank’s 
state of origin.  These results are presented in Appendix C and we find results consistent with those 
previously provided. 
In a further test of H2 we estimate a dynamic panel GMM model to explore the relationship 
between banks’ competition culture and discretionary loan loss provisioning.  In estimating this 
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model we control for the possibility that the relationship between bank’s competition culture and 
discretionary loan loss provisioning is dynamically endogenous or suffers from unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity.  Further, this approach allows us to explicitly control for lagged 
values of DLLP.  What is more, we are able to use firm information within our dataset as 
instruments.  We estimate the following empirical model: 
𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡     =   𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛾1𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛽2∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡  +  𝛽3∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡  
                              + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 +  𝑡, (6.8) 
where we take the first-difference of Eq.’s (6.8) to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and 
potential bias due to omitted variables.  Following this, we estimate the first-differenced model for 
both equations by GMM using lagged values (and differences) of our measures of DLLP; namely, 
DLLPa and DLLPb, and the control variables as instruments.   
The system GMM estimates are presented in Table 6.7, and consistent with our previously 
reported results, we find a positive relationship between banks’ competition culture and our 
measures of discretionary loan loss provisioning.  In our GMM model estimations, we assume that 
only the year dummies are exogenous.  The AR(1) and AR(2) serial correlation tests results suggest 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  Further, we apply Hansen’s 
(1982) test for overidentification to assess the validity of our instruments, and based on the results 
we do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid.  Furthermore, we conduct the 
difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity to determine whether the subset of instruments used in the 
level equation is exogenous.  We do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are 
exogenous.  Altogether, the results of these specification tests lead us to conclude that our dynamic 
GMM regressions are valid and lend further support to our argument that banks’ competition 




6.4.3 Banks’ Competition Culture and Procyclicality  
To test H3 we utilize the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 to explore whether high COMP banks 
engage in greater procyclical lending.  In particular, we explore the relationship between banks’ 
pre-crisis period competition culture and crisis period lending where we denote, CRISIS, as a 
variable coded one for the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise.  We then use, CRISIS, to 
consider the impact of competition culture in the year preceding the financial crisis, 
PRE_CRISIS_COMP, on crisis period lending.  To do this we estimate the following empirical 
model:  
∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑡  =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡  ×  𝑃𝑅𝐸_𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 +  𝛼4𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛼5∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡  
                               + 𝛼6∆𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 +  𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1  +  𝑡. (6.9) 
The estimates of this models are provided in Table 6.8 below where the sign and significance 
of the coefficients associated with the interaction term CRISIS × PRE_CRISIS_COMP is 
consistent with banks that have greater pre-crisis competition culture engaging in less crisis period 
lending (column 1).  In particular, we find in column (1) the coefficient of our interaction term of 
interest to be -0.073 (t-value = 2.56), while this term in column (2) for our GLS-RE regression is 
-0.075 (t-value = 2.46).  Also, we re-estimate Eq. (6.9) by including state dummies to control for 
a bank’s state of origin.  These results are presented in Appendix C and are similar to those 
provided above. 
Finally, we examine H4 which suggest that high COMP banks also engage in more crisis period 
loan loss provisioning.  To do this, we explore the relationship between banks’ pre-crisis period 
competition culture and crisis period abnormal loan loss provisioning.  As in the preceding model, 
we let the variable, CRISIS, be coded one for the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise.  We then 
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use, CRISIS, to consider the impact of competition culture in the year preceding the financial crisis, 
PRE_CRISIS_COMP, on the crisis period loan loss provisioning.  In particular, we estimate the 
following empirical model:  
𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡  =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡  ×  𝑃𝑅𝐸_𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 +  𝛼4𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡  +  𝛼5∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 
                             + 𝛼6∆𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 +  𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1  +  𝑡. (6.10) 
Table 6.9 presents OLS (columns 1 – 2) and GLS-RE estimates (columns 3 – 4) the estimate of 
Eq. (6.10) where the sign and significance of the coefficients associated with the interaction term 
CRISIS × PRE_CRISIS_COMP are consistent with greater pre-crisis competition culture banks 
engaging in more crisis period discretionary loan loss provisioning.  In particular, we find in 
column (1) the coefficient of our interaction term of interest to be 0.114 (t-value = 2.10), while 
this term in columns (2), (3) and (4) is 0.110 (t-value = 2.11), 0.120 (t-value = 2.18), and 0.122 (t-
value = 2.25), respectively.  Re-estimate of Eq. (6.10) are provided in Appendix C where we 




In summary, we conduct a textual analysis of banks’ 10-K filings to examine the effect of 
competition culture on banks’ lending and loan loss provisioning.  We find evidence that banks 
with greater competition culture are more likely to engage in more lending and loan loss 
provisioning activity.  Further, we find that banks with higher competition culture are more likely 
to engage in less lending during the recent financial crisis but more abnormal loan loss 
provisioning.  In particular, we report that during the recent financial crisis, those banks with higher 
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pre-crisis period levels of competition culture reduce lending more and engage in more pronounced 
in loan loss provisioning compared to other banks.   
All told, this study has important policy implications and its findings would be of interest to 
bank regulators, bank managers, and the research community.  This is because the effect of bank’s 
competition culture on lending and discretionary loan loss provisioning has implications for the 
manner in which banks and other financial institutions are governed and managed.  The insights 
provided here could be used to help banks attract capital investment especially during times of 
economic crisis and be used to help reduce systematic risk.  
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Table 6.1: Definition of Variables 
 Symbol   Definitions 





COMP = the bank’s competition culture  estimated for each fiscal year 
using the text-analysis approach; 
Bank lending   
  
 
ΔLOAN = the change from the beginning of the fiscal year in the 
natural log of loans [Compustat item: lntal]; 
Discretionary loan loss provisioning  
  
 
DLLPa = the absolute value of the residual from the following 
equation: LLPt = α1+ α2ΔNPAt+1 + α3ΔNPAt + α4ΔNPAt-1 + 
α5ΔNPAt-2 + α6SIZEt-1 + α7ΔLOANt + α8ΔGDPt + α9CSRETt 
+α10ΔUNEMPt + ε; where LLP is loan loss provision 
[Compustat item: pll] divided by lagged total loans 
[Compustat item: lntal], ΔNPA is the change in non-
performing assets [Compustat item: npat], SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at], 
ΔLOAN is the change in total loans [Compustat item: lntal], 
ΔGDP is the change in GDP over the fiscal year, CSRET is 
the return on the Case-Shiller Real Estate Index over the 
fiscal year, and ΔUNEMP represents the change in the 
employment rate over the fiscal year; 
 
DLLPb = the absolute value of the residual from the following 
equation: LLPt = α1+ α2ΔNPAt+1 + α3ΔNPAt + α4ΔNPAt-1 + 
α5ΔNPAt-2 + α6SIZEt-1 + α7ΔLOANt + α8ΔGDPt + α9CSRETt 
+α10ΔUNEMPt +α11ALWt + ε; where LLP is loan loss 
provision [Compustat item: pll] divided by lagged total 
loans [Compustat item: lntal], ΔNPA is the change in non-
performing assets [Compustat item: npat], SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at], 
ΔLOAN is the change in total loans [Compustat item: lntal], 
ΔGDP is the change in GDP over the fiscal year, CSRET is 
the return on the Case-Shiller Real Estate Index over the 
fiscal year, and ΔUNEMP represents the change in the 
employment rate over the fiscal year, and ALW is the loan 
loss allowance [Compustat item: rcl] divided by total loans 
[Compustat item: lntal]; 




CAP1 = is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat 




ΔUNEMP = the change in the US employment rate over the fiscal year; 
 
 
ΔCAP1 = annual dividend yield; 
 
 
DEPOSITS = the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided by 
total assets [Compustat item: at]; and 
 
 









Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the mean, median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, minimum value, maximum value, and 
the number of observations for all variables used in the study.  
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
COMP 5,683 0.45 0.06 0 0.42 0.45 0.49 1 
ΔLOAN 5,176 4.51 1.8 -2.78 3.39 4.39 5.52 13.03 
DLLPa 5,683 0.00009 0.01 -0.04 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.11 
DLLPb 5,683 -0.00002 0.01 -0.06 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.11 
CAP1 5,683 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.54 
ΔUNEMP 5,683 -0.08 1.04 -1.2 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 3.5 
ΔCAP1 5,683 0.00003 0.02 -0.27 -0.01 0 0.01 0.31 
DEPOSITS 5,683 0.75 0.1 0.16 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.97 
SIZE 5,683 7.37 1.45 4.05 6.36 7.02 8.02 14.61 





Table 6.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the main variables used in the empirical analyses. 
The bold figures indicate significance at the five percent level and above. 
 COMP ΔLOAN DLLPa DLLPb CAP1 ΔUNEMP ΔCAP1 DEPOSITS 
ΔLOAN 0.1601        
DLLPa 0.0589 0.0167       
DLLPb 0.0473 0.0369 0.9757      
CAP1 0.0040 -0.2212 -0.0406 -0.0655     
ΔUNEMP 0.0841 -0.0891 0.0112 0.0166 -0.0933    
ΔCAP1 0.0007 -0.0062 0.0402 0.0232 0.2778 -0.0342   
DEPOSITS 0.0692 -0.2495 0.0327 0.0073 0.0782 -0.1314 -0.0248  





Table 6.4: OLS and Random Effects Estimates of Banks’ Competition Culture and Lending 
This table presents OLS (columns 1 - 3) and GLS-RE (columns 4 - 6) estimates for the relations between 
banks’ competition culture and bank lending.  The dependent variable ΔLOAN is the change from the 
beginning of the fiscal year in the natural log of loans [Compustat item: lntal].  The value of COMP is the 
competition culture estimated from the bank’s 10-K filings.  The variable ΔCOMP represents the change 
in COMP over the fiscal year.  The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio 
[Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable ΔCAP1 is the 
change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate 
over the fiscal year.  The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided 
by total assets [Compustat item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets 
[Compustat item: at].  The estimates include year dummies to control time-invariant fixed year-specific 
effects.  All models include a constant and the standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The t-statistics 
are given in parentheses. 
 ΔLOANt 
  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COMPt 0.045***   0.027*** 
  
 
(4.13)          (2.66) 
  
ΔCOMPt  0.023** 0.028** 
 
0.012 0.020* 
  (2.30) (2.5) 
 
       (1.27)        (1.87) 




  (3.06)  
 
       (1.79) 
 
ΔCOMPt-1   0.048*** 
  
0.036** 
   (3.34) 
  
       (2.49) 
COMPt-2   0.037** 
  
0.027* 
   (2.44) 
  
       (1.88) 
CAP1t -0.017 -0.053*** -0.060*** 0.02 -0.009 -0.012 
 (1.26) (3.83) (3.7)        (1.38)        (0.56)        (0.61) 
ΔUNEMPt 0.330** 0.444** 0.356*** 0.298* 0.400** 0.337** 
 (2.12) (2.34) (2.66)        (1.91)        (2.07)        (2.55) 
ΔCAP1t -0.008 0.00 0.012 -0.01 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.73) (0.00) (0.88)        (1.02)        (0.23)        (0.33) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.024* 0.026** 0.036** 0.024* 0.021 0.037** 
 (1.82) (1.99) (2.47)        (1.80)        (1.46)        (2.39) 
SIZEt-1 0.770*** 0.776*** 0.779*** 0.743*** 0.755*** 0.768*** 
 (62.95) (58.64) (52.6)      (54.77)      (50.53)      (49.43) 
R2 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.66 
N 5,176 4,096 3,138 5,176 4,096 3,138 




Table 6.5: Dynamic System GMM Regressions of Banks’ Competition Culture and Lending 
This table presents dynamic panel GMM estimates of the relations between banks’ competition culture and 
bank lending.  The dependent variable ΔLOAN is the change from the beginning of the fiscal year in the 
natural log of loans [Compustat item: lntal].  The value of COMP is the competition culture estimated from 
the bank’s 10-K filings.  The variable ΔCOMP represents the change in COMP over the fiscal year.  The 
value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable ΔCAP1 is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal 
year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate over the fiscal year.  The 
variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat 
item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at].  The 
estimates include year dummies to control time-invariant fixed year-specific effects.  AR(1) and AR(2) are 
tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation.  The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. 
The Diff-in-Hansen test exogeneity is under the null that instruments used for the equations in levels are 
exogenous.  The model includes a constant and the standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  The t-
statistics are given in parentheses.  
ΔLOANt 
COMPt  0.121** 
   (2.06) 
CAP1t  -0.019 
  (0.28) 
ΔUNEMPt  -0.014 
  (0.42) 
ΔCAP1t  0.157* 
  (1.84) 
DEPOSITSt-1  0.101* 
  (1.91) 
SIZEt-1  0.746*** 
   (8.22) 
ΔLOANt – 1  -0.001 
   (0.01) 
AR(1) test p-value  0.00 
AR(2) test p-value  0.33 
Hansen test for over-identification p-value  0.70 
Diff–in–Hansen tests of exogeneity p-value  0.30 
N  3,374 




Table 6.6: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Competition Culture and Loan Loss 
Provisioning 
This table presents OLS (columns 1 - 2) and GLS-RE (columns 2 - 4) estimates for the relationship between 
banks’ competition culture and abnormal loan loss provisioning.  The dependent variables DLLPa and 
DLLPb represent the absolute value of bank’s abnormal loan loss provision estimated using Eq.’s (6.2a) 
and (6.2b), respectively. The variable COMP is bank’s competition culture estimated from the 10-K filings.  
The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at 
the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable ΔCAP1 is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal 
year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate over the fiscal year.  The 
variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat 
item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at]. The 
estimates include year dummies to control time-invariant fixed year-specific effects.  All models include a 
constant and the standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  The t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
  
DLLPat DLLPbt DLLPat DLLPbt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
COMPt 0.045*** 0.035** 0.050*** 0.039*** 
 (2.79) (2.28)   (3.40)     (2.70) 
CAP1t -0.082*** -0.098*** -0.078*** -0.095*** 
 (4.64) (5.78)     (3.85)     (4.96) 
ΔUNEMPt -0.156 -0.260** -0.148 -0.235* 
 (1.46) (2.20)     (1.18)     (1.75) 
ΔCAP1t 0.039** 0.031* 0.041*** 0.034** 
 (2.49) (1.85)     (2.76)     (2.16) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.019 0.00 0.016 -0.006 
 (0.71) (0.01)    (0.52)    (0.20) 
SIZEt-1 -0.007 -0.004 0.014 0.01  
(0.31) (0.19)     (0.58)    (0.45) 
R2 0.07 0.05     0.07      0.05  
N 5,683 5,683 5,683 5,683 




Table 6.7: Dynamic System GMM Regressions of Banks’ Competition Culture and Discretionary 
Loan Loss Provisioning 
This table presents dynamic panel GMM estimates of the relations between banks’ competition culture and 
discretionary loan loss provisioning.  The dependent variables DLLPa and DLLPb represent the absolute 
value of bank’s abnormal loan loss provision estimated using Eq.’s (6.2a) and (6.2b), respectively.  The 
value of COMP is the competition culture estimated from the bank’s 10-K filings.  The variable ΔCOMP 
represents the change in COMP over the fiscal year.  The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 
risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The 
variable ΔCAP1 is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change 
in the employment rate over the fiscal year.  The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat 
item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at].  The estimates include year dummies to control time-invariant 
fixed year-specific effects.  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation.  The Hansen test of over-identification 
is under the null that all instruments are valid.  The Diff-in-Hansen test exogeneity is under the null that 
instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous.  All models include a constant and the standard 
errors are clustered at the bank-level.  The t-statistics are given in parentheses.  
DLLPat  DLLPbt 
   (1)   (2) 
COMPt  0.212*   0.250* 
   (1.66)   (1.80) 
CAP1t  0.125   0.125 
  (1.09)   (0.98) 
ΔUNEMPt  0.114**   0.088** 
  (2.44)   (2.05) 
ΔCAP1t  0.008   -0.004 
  (0.08)   (0.05) 
DEPOSITSt-1  0.174   0.175 
  (1.35)   (1.33) 
SIZEt-1  0.068   0.090 
   (0.72)   (0.82) 
DLLPat – 1  0.399**    
   (2.15)    
DLLPat – 2  -0.044    
   0.399**    
DLLPbt – 1     0.362** 
      (2.14) 
DLLPbt – 2     -0.107 
     (0.79) 
AR(1) test p-value  0.01   0.03 
AR(2) test p-value  0.45   0.58 
Hansen test for over-identification p-value  0.17   0.15 
Diff–in–Hansen tests of exogeneity p-value  0.58   0.76 
N  3,082   3,082 





Table 6.8: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Pre-Crisis Competition Culture and 
Crisis-period Lending  
This table presents OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE (columns 2) estimates for the relationship between banks’ 
pre-crisis period competition culture and crisis-period bank lending.  The dependent variable ΔLOAN is the 
change from the beginning of the fiscal year in the natural log of loans [Compustat item: lntal].  The variable 
CRISIS is coded one for the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise.  The variable PRE_CRISIS_COMP 
represents bank’s competition culture estimated from the 10-K filings in the fiscal year 2006.  The value of 
the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning 
of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable ΔCAP1 is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The 
variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate over the fiscal year.  The variable 
DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat item: at].  
The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at].  The estimates include 
year dummies to control time-invariant fixed year-specific effects.  All models include a constant and the 
standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  The t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
  ΔLOANt  
  (1) (2) 
CRISISt -1.854*** -1.643** 
                   (2.64)                      (2.33) 
CRISISt × PRE_CRISIS_COMP -0.073** -0.075** 
                   (2.56)                      (2.46) 
CAP1t -0.017 0.02 
                   (1.24)                      (1.35) 
ΔUNEMPt 0.345** 0.298* 
                   (2.22)                      (1.91) 
ΔCAP1t -0.009 -0.01 
                   (0.79)                      (1.09) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.031** 0.029** 
                   (2.44)                      (2.14) 
SIZEt-1 0.784*** 0.753***  
                (67.88)                    (57.76) 
R2 0.63                        0.63  
N 5,176 5,176 





Table 6.9: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Pre-Crisis Competition Culture and 
Crisis-period Loan Loss Provisioning 
This table presents OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE (columns 2) estimates for the relationship between banks’ 
pre-crisis period competition culture and crisis period abnormal loan loss provisioning.  The dependent 
variables DLLPa and DLLPb represent the absolute value of bank’s abnormal loan loss provision estimated 
using Eq.’s (6.2a) and (6.2b), respectively.  The variable CRISIS is coded one for the years 2007 to 2009 
and zero otherwise.  The variable PRE_CRISIS_COMP represents bank’s competition culture estimated 
from the 10-K filings in the fiscal year 2006.  The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-
adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The 
variable ΔCAP1 is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change 
in the employment rate over the fiscal year.  The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat 
item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at].  The estimates include year dummies to control time-invariant 
fixed year-specific effects.  All models include a constant and the standard errors are clustered at the bank-
level.  The t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 DLLPat DLLPbt DLLPat DLLPbt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CRISISt 0.798** 1.176*** 0.761* 1.067** 
           (2.02)           (2.73)           (1.74)           (2.28) 
CRISISt × PRE_CRISIS_COMP 0.114** 0.110** 0.120** 0.122** 
           (2.10)           (2.11)           (2.18)           (2.25) 
CAP1t -0.076*** -0.093*** -0.072*** -0.089*** 
           (4.31)           (5.47)           (3.53)           (4.65) 
ΔUNEMPt -0.119 -0.231* -0.111 -0.203 
           (1.12)           (1.96)           (0.89)           (1.53) 
ΔCAP1t 0.038** 0.030* 0.040*** 0.033** 
           (2.43)           (1.80)           (2.69)           (2.10) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.023 0.002 0.019 -0.004 
           (0.84)           (0.06)           (0.65)           (0.13) 
SIZEt-1 -0.002 -0.001 0.018 0.012 
           (0.07)           (0.05)           (0.76)           (0.53) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 
N      5,683      5,683      5,683      5,683  









7.1 Overview and Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, we explore the role that a specific type of corporate culture; namely, competition 
culture plays in corporate finance.  To be sure firms’ culture is a broad, intangible and inherently 
complex concept (See e.g. Kreps, 1990; Schein, 1990, 1992; Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2011; 
Guiso et al., 2006; Zingales, 2015; Graham et al., 2017), which is expected to be influenced by 
and reflect the values and practices of top management and those charged with governance.  
Further, this construct is expected to have a significant effect on firms’ economic outcomes as it 
incentivizes particular behaviors and influences the environment within which decisions are taken.  
Thus, following insights provided by the competing values framework (CVF) for corporate 
culture, we introduce firms’ competition culture and an important, economically valid and 
significant empirical construct that is of increasing relevance and interest to researchers in finance 
and economics.   
To measure competition culture, we rely on the textual analysis of firms’ 10-K reports as this 
approach has recently been shown to be a valuable tool in finance for detecting economically 
relevant information from various bodies of texts (see e.g. Antweiler and Murray, 2004; Hoberg 
and Hanley, 2010; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011, 2016; 
Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Kearney and Liu, 2014).  Specifically, we show that this 
approach can be applied to quantify corporate culture and although it remains debatable as to 
whether corporate culture is best measured using this method, we argue that our measure is 
reasonable based on the intuition that the words used by the management of a firm reflect the 
values that these individuals have developed over time.  Further, we validate our empirical 
construct by relating it to alternative measures of competition culture.  
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Hence, using our text-based measure of competition culture we document in the first study (see 
Chapter 4) that firms’ institutional ownership structure influences the level of competition culture.  
This finding provides evidence that firms’ institutional ownership structure is an important 
determinant of firms’ corporate culture.  Specifically, we show that transient institutional 
ownership help to promote the competition culture, while dedicated institutional ownership 
dampens this type of culture in firms. 
In the second study of the thesis (see Chapter 5), we use our measure of firms’ competition 
culture to show that firms with higher competition culture are more likely to meet and/or beat 
analysts’ forecasts.  However, we also reveal a darker side to firms’ competition culture as firms 
with this type of corporate culture are more prone to experience stock price crash risks.  
Interestingly, we document this phenomenon particularly among firms with a high proportion of 
transient and a low proportion of dedicated institutional ownership, and that is consistent with 
competition culture playing a mediating role.  
In the final study (see Chapter 6) we examine the effect of banks’ competition culture on bank 
lending and loan loss provisioning and find that banks with greater competition culture are likely 
to engage in greater lending and loan loss provisioning activity.  However, we report that during 
the recent financial crisis banks with higher pre-crisis competition culture reduce their lending 
more and have a more pronounced increase in loan loss provisioning during the crisis period.  
Taken together, these results suggest that dedicated institutional ownership helps to soothe 
managements’ orientation towards the competition culture, while transient institutional ownership 
reinforces it and hence works as a stimulus for management to engage in opportunistic behavior 
that can negatively affect firms’ economic outcomes.  In particular, since our results suggest that 
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institutional investors have a positive effect on a firm’s orientation towards competition culture, it 
should come as no surprise that firms with high competition culture are more likely to meet/ beats 
analysts’ forecasts possibly in an attempt to meet the performance expectations of transient 
investors.  However, it is also likely that managers at such firms may feel pressured to conceal 
“bad” news in an attempt to reach the expected levels of performance and hence firms with greater 
competition culture are more likely to experience large firm-specific declines in their stock prices 
when this “bad” news is released to the market.  Furthermore, building on this story for financial 
firms, it is reasonable that high competition culture in banks encourages managers to engage in 
greater marginal lending and loan loss provisioning activity.   
All told, the results of this thesis have important implications of interest to academics, bank 
regulators, and the wider business community.  This is because the effect of institutional ownership 
on competition culture has implications for the manner in which firms are governed and managed.  
In particular, our main findings should be of interest to those charged with governance, who have 
a responsibility to eliminate any pressures on managers from outside investors to increase their 
competition culture in order to achieve short-term financial objectives which may increase 
idiosyncratic and systematic risks.  
Future research will explore the role played by other cultural orientations under the CVF in 
explaining firms’ economic outcomes.  Also, we leave it to future studies to directly consider the 
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In what follows, we provide further details on the data, research design and execution to assist 
with the digestibility of our results.  We provide the results of supplemental analyses conducted to 
add support to the empirical work included in Chapter 4.  In particular, we provide evidence 
concerning the validity of our measure, before differentiating it from product market competition.  
The tables are as follows: 
 Table A.1 presents the bag of words with synonyms that we use to construct our 
measure of competition culture.   
 Table A.2 presents univariate and multivariate analyses of the relationship between 
our measure of competition culture and other indicators of corporate culture. In 
Panel’s A and B we present comparisons between COMP and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) 
text-based measures of corporate culture.  In Panel C and D we compare COMP with a 
firm’s profit margin, measured as earnings before interest and taxes scaled by the firm’s 
total sales revenue. Profit margin is a theoretically (Cameron et al. 2014 and empirically 
valid proxy for the intensity of firms’ competition culture (see e.g., Tremblay, 2016). 
 Table A.3 presents univariate analyses of the relationships between institutional 
ownership, corporate competition culture, and product market competition. 
 Table A.4 presents OLS estimates used to investigate the relations between 
institutional ownership, competition culture, and Li et al.’s (2013a) product market 
competition (PCTCOMP).  We present comparisons between COMP and PCTCOMP 
based on the same set of observations. 
 Table A.5 presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relations between 
institutional ownership, competition culture, and Li et al.’s (2013a) product market 
competition.  We present comparisons between COMP and PCTCOMP based on the same 
set of observations. 
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 Table A.6 presents instrumental variable (IV) regressions of the relationships 
between transient and dedicated institutional ownership and Li et al.’s (2013a) 
product market competition.  
 Table A.7 presents fixed effects estimates used to investigate the impact of transient 
[Panel A] and dedicated [Panel B] institutional ownership on competition culture.  We 
include year and firm dummies to capture time-invariant year and firm-specific fixed 
effects. 
 
A.2 Measuring Competition Culture  
To construct our measure of firms’ competition culture, COMP, we first convert each firm-year 
10–K report in our sample into lower case so that capitalization is ignored.  Next, we replace any 
URLs embedded in the document with the text “HTTP”.  This form of URL normalization helps 
to ensure that our measure is not biased due to web addresses contained in the firms’ 10–K.  Next, 
all non–words and punctuations are removed and all white spaces (e.g. tabs and newlines) are 
trimmed to a single space.  Following this necessary pre-processing, we then produce our measure 
of firms’ competition culture, COMP, by counting the number of times the lexical items for 
competition appears in a firm’s annual 10–K report.  We account for inflections (i.e., various forms 
of the same word) by using the stemmed form (e.g. “compete” becomes “compet”).  This helps to 
ensure that when we conduct our word search, we count all variants of that word.  We account for 
negation by excluding those times when “not”, “less”, “few” or “limited” precede “compet” by 
three or fewer words.  We also ignore references to the word “competent”.  Finally, we produce 
our relative measure of firms’ competition culture by controlling for the other cultural types.  In 
particular, we scale the raw word count for lexical items consistent with the competition culture 
by the total count of lexical items for all cultures indicated by the competing values framework 
(CVF).  Table A.1 present the lexical items that describe the four corporate cultures (compete, 




A.3 Is our Measure of Competition Culture Valid?  
According to Kerlinger (1973) evidence of construct validity is present when the pattern of 
associations among variables conforms to what is predicted by theory.  In this regard, we have 
reasons to expect that if our relative measure of competition culture, COMP is a valid measure 
then it should be positively and significantly related to other indicators of firms’ competition 
culture.  Hence, we posit the following proposition;  
P1: There is a strong positive relationship between our measure of competition culture and 
other indicators of competition culture. 
 
To investigate P1 we adopt two approaches where we first explore the relationship between our 
measure of competition culture and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) text-based measures of corporate 
culture.  Following this, we examine the relationship between our measure of competition culture 
and several non-text indicators of firm’s corporate culture that are not only consistent with theory, 
reasonable and intuitive, but that have been used in past empirical studies for this very purpose 
(see e.g. Tremblay, 2016).  In all cases, we document evidence consistent with our measure of 
competition culture capturing firm attributes that reflect the thrust to compete.  In particular, we 
first explore the plausibility of P1 by estimating the following model: 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐵_𝐹𝑅𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐹𝑅𝑡  
                                                 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐹𝑅𝑡 + 𝑡, (A.1) 
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where, the variables COMPETE_FR, COLLAB_FR, CONTROL_FR, and CREARE_FR represent 
are the four corporate cultures; namely, compete, collaborate, control, and create as theorized by 
the CVF and as measured following the exact approach that is taken in Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014). 
In addition, we investigate whether P1 is reasonable by estimating the empirical model 
presented below;  
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡  =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡  +  𝛼3𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌_𝐴𝑇𝑡  +  𝛼4𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑡  
                                                     + 𝛼5𝑅&𝐷_𝐴𝑇𝑡 + 𝑡, (A.2) 
where the variable EBIT_SALES is a firm’s profit margin measured by a firm’s income before 
interest and taxes divided by firm’s total sales.  The variable EMPLOY_AT denotes the number of 
employees of the firm scaled by firm’s total assets.  TURNOVER is the firm’s total sales scaled by 
total assets.  The variable R&D_AT represents the firm’s research and development expenditure 
divided by the firm’s total assets.  As suggested in past studies (see e.g., Tremblay, 2016), the 
variables EBIT_SALES, EMPLOY_AT, TURNOVER, and R&D_AT can be used as indicators of 
firms’ intensity of the CVF’s compete culture, collaborate culture, control culture, and create 
culture. 
Table A.2 Panel A presents the Pearson correlations between COMP, and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s 
(2014) text-based measures of corporate culture (COMPETE_FR, COLLAB_FR, CONTROL_FR, 
and CREARE_FR).  And, consistent with P1, we find that our relative measure of firms’ 
competition culture COMP is positively and significantly related to Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) 
text-based measure of competition culture; namely, COMPETE_FR (correlation = 0.6290).  
Further, Panel B of Table A.2 provides OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE (column 2) estimates of Eq. 
(A.1).  In keeping with P1, we find a positive and significant relationship between COMP and 
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COMPETE_FR as indicated by the coefficient term on COMPETE_FE of 0.972 (t-value = 33.22) 
in column (1) and 0.922 (t-value = 27.13) in column (2). 
Pearson correlations for the relationship between COMP and indicators of the intensity of firm’s 
corporate culture that are based on firm’s financial numbers are presented in Table A.2 Panel C.  
We find that our relative measure of competition culture COMP is positively and significantly 
related to EBIT_SALES (correlation = 0.0137), a proxy of firm’s competition culture (see e.g., 
Tremblay, 2016).  In addition, we present in Panel D of Table A.2 OLS (column 1) and GLS-
random effect (column 2) estimates of Eq. (A.2) and consistent with P1, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between COMP and EBIT_SALES as indicated by the coefficient term on 
EBIT_SALES of 0.009 (t-value = 5.72) in column (1) and 0.004 (t-value = 6.68) in column (2). 
What’s more, in a further check on the sanity of our measure we note that prior works suggest 
that a firm’s corporate culture is slow to change and should, therefore, persist over time (Hartnell 
et al., 2011; Cameron et al., 2014; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Guiso et al., 2015a, 2015b).  This 
expectation is explained in part because a firm’s corporate culture is argued to be composed of 
those organizational attributes that form the core traits of the firm and these core attributes can 
impact economic relations well beyond those who initially formed and instilled them.  Given this, 
it is reasonable to observe rather persistent levels of firms’ competition culture and thus we posit 
the following;  
P2: Competition culture is a persistent characteristic of a firm. 
 
Evidence consistent with P2 is provided in Table 4.4 Panel A (please see Chapter 4) where we 
find that those firms in the lowest decile (1st) of COMP in any one year have a 67% probability of 
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remaining in that decile, while firms in the decile of the highest rank (10th) remain in that decile 
66% of the time.  
 
A.4 Competition Culture and Product Market Competition   
We present further analyses aimed at supplementing the results and findings previously 
presented.  Even though the COMP measure is designed to capture firms’ competition culture 
under the CVF it is plausible that it may have an association with measures indented to capture 
firms’ product market competition through textual analysis.  In this regard, we explore whether 
our measure of firm’s competition culture is indeed distinct from Li et al.’s (2013a) product market 
competition measure, as they measure the intensity of firms’ product market competition in a 
manner that is seemingly close to our approach.  Specifically, they count the number of times the 
words “competition(s)”, “competitor(s)”, “competitive(s)”, “compete(s)”, “competing(s)”, appear 
in the firm’s 10-K filing minus those occasions when these words are proceeded by “not”, “less”, 
“few” or “limited” by three or fewer words.  They then control for the length of the 10-K by scaling 
by the number of words in the report.  
However, unlike Li et al. (2013a) we compute COMP using a more comprehensive bag of words 
that captures corporate values relevant to a firm’s operating philosophy under the CVF, 
particularly the compete, create, collaborate, and control corporate cultures.  We then scale the 
number of competition culture words by the total number of the words characterizing all four 
corporate cultures (as opposed to the total number of words in the 10-K).  This approach allows us 
to construct an intensity measure of a firm’s competition culture, which is consistent to the CVF 
that theorizes a context in which the four different corporate cultures vie with each other.  
 
218 
Nevertheless, if our measure simply reflects variations in product market competition then it is 
possible that the relationship that we discover between TRA (DED) and COMP is driven by the 
intensity of firms’ product market competition as opposed to the intensity of firms’ competition 
culture.  To preclude such possibility, we analyze in Table A.3 the relations between TRA (DED), 
our measure of competition culture, COMP, and product market competition, PCTCOMP, as 
computed in Li et al. (2013a).14  Table A.3 Panel A presents mean scores for TRA (DED) by deciles 
of COMP and PCTCOMP, respectively, inclusive of the results of t-tests conducted to assess the 
significance of the difference in means between the highest (10th) and the lowest (1st) deciles.  
Panel B of Table A.3 highlights Pearson correlations between COMP, TRA, DED, and PCTCOMP.  
Interestingly, we find that while our prior results suggest that transient institutional ownership 
(TRA) is strongly positively related to competition culture as measured by COMP, transient 
institutional ownership is not related to product market competition as measured by PCTCOMP.   
In addition, we estimate the following models to present comparisons between COMP and 
PCTCOMP based on the same set of observations.  
 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1 (𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1)   =  𝛼1  +  𝛼2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  +  𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 
                                                                                 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝛼7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡   
                                                                           + 𝛼10𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡  +  𝑡, (A.3) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1 (𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1)    =  𝛼1  + 𝛼2∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  +  𝛼3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1) +  𝛼4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡  
                                                                             + 𝛼5𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝛼8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 
                                                                       + 𝛼10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼11𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡   +  𝑡, (A.4) 
and 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1 (𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡+1) =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  + 𝛼3∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−1(𝑜𝑟 ∆𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−1)  
                                                                                   + 𝛼4 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡−2(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡−2) +  𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡    
                                                 
14 Li et al. (2013a) product market data are obtained from: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng. 
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                                                                                   + 𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +   𝛼9𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 +  𝛼10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  
                                                                             + 𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡  +  𝛼12𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 +  𝑡. (A.5) 
The OLS estimates for Eq.’s (A.3) to (A.5) are shown in Table A.4.  The results suggest that 
COMP measures something that is distinctly different from PCTCOMP.  In particular, our findings 
indicate that COMP has a significant positive (negative) relationship with transient (dedicated) 
institutional ownership, while PCTCOMP does not have any relationship with institutional 
ownership structure whatsoever.  In addition to the OLS estimates presented in Table A.4, we 
provide RE estimates of for Eq.’s (A.3) to (A.5) for completeness in Table A.5.  These estimates 
also suggest a statistically significant relationship between COMP and our measures of 
institutional ownership, while being unable to detect any significant relations for PCTCOMP.  
What’s more, we further test the relationship between TRA (DED) and PCTCOMP directly by 
estimating the following instrumental variable model: 
𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 =    𝛼1 + 𝛼2?̂?𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 ?̂?𝐸𝐷𝑡) + 𝛼3𝑅2000𝑡 × 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑅𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡   
                                             + 𝛼5𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑡  +  𝑡, (A.6a) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐸𝐷𝑡)  =  𝛾1 + 𝛿1𝑅2000𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅2000𝑡 × 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑅𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡  
                                                         + 𝛽3𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑡  +  𝜇𝑡, (A.6b) 
where R2000 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a member of the Russell 2000 
index and is zero if the firm is assigned to the Russell 1000 index, RANK is the firm’s rank within 
the Russell index based on firm’s market capitalization, MRKCAP is firms’ market capitalization 
on May 31st each year, and FLOAT is the difference between rank implied by the observed market 
capitalization and the rank assigned by Russell in June. 
The estimates of the two-stage model Eq.’s (A.6a) and (A.6b) are presented in Table A.6. The 
coefficient of interest, 𝛼2, of Eq (A.4a) is insignificant.  
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Taken altogether, our findings imply that the relationship between TRA (DED) and our measure 
of competition culture is not driven by managers’ perception of firms’ product market competition.  
Rather, they are consistent with COMP measuring corporate attributes pertaining to the 




Table A.1: Bag of Words 
This table reports the bag of words with synonyms that best describe the four corporate cultures (compete, 
create, collaborate, and control) of the competing value framework (CVF) (Cameron et al., 2014).  Words 
ending with “*” indicate that we utilize all suffixes for those words to count as many words as possible with 
a close meaning.  While conducting our count, we exclude negation of the lexical items by ignoring 




achiev*, acqui*, aggress*, attack*, budget*, challeng*, charg*, client*, compet*, customer*, deliver*, direct*, 
driv*, excellen*, expand*, fast*, goal*, growth*, hard*, invest*, market*, mov*, outsourc*, performanc*, 
position*, pressur*, profit*, rapid*, reputation*, result*, sale*, satisf*, scan*, signal*, speed*, strong*, succes*, 
superior*, target*, win* 
 
Create culture:  
adapt*, begin*, chang*, creat*, discontin*, dream*, elabor*, entrepre*, envis*, experim*, fantas*, freedom*, futur*, 
idea*, init*, innovat*, intellec*, learn*, new*, origin*, pioneer*, predict*, radic*, risk*, start*, thought*, trend*, 
unafra*, ventur*, vision* 
 
Collaborate culture:  
boss*, burocr*, cautio*, cohes*, certain*, chief*, collab*, conservat*, cooperat*, detail*, document*, efficien*, 
error*, fail*, help*, human*, inform*, logic*, method*, outcom*, partner*, people*, predictab*, relation*, qualit*, 
regular*, solv*, share*, standard*, team*, teamwork*, train*, uniform*, work*, group* 
 
Control culture: 
capab*, collectiv*, commit*, competenc*, conflict*, consens*, control*, coordin*, cultur*, decentr*, employ*, 
empower*, engag*, expectat*, facilitator*, hir*, interpers*, involv*, life*, long-term*, loyal*, mentor*, monit*, 






Table A.2: Univariate and Multivariate Analyses of the Relationships between Our Measure of 
Competition Culture and Other Indicators of Firm’s Corporate Culture 
This table presents univariate and multivariate analyses of the relationships between our measure of 
competition culture and other indicators of the four corporate cultures (compete, create, collaborate, and 
control) that are theorized by the competing values framework (CVF) (Cameron et al., 2014).  Panels A 
highlights Pearson’s correlation results between our measure of competition culture and Fiordelisi and 
Ricci’s (2014) text-based measures of corporate culture.  Panel B presents OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE 
(column 2) estimates for the relation between COMP and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) text-based measures 
of corporate culture.  In Panels C we provide Pearson’s correlation results between the measure of 
competition culture and other proxies for the intensity of firms’ corporate culture that are based on firms’ 
financial numbers (see e.g. Tremblay, 2016).  Panel D provides OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE (column 2) 
estimates for the relation between the measure of competition culture and other proxies for the intensity of 
firms’ corporate culture that are based on firms’ financial numbers (see e.g. Tremblay, 2016).  The 
correlation results utilize bold figures to indicate significance at the 10 percent level and above.  The 
regressions all include year and industry dummies to capture year and industry-specific fixed effects; the 
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. 
Panel A. Pearson’s correlations for the relation between COMP and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) text-based measures 
of corporate culture. 
  COMP COMPETE_FR COLLAB_FR CONTROL_FR 
COMPETE_FR 0.6290    
COLLAB_FR -0.1877 0.2946   
CONTROL_FR -0.2818 0.3619 0.1582  
CREATE_FR -0.1439 0.2199 0.0761 0.2549 
 
Panel B. OLS and GLS-RE estimates for the relation between COMP and Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) text-based 
measures of corporate culture. 
      COMPt  
      (1) (2) 
COMPETE_FRt   0.972*** 0.922*** 
   (33.22) (27.13) 
COLLAB_FRt   -0.387*** -0.420*** 
   (31.83) (27.54) 
CONTROL_FRt   -0.491*** -0.421*** 
   (7.65) (6.18) 
CREATE_FRt   -0.192*** -0.174*** 
   (3.96) (3.64) 
R2   0.86                    0.86  
N     24,912 24,912 





Table A.2 cont’d. 
Panel C. Pearson’s correlations for the relation between COMP and proxies for the intensity of firms’ corporate culture 
that are based on firms’ financial numbers. 
  COMP EBIT_SALES EMP_AT TURNOVER 
EBIT_SALES 0.0137    
EMP_AT -0.0469 0.0051   
TURNOVER -0.0143 0.0625 0.0512  
RD_AT 0.0388 -0.0585 -0.1722 -0.7591 
 
Panel D. OLS and GLS-RE estimates for the relation between COMP and proxies for the intensity of firms’ 
corporate culture that are based on firms’ financial numbers. 
      COMPt  
      (1) (2) 
EBIT_SALESt   0.009*** 0.004*** 
   (5.72) (6.68) 
EMP_ATt   -0.243*** -0.155*** 
   (3.88) (3.26) 
TURNOVERt   -0.01 -0.020* 
   (0.65) (1.80) 
RD_ATt   -0.037* -0.042*** 
   (1.75) (3.22) 
R2   0.19 0.19 
N     16,695 16,695 





Table A.3: Univariate Analyses of the Relationships between Institutional Ownership, Competition 
Culture, and Product Market Competition 
This table presents univariate analyses of the relationships between transient (TRA) and dedicated (DED) 
institutional ownership, competition culture (COMP), and Li et al.’s (2013a) product market competition 
(PCTCOMP).  Panel A shows the results by deciles of competition culture, and product market competition.  
The significance of the difference between means in deciles 10 and 1 are indicated in the last row where, 
“*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel B highlights Pearson’s correlation results between the institutional ownership, competition culture, 
and product market competition. The bold figures indicate significance that the 10 percent level and above.  
Panel A. Deciles analysis. 
    COMP   PCTCOMP 
    TRA DED   TRA DED 
Lowest  1 0.1287 0.0501  0.1422 0.0402 
 2 0.1306 0.0392  0.1396 0.048 
 3 0.1333 0.038  0.1458 0.0502 
 4 0.1329 0.0366  0.1453 0.0525 
 5 0.1409 0.0354  0.1405 0.0535 
 6 0.1451 0.0373  0.1447 0.0559 
 7 0.1463 0.0367  0.137 0.0652 
 8 0.1449 0.0357  0.1385 0.0616 
 9 0.149 0.034  0.1368 0.0592 
Highest  10 0.145 0.0406   0.1448 0.0643 
Diff (10) - (1) 0.0164 -0.0095  0.0026 0.0241 
t–stat 6.18*** -5.69***   0.77 11.14*** 
  
Panel B. Pearson’s correlations. 
          PCTCOMP 
COMP      0.1389 
TRA     0.0012 
DED         0.0651 
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Table A.4: OLS Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture and Product Market Competition 
This table presents OLS estimates used to investigate the relations between transient and dedicated institutional ownership, competition culture, and 
Li et al.’s (2013a) product market competition.  All regressions include control variables, year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are 
clustered at the firm-level. 
Panel A. The effect of transient institutional ownership on competition culture and product market competition. 
  COMPt + 1  PCTCOMPt + 1 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
TRAt 0.062***      0.008     
              (4.42)                            (0.73)     
ΔTRAt   0.044*** 0.043***    0.006 0.005 
                             (4.45)                          (4.49)                        (0.67)             (0.60) 
TRAt – 1   0.069***      0.007   
                              (4.05)                          (0.57)   
ΔTRAt – 1     0.059***      0.002 
                               (4.70)                  (0.20) 
TRAt – 2     0.068***      0.009 
                               (3.54)                  (0.63) 
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17  0.32 0.32 0.32 
N 15,242 15,242 15,242  15,242 15,242 15,242 
 
Panel B. The effect of dedicated institutional ownership on competition culture and product market competition. 
  COMPt + 1  PCTCOMPt + 1 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
DEDt  –0.028*      –0.019     
                (1.82)                             (1.57)     
ΔDEDt   –0.023** –0.023**    –0.016 –0.015 
                              (2.04)                          (1.99)                       (1.64)             (1.54) 
DEDt – 1   –0.027      –0.018   
                              (1.46)                         (1.25)   
ΔDEDt – 1     –0.01      –0.009 
                               (0.79)                  (0.79) 
DEDt – 2     –0.035*      –0.019 
                               (1.73)                  (1.20) 
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17  0.33 0.33 0.33 
N 15,242 15,242 15,242  15,242 15,242 15,242 




Table A.5: Random Effects Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture and Product Market Competition 
This table presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relations between institutional ownership, competition culture, and Li et al.’s (2013a) 
product market competition.  All regressions include controls, year and industry fixed effects.  The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Panel A. The effect of transient institutional ownership on competition culture and product market competition. 
  COMPt + 1   PCTCOMPt + 1 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 







0.019*** 0.018***  
 
0.005 0.006   
     (2.70)              (2.58)  
 
                    (0.63)               (0.72) 













                     (0.10) 
 




–0.002    
              (3.14)  
  
              (0.21) 




0.004    
             (3.22)  
  
                   (0.28) 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.28 0.28 0.28 
N 15,242 15,242 15,242   15,242 15,242 15,242 
 
Panel B. The effect of dedicated institutional ownership on competition culture and product market competition.  
COMPt + 1  PCTCOMPt + 1 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
DEDt  –0.021*      –0.012      
   (1.84) 
  




–0.021** –0.022**  
 
–0.012 –0.012   
            (2.44)           (2.55)  
 
             (1.30)               (1.26) 













             (0.63) 
 




–0.004    
          (1.19)  
  
              (0.33) 




–0.011    
         (1.20)  
  
              (0.70) 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.28 0.28 0.28 
N 15,242 15,242 15,242   15,242 15,242 15,242 




Table A.6: Instrumental Variable Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Product Market 
Competition 
This table presents instrumental variable (IV) regressions of the relationships between transient (TRA) 
and dedicated (DED) institutional ownership and Li et al.’s (2013a) product market competition 
(PCTCOMP) [Panel A], and the results of a Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instruments test [Panel B].  
The regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Panel A. IV regression first and second stage results. 
  1st stage: TRAt  PCTCOMPt  1st stage: DEDt  PCTCOMPt  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
TRAt 
 











   
 
 0.005   
   
 
 (0.18) 
R2000t 0.263***    -0.161***    
(6.91)    (3.78)   
R2000t×RANKt -0.350***  0.152***  -0.641**  0.152***  
(10.09)  (4.45)  (2.04)  (4.44) 
MRKCAPt -0.068***  -0.031***  -0.007  -0.031***  
(5.73)  (4.11)  (0.86)  (4.06) 
FLOATt 0.957***  0.005  -0.039  0.005  
(5.38)  (0.29)  (0.23)  (0.29) 
R2 0.18     0.08    
N 2,440  1,808  2,440  1,808 
 





F – Statistic 
Critical 
value 
TRAt R2000t 50.46 16.38 
DEDt R2000t 60.21 16.38 





Table A.7: Fixed Effects Regressions of Institutional Ownership on Competition Culture  
This table presents fixed effects estimates used to investigate the impact of transient (TRA) [Panel A] 
and dedicated (DED) [Panel B] institutional ownership on the level of firms’ competition culture 
(COMP). All regressions include year and firm fixed effects.  The standard errors are all clustered at 
the firm-level.  
Panel A. The effect of transient institutional ownership on competition culture. 
 COMPt + 1   
  (1) (2) (3) 
TRAt 0.014*      








                                (2.42) 
 





                                (2.04) 





                                (0.95)                                 (0.70) 





                                (2.00) 
AGEt 0.11 0.11 0.11 
                                  (1.34)                                 (1.34)                                 (1.34) 
DTURNt 0.001 0 0.001 
                                  (0.19)                                 (0.10)                                 (0.36) 
LEVt 0.023** 0.024** 0.024** 
                                  (2.05)                                 (2.11)                                 (2.11) 
MTBt -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016***  
                                (2.90)                                 (2.82)                                 (2.78) 
RETt -0.048** -0.052** -0.050** 
                                  (2.38)                                 (2.56)                                 (2.50) 
ROAt -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
                                  (3.43)                                 (3.46)                                 (3.42) 
SIZEt 0.110*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
                                  (5.39)                                 (5.14)                                 (5.14) 
STDEVt -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.068***  
                                (2.78)                                 (2.94)                                 (2.90) 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 
N 31,223 31,223 31,223 





Table A.7 cont’d. 
Panel B. The effect of dedicated institutional ownership on competition culture. 
 COMPt + 1   
  (1) (2) (3) 
DEDt -0.019**      








                                (2.05) 
 





                                (2.20) 





                                (2.33)                                 (2.34) 





                                (1.68) 
AGEt 0.108 0.108 0.109 
                                  (1.31)                                 (1.31)                                 (1.32) 
DTURNt 0.002 0.002 0.002 
                                  (0.51)                                 (0.53)                                 (0.56) 
LEVt 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 
                                  (2.08)                                 (2.08)                                 (2.09) 
MTBt -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***  
                                (2.82)                                 (2.82)                                 (2.85) 
RETt -0.041** -0.041** -0.041** 
                                  (2.04)                                 (2.04)                                 (2.05) 
ROAt -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
                                  (3.30)                                 (3.31)                                 (3.29) 
SIZEt 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
                                  (5.86)                                 (5.86)                                 (5.87) 
STDEVt -0.058** -0.059** -0.059**  
                                (2.49)                                 (2.51)                                 (2.51) 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 
N 31,223 31,223 31,223 





Appendix B  
The Effect of Firms’ Competition Culture on Meeting/ Beating 
Earnings Forecast and Crash Risk  
 
B.1 Overview  
This appendix provides further details on the research design and execution to assist with 
the digestibility of our main results.  As such, we present the results of supplemental analyses 
conducted to add support to the main empirical work included in Chapter 5.  These tables are 
as follows: 
 Table B.1 presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship between 
competition culture and meeting and/or beating earnings expectations. 
 Table B.2 presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship between 
competition culture and stock price crash risk.  
 Table B.3 presents OLS estimates used to investigate the relationship between 
competition culture and stock price crash risk.  These estimates include additional 
controls for managerial short-termism. 
 Table B.4 presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship between 




Table B.1: Random Effects Regressions of Competition Culture on and Meeting and/or Beating 
Earnings Expectations. 
This table presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition culture 
and meeting and/or beating earnings expectations.  All regressions include year fixed effects and the 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 












0.086***   
               (1.96) 
 
                      (2.61) 
 







–0.009   
               (0.33) 
 
                     (0.28) 
 







–0.01   
               (0.89) 
 
                      (1.16) 
 







0.145***   
               (1.86) 
 
                     (3.67) 
 







–0.139***   
               (3.31) 
 
                     (4.78) 
 







0.061**   
               (3.06) 
 
                      (2.60) 
 







–0.085***   
               (1.32) 
 
                     (2.90) 
 







0.156***   
             (2.84) 
 
                       (3.82) 
 







0.154***   
               (4.01) 
 
                     (5.11) 
 







–0.077***   
               (2.88) 
 
                      (1.96) 
 







0.05   
               (0.16) 
 
                      (0.93) 
 








N   13,141   13,141   13,141 






Table B.2: Random Effect Regressions of Competition Culture on Stock Price Crash Risk 
This table presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition culture 
and crash risk.  All regressions include year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. 











                  (2.34) 
 
                  (3.62) 
 






                  (4.85) 
 
                  (4.29) 
 






                  (3.12) 
 
                  (2.37) 
 






                  (3.54) 
 
                  (1.70) 
 






                  (1.06) 
 
                  (1.07) 
 






                  (4.75) 
 
                  (2.89) 
 






                  (7.90) 
 
                  (4.57) 
 






                (20.03) 
 
                (10.22) 
 






                  (4.62) 
 
                  (2.93) 
 















Table B.3: OLS Regressions of Competition Culture on Stock Price Crash Risk 
This table presents OLS estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition culture and 
crash risk with additional controls for managerial short-termism.  These additional controls are as 
follows: RDC equal to 1 if the firm experiences a cut in R&D expenditure over the past year; RDI, 
firm’s R&D intensity measured as total R&D expenditure for the fiscal year scaled by sales; RDII, 
industry R&D intensity measured as total R&D expenditure for all firms in the industry for the fiscal 
year scaled by total industry sales; ΔGDP, the natural logarithm of the change in US GDP.  All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. 
  DUVOLt + 1   ESIGMAt + 1   NCSKEWt + 1 
                        (1)                         (2)                         (3) 





              (2.34) 
 
              (2.67) 
 






              (2.80) 
 
              (2.89) 
 






              (2.26) 
 
              (1.56) 
 






              (1.43) 
 
              (1.62) 
 






              (0.60) 
 
              (0.27) 
 






              (4.77) 
 
              (2.59) 
 






              (7.27) 
 
              (7.06) 
 






            (14.46) 
 
              (7.66) 
 






              (5.02) 
 
              (3.07) 
 






              (0.62) 
 
              (1.42) 
 






              (0.58) 
 
              (1.56) 
 






              (0.96) 
 
              (0.09) 
 






              (1.70) 
 
              (4.21) 
 






N 11,343   11,343   11,343 




Table B.4: Subsample Analyses of Competition Culture on Stock Price Crash Risk 
This table presents GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship between competition culture and crash risk for subsamples of firms.  All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Panel A. The effect of competition culture on crash risk for subsamples of high transient and low (or high) dedicated ownership firms. 
  HIGH TRA & LOW DED    HIGH TRA & HIGH DED  
 DUVOLt + 1 
 
ESIGMAt + 1 
 
NCSKEWt + 1 
 
DUVOLt + 1 
 
ESIGMAt + 1 
 
NCSKEWt + 1 
                           (1)                             (2)                             (3)                             (4)                             (5)                              (6) 











                 (2.83) 
 
                 (3.48) 
 
                 (3.15) 
 
                (0.34) 
 
                 (0.69) 
 












                (1.54) 
 
                 (0.67) 
 
                 (1.95) 
 
                 (2.57) 
 
                 (1.81) 
 












                (2.77) 
 
                (2.16) 
 
                  (2.66) 
 
                (2.38) 
 
                 (1.24) 
 












                (2.17) 
 
                (2.11) 
 
                  (2.16) 
 
                (1.71) 
 
                 (0.05) 
 












                (0.46) 
 
                (0.81) 
 
                 (0.56) 
 
                 (2.49) 
 
                (1.58) 
 












                 (0.87) 
 
                 (0.49) 
 
                  (0.52) 
 
                 (1.67) 
 
                 (1.33) 
 












                 (2.06) 
 
                (1.50) 
 
                  (1.28) 
 
                 (1.86) 
 
                 (0.58) 
 












                 (5.90) 
 
                 (3.23) 
 
                 (4.82) 
 
                 (5.72) 
 
                 (2.47) 
 












                 (1.16) 
 
                 (0.08) 
 
                  (1.27) 
 
                 (2.06) 
 
                 (1.71) 
 












N 4,011  4,011  4,011  3,575  3,575  3,575 





Table B.4 cont’d. 
Panel B. The effect of competition culture on crash risk for subsamples of low transient and low (or high) dedicated ownership firms. 
  LOW TRA & LOW DED  
 
LOW TRA & HIGH DED   
DUVOLt + 1 
 
ESIGMAt + 1 
 
NCSKEWt + 1 
 
DUVOLt + 1 
 
ESIGMAt + 1 
 
NCSKEWt + 1 
                             (1)                              (2)                              (3)                              (4)                              (5)                              (6) 
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                  (0.81) 
 
                 (1.07) 
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                 (1.12) 
 
                  (1.10) 
 
                 (2.24) 
 
                 (2.49) 
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                 (0.71) 
 
                  (1.21) 
 
                  (1.54) 
 
                 (1.43) 
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                 (0.63) 
 
                  (0.09) 
 
                  (1.04) 
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                  (0.11) 
 
                 (0.10) 
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                 (0.86) 
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                 (1.15) 
 
                 (1.20) 
 
                 (1.82) 
 
                 (0.26) 
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                 (2.64) 
 
                 (3.36) 
 
                 (3.54) 
 
                 (2.26) 
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                 (6.35) 
 
                 (9.85) 
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                  (0.94) 
 
               (0.86) 
 
                 (1.65) 
 
                  (1.33) 
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Appendix C  
The Effect of Banks’ Competition Culture on Bank Lending and 
Loan Loss provisioning  
 
C.1 Overview 
In this appendix, we provide the results of further analyses designed to assist with the 
interpretation of the main results of Chapter 6.  These tables the present these supplemental 
analyses are as follows: 
 Table C.1 presents OLS and GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship 
between banks’ competition culture and bank lending.  These results include year 
and state dummies to time and state fixed effects. 
 Table C.2 presents OLS and GLS-RE estimates used to investigate the relationship 
between banks’ competition culture and discretionary loan loss provisioning.  
These results include year and state dummies to capture time and state fixed effects. 
 Table C.3 presents OLS and GLS-RE regressions of banks’ pre-crisis competition 
culture and crisis-period bank lending.  These results include year and state dummies 
to capture time and state fixed effects. 
 Table C.4 presents OLS and GLS-RE regressions of banks’ pre-crisis competition 
culture and crisis-period discretionary loan loss provisioning.  These results include 




Table C.1: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Competition Culture and Lending 
This table presents OLS (columns 1 - 3) and GLS-RE (columns 4 - 6) estimates for the relations between 
banks’ competition culture and bank lending.  The dependent variable ΔLOAN is the change from the 
beginning of the fiscal year in the natural log of loans [Compustat item: lntal]. The value of COMP is 
the competition culture estimated from the bank’s 10-K filings. The variable ΔCOMP represents the 
change in COMP over the fiscal year.  The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted 
capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable 
ΔCAP is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the 
employment rate over the fiscal year.  The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat 
item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat item: at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at].  The estimates include year and state dummies to control time-
invariant fixed year and state-specific effects.  All models include a constant and the standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-level. The t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 ΔLOANt 
  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COMPt 0.037***    0.023**     
(3.47)   (2.20)   
ΔCOMPt  0.019* 0.025**             0.01   0.018*  
  (1.85) (2.30)  (0.86) (1.65) 
COMPt-1  0.028**              0.01   
  (2.25)   (1.06)  
ΔCOMPt-1   0.040***    0.030**  
   (2.81)   (2.07) 
COMPt-2   0.025*              0.02  
   (1.73)   (1.13) 
CAP1t -0.016 -0.050*** -0.054***            0.02            0.01           0.01 
 (1.18) (3.56) (3.19) (1.28) (0.56) (0.55) 
ΔUNEMPt -0.026 0.005 0.009            0.20             0.32   0.493*  
 (1.11) (0.18) (0.33)           (0.87)           (1.21)           (1.84) 
ΔCAP1t -0.008 -0.002 0.012           0.01           0.00            0.01  
 (0.76) (0.11) (0.84) (0.97) (0.25) (0.34) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.012 0.016 0.025*            0.01             0.01   0.027*  
 (0.9) (1.19) (1.69) (1.02) (0.70) (1.71) 
SIZEt-1 0.766*** 0.770*** 0.768***  0.739***   0.749***   0.757***  
 (60.6) (55.07) (49.17) (51.01) (46.45) (45.79) 
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.67 
N 5,176 4,096 3,138 5,176 4,096 3,138 




Table C.2: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Competition Culture and Loan 
Loss Provisioning 
This table presents OLS (columns 1 - 2) and GLS-RE (columns 2 - 4) estimates for the relationship 
between banks’ competition culture and abnormal loan loss provisioning.  The dependent variables 
DLLPa and DLLPb represent the absolute value of bank’s abnormal loan loss provision estimated using 
Eq.’s (6.2a) and (6.2b), respectively.  The variable COMP is bank’s competition culture estimated from 
the 10-K filings. The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio 
[Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100. The variable ΔCAP1 is the 
change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment 
rate over the fiscal year. The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] 
divided by total assets [Compustat item: at]. The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total 
assets [Compustat item: at].  The estimates include year and state dummies to control time-invariant 
fixed year and state-specific effects.  All models include a constant and the standard errors are clustered 
at the bank-level.  The t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
  
DLLPat DLLPbt DLLPat DLLPbt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
COMPt 0.042*** 0.030** 0.047*** 0.035** 
 (2.58) (1.98)   (3.18)  (2.41) 
CAP1t -0.083*** -0.099*** -0.078*** -0.095*** 
 (4.59) (5.72)   (3.67)   (4.75) 
ΔUNEMPt 0.076*** 0.059** 0.757*** 0.650** 
 (2.85) (2.06)   (2.73)    (2.12) 
ΔCAP1t 0.040** 0.031* 0.041*** 0.034** 
 (2.54) (1.86)   (2.78)    (2.18) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.015 -0.008 0.014 -0.01 
 (0.48) (0.26)   (0.45)    (0.30) 
SIZEt-1 -0.01 -0.007 0.018 0.013  
(0.40) (0.30) (0.70) (0.54) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
State dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
N 5,683 5,683 5,683 5,683 




Table C.3: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Pre-Crisis Competition Culture and 
Crisis-period Lending 
This table presents OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE (columns 2) estimates for the relationship between 
banks’ pre-crisis period competition culture and crisis period bank lending.  The dependent variable 
ΔLOAN is the change from the beginning of the fiscal year in the natural log of loans [Compustat item: 
lntal].  The variable CRISIS is coded one for the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise.  The variable 
PRE_CRISIS_COMP represents bank’s competition culture estimated from the 10-K filings in the fiscal 
year 2006.  The value of the variable CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat 
item: capr1] at the beginning of the fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable ΔCAP1 is the change in 
CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate over 
the fiscal year.  The variable DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided by 
total assets [Compustat item: at]. The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets 
[Compustat item: at].  The estimates include year and state dummies to control time-invariant fixed year 
and state-specific effects.  All models include a constant and the standard errors are clustered at the 
bank-level.  The t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
  ΔLOANt  
  (1) (2) 
CRISISt 0.382*** -1.146 
               (3.36)               (1.07) 
CRISISt × PRE_CRISIS_COMP -0.069** -0.075** 
               (2.39)               (2.40) 
CAP1t -0.015 0.018 
               (1.15)               (1.27) 
ΔUNEMPt -0.097*** 0.198 
               (5.99)               (0.87) 
ΔCAP1t -0.009 -0.01 
               (0.85)               (1.04) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.018 0.018 
               (1.37)               (1.29) 
SIZEt-1 0.779*** 0.749*** 
             (63.69)             (53.08) 
Year dummies YES YES 
State dummies YES YES 
R2 0.65 0.64 
N 5,176 5,176 





Table C.4: OLS and Random Effects Regressions of Banks’ Pre-Crisis Competition Culture and 
Crisis-period Loan Loss Provisioning 
This table presents OLS (column 1) and GLS-RE (columns 2) estimates for the relationship between 
banks’ pre-crisis period competition culture and crisis period abnormal loan loss provisioning.  The 
dependent variables DLLPa and DLLPb represent the absolute value of bank’s abnormal loan loss 
provision estimated using Eq.’s (6.2a) and (6.2b), respectively.  The variable CRISIS is coded one for 
the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise.  The variable PRE_CRISIS_COMP represents bank’s 
competition culture estimated from the 10-K filings in the fiscal year 2006.  The value of the variable 
CAP1 is the bank’s tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio [Compustat item: capr1] at the beginning of the 
fiscal year, divided by 100.  The variable ΔCAP1 is the change in CAP1 over the fiscal year.  The 
variable ΔUNEMP represents the change in the employment rate over the fiscal year.  The variable 
DEPOSITS is the lagged total deposits [Compustat item: dptc] divided by total assets [Compustat item: 
at].  The variable SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets [Compustat item: at].  The estimates 
include year and state dummies to control time-invariant fixed year and state-specific effects.  All 
models include a constant and the standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  The t-statistics are 
given in parentheses. 
 DLLPat DLLPbt DLLPat DLLPbt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CRISISt -0.556*** -0.540*** -2.837*** -2.450** 
           (5.51)           (4.95)           (2.66)           (2.06) 
CRISISt × PRE_CRISIS_COMP 0.118** 0.113** 0.126** 0.127** 
           (2.17)           (2.17)           (2.29)           (2.33) 
CAP1t -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.071*** -0.089*** 
           (4.29)           (5.44)           (3.36)           (4.45) 
ΔUNEMPt 0.217*** 0.195*** 0.771*** 0.661** 
           (7.40)           (6.62)           (2.79)           (2.16) 
ΔCAP1t  0.038**   0.030*   0.040***   0.033**  
           (2.48)           (1.82)           (2.70)           (2.12) 
DEPOSITSt-1 0.017 -0.007 0.017 -0.008 
           (0.57)           (0.22)           (0.55)           (0.25) 
SIZEt-1 -0.005 -0.005 0.022 0.014 
           (0.21)           (0.22)           (0.87)           (0.60) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
State dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2            0.08             0.06             0.07             0.06  
N 5,683 5,683 5,683 5,683 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
